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1Introduction: Three Keywords in Composition
Let us imagine, as a way of beginning this project, that it is March 9, 
1954, right at the peak of Senator McCarthy’s political power—if not the peak of 
America’s second Red Scare.  A composition teacher, who has just recently 
acquired a television set, is in the middle of grading a stack of themes when he 
remembers that See It Now is just starting its broadcast, another exposé on 
McCarthyism.  He puts his themes aside so that he can watch.  It is a “good 
evening”—this is not an entirely unlikely scenario—and it also happens to be the 
first time that our composition teacher has seen McCarthy on a television screen. 1
Until recently, our teacher has kept himself politically informed by 
reading his daily newspaper and by listening to the radio.  The USSR’s 
development of a workable atomic bomb, the “fall” of China to communism, and 
our recent detonation of a hydrogen bomb are of greater concern to our teacher 
than the new “enemy within,” but he has read about the Hollywood Ten, Alger 
Hiss, the Rosenbergs, and Senator Joe McCarthy.  He has listened, with some 
skepticism, to a few of the trials on the radio.  
Since we are imagining, let us say too that our teacher—though he 
identifies himself as a liberal and does not completely sympathize with the plight 
of former Communists—believes what Truman had once said about 
McCarthyism:
1
 Rosteck explains that “where in 1947 only roughly 1 in 100 homes had 
television receivers, by 1955 nearly 80 in 100 owned at least one receiver” 
(Rosteck 23). 
2It is the use of the Big Lie and the unfounded accusation against any 
citizen, in the name of Americanism and security.  It is the rise to power of 
a demagogue who lives on untruth; it is the spread of fear and the 
destruction of faith at every level of our society.  (qtd. in Rosteck 14)
While he certainly believes that the Soviet Union cannot be ignored as a military 
threat in the new political climate, he also believes that McCarthy and others like 
him have been exploiting America’s fears for their own political gain.  As a 
writing teacher, he is not only amazed at how unreasonable and nonfactual 
McCarthy’s arguments are, he finds it incredible—and he still uses that word in 
the old fashioned sense—how effective his polemics tend to be.  
Recently, though, he has witnessed a change, for even his conservative 
friends—when he has the energy to push the point with them—have started to 
agree with him about McCarthy.  Our teacher has no way of knowing this, but the 
very television show that he is watching will contribute to this change in public 
opinion.  Over forty years later, Robert Ivie explains this phenomenon in his essay 
“Diffusing Cold War Demagoguery: Murrow versus McCarthy on ‘See It Now.’”  
Ivie argues: 
McCarthy’s political power had peaked by mid-1953.  Thereafter, a 
crescendo of criticism had begun to arise in the press and Senate, and at 
the turn of the year a previously reticent Republican administration was 
beginning to make noises of disapproval.  Eisenhower himself had become 
publicly exasperated by McCarthy’s attacks on the army.  Even those who 
supported McCarthy were tiring of his tactics.  (83)  
3Ivie continues his argument by contending that this was the right moment for 
Edward Murrow to “mobilize the growing sentiment against a man who in many 
people’s view had gone too far and had gotten too rough” (83).  Looking back, we 
can see that Murrow’s timing could not have been better.  McCarthy “was too 
distracted by the impending Army-McCarthy hearings to do much more than take 
a few mean swipes at his opponent on television” (83).   These swipes, which had 
been so effective for McCarthy in the past, would contribute to his own undoing.
It is difficult to surmise what watching See It Now is like for our teacher.  
He has certainly seen pictures of McCarthy, he has even listened to some of the 
McCarthy hearings on the radio, but nothing could have prepared him for having 
this demagogue captured on his television set in his own living room.  Could this 
really be the man who, interrogating Reed Harris on the radio just months before, 
had seemed so menacing?  On the screen, McCarthy looks smaller, more remote.  
Our teacher discovers the incidental fact that the Senator belches and picks his 
nose in public, but, more importantly, he witnesses McCarthy’s arguments being 
framed in such a way that it seems inevitable to him that he will soon fall.  
Edward Murrow has achieved, from our teacher’s perspective, what he had 
previously believed only the most sophisticated writers could accomplish: the 
undercutting of a fallacious argument with irony.
In previous exposés, Murrow had shown McCarthy’s bullying and 
browbeating techniques in action.  Ivie argues that the impression that McCarthy 
left on the American viewer watching See It Now was primarily one of 
darkness—the very same imagery that McCarthy had used to portray 
4Communists.  Murrow opposed this darkness “to the values of an open society, 
values which Eisenhower had reiterated on national television as recently as 
November 23, 1953—just three and a half months before Murrow’s [first] report 
on McCarthy” (90).  Though our teacher could not have known this at the time, 
by April 6, when McCarthy would respond to Murrow, it would only lead more 
fully to his undoing, because McCarthy would answer Murrow’s charges with 
even more metaphors of darkness.  As Ivie puts it:     
These metaphorical clusters implicitly identified McCarthy with the 
darkness into which he himself had cast Communism, thereby opposing 
the tyranny of his demagoguery to the enlightenment of freedom for which 
Murrow and the republic stood.  Together, these clusters conformed to and 
reinforced the negative symbolic context of McCarthyism that had 
emerged prior to the broadcast.  The metaphorical substructure of 
Murrow’s accusation set up an interpretive formula which McCarthy’s 
response served to validate: Communism = darkness = tyranny = 
McCarthy.  The turn against McCarthy was constructed to take advantage 
of his own momentum.  (88)
This formula, and the fact that it appears that reason and enlightenment won out 
over McCarthyism in this particular case, has intriguing implications for this 
study.  But what is most important for us to consider, as we begin to contemplate 
the effects of the Cold War on the field of writing instruction, is what goes on in 
our teacher’s mind before he goes back to grading his themes.
5He wonders if his students, though he has never mentioned McCarthy in 
his classes, would recognize the fallaciousness of his arguments: ad hominem 
attacks, circular reasoning, either-or propositions, red herrings... just to name a 
few.  He wonders, because he has never really brought it up, what his students 
think about this new war-that-is-not-a-war, the Soviet Union, and communism in 
general.  These are important issues, he thinks, but recent events have made him 
cautious about bringing any type of controversial subjects into the classroom.  He 
is only, after all, a part-time instructor. 
For a moment, though, he reflects on the possibility of looking more 
particularly at the abuses of rhetoric that McCarthy engages in.  He could include 
abuses of rhetoric from both liberal and conservative politicians, to present a more 
balanced view to his students.  His chair might allow him to deviate from the 
standard units on expository and descriptive writing if he made his case 
objectively.  But this thought passes as he goes back to grading the themes in 
front of him:  descriptions of the rooms that his students lived in before they 
arrived at the university.  “They are remarkably similar rooms,” he thinks, which 
triggers a thought about the Brown versus Board of Education case, which he has 
just recently read about, which is quietly making its way to the Supreme Court at 
this time.  He wonders too for just a moment what his students might think about 
that, but this thought passes just as quickly as he simultaneously lies and does not 
lie to himself about the quality of the theme in front of him.  
It creates a “dominant impression,” as Brooks and Warren put it, but he 
finds himself wanting more from the theme than the writer has given him so far.  
6How can he articulate this thought?  What does he want?  More precise 
descriptions?  A better sense of who this young man is through his description of 
the room?  Sure, he wants these things and tells him, so that he might get an even 
better grade on the next assignment.  But there is something else, something he 
cannot possibly write down on this student’s paper but that he would like to 
clarify, at least for his own purposes, to make him a better teacher, a better 
citizen, a better human being.  He looks out the window and through the darkness 
for just a moment.  The thought passes.  It is already later in the evening than he 
had imagined, and he still has sixty-six themes left to grade.
***
This opening anecdote, though plausible, proves very little about the 
effects of the Cold War on the field of writing instruction.  I only hope that by 
beginning here we can get a better sense of the overall goal of this project: to 
clarify the often-contrary aspirations that teaching composition brings to our daily 
lives.  Because the articulation of these goals becomes even more difficult in 
politically repressive times, it is necessary to delineate, as precisely as we can, the 
reasons why the Cold War atmosphere circumscribed the field of writing 
instruction.  
These reasons are not necessarily easy to articulate, and this difficulty may 
be the reason why scholars in the field of composition and rhetoric often make 
very general assumptions about writing instruction in the early Cold War period.  
If we choose to deal with the fifties at all, we often pass over them casually and 
mark our field’s origin in the early sixties, as Stephen North does in his landmark 
7study The Making of Knowledge in Composition: Portrait of an Emerging Field.  
Though they were certainly tumultuous times, the sixties mark a time when we 
can more easily outline our disciplinary history.   After WWII, and especially 
after the National Defense Education Act was expanded to include the field of 
English, more people attending school needed composition classes (Bartholomae 
41).  This practical need, coupled with what some would consider a backlash 
against McCarthyism, allowed those of us in the field of English to take a more 
active role in the shaping of our discipline.
For those of us who view writing and meaning making as inherently 
political acts, the sixties and the seventies mark a time of positive change in the 
course of writing instruction, on both the theoretical and the practical plane.  No 
longer would writing teachers be confined to the teaching of formalistic rhetorical 
and grammatical procedures and the elitist and exclusionary politics that such 
teaching reinforces.  Instead, we would teach grammatical and rhetorical 
principles by encouraging students to generate personal and social contexts for 
their writing.  Because students would be involved in the writing process, as 
active instead of passive participants, they would—at least theoretically—find 
themselves empowered.  They would discover that they were authorities on 
subjects, and as students became authorities they would enter into more 
democratic relationships with the students in their classes, and with their teachers.  
Democracy could spread from this ground up.  
8Recently, composition historians have started to uncover knowledge about 
writing instruction in the Progressive Era.2  They have discovered much of the 
same democratic idealism in writing teachers, the same belief that writing is an 
inherently political act, the same hopes for true equality among all people, and 
many of the same educational practices that emerge from this belief.  There is still 
a great deal more that we can learn by studying these progressive-era pedagogies.  
As scholars continue to uncover this fascinating period, we will find educational 
practices that worked and ones that failed, and this too will enrich both our theory 
and our practice in the field of composition and rhetoric.  
This dissertation, however, will not focus on the positive changes that 
have occurred in our field, but will focus instead on what many would consider a 
time of repression, the early Cold War era in the United States.  “The fifties 
were,” as the historian Ellen W. Schrecker puts it, “the heyday of consensus 
history, modernization theory, structural functionalism, and new criticism.  
Mainstreams scholars celebrated the status quo, and the end of ideology 
dominated intellectual discourse” (339).   It is generally assumed that the fifties 
were a time when there was a tremendous payoff for teachers of writing to view 
composition in the academy as an inherently apolitical act, to focus on formalistic 
rhetorical and grammatical principles, and to repress the political implications of 
this teaching philosophy.  This rhetorical philosophy has commonly been called 
2
 Among these are Katherine H. Adams’s Progressive Politics and the Training of 
America’s Persuaders, Adams’s A Group of Their Own: College Writing Courses 
and American Women Writers, 1880-1940, John C. Brereton’s The Origins of 
Composition Studies in the American College, 1875-1925, and Susan Kates’s 
Activist Rhetorics and American Higher Education: 1885-1937.
9current-traditional rhetoric, and many scholars have defined and redefined the 
boundaries of this apolitical rhetoric.3  A closer investigation of the fifties, 
however, proves that not all writing instruction in the fifties should be classified 
as current-traditional.  To understand what happened and why it happened, we 
must analyze the historical and rhetorical circumstances of the early Cold War 
era.  
In the broadest sense, this dissertation hopes to discover to what extent 
current-traditional rhetoric pervaded writing instruction in the fifties and, to the 
extent that it was pervasive, what specific political function current-traditional 
rhetoric played in the early Cold War period.  This is not an easy task.  In terms of 
writing instruction, the fifties seem to be a void, difficult to classify and visible 
only by looking at what surrounds it.  The historian John Patrick Diggins explains 
this phenomenon best when talking about the fifties in general: 
3
 Richard Young describes the features of current-traditional rhetoric as follows:
The emphasis on the composed product rather than the composing 
process; the analysis of discourse into words, sentences, and paragraphs; 
the classification of discourse into description, narration, exposition, and 
argument; the strong concern with usage (syntax, spelling, punctuation) 
and with style (economy, clarity, emphasis); the preoccupation with the
informal essay and the research paper; and so on.  (qtd. in Crowley 13)
In The Methodical Memory, Crowley complicates and “elaborate[s] Young’s ‘and 
so on’ as follows:”
Current-traditional rhetoric occults the mentalism that underlies its 
introspective theory of invention; it subscribes to the notion that 
“subjects”—the “matter” of discourses—are mental configurations whose 
existence is ontologically prior to their embodiment in discourse; it prefers 
the discursive movement from generalization to specification; it 
concentrates on expository discourse; it recommends that the inventional 
scheme devised for exposition be used in any discursive situation; and it 
translates invention out of the originating mind and onto the page.  In 
other words, this rhetoric assumes that the process of invention can be 
graphically displayed in discourse.  (13)
10
Difficult to classify politically, the forties and fifties represented neither 
reform nor reaction, neither liberal activism in the sense of social justice 
nor conservative consolidation and a return to the old order.  Yet it would 
be wrong to claim, as some writers have, that the era was merely a period 
of passivity and postponement, as though nothing important happened 
until the radical sixties came along to awaken America from its 
ideological slumbers.  (xiii)  
My investigation of writing instruction in the fifties will prove that it is equally 
wrong to claim that the fifties represented passivity in the realm of composition 
and communication.  Not a time for liberal activism, the fifties, nevertheless, have 
something to teach us about how composition and rhetoric programs should 
ethically respond to a repressive political climate.  
While there are good reasons to champion the rhetoric and composition 
theories of the sixties and beyond, Robin Varnum is correct when she argues:
The unfortunate effect of polarizing old and new developments in 
composition… has been the devaluation of much that occurred before 
1960.  The notion that writing used to be taught in one tired old way has 
prevented many of those who currently teach writing from seeing the 
dynamic vitality of an era which… was as lively as any other.  (15)  
While her study focuses on the writing practices of one university during the early 
Cold War era, this study will paint with a much broader brush, analyzing more 
explicitly the historical, political, and disciplinary movements that influenced the 
11
field of writing instruction from 1934-1954.  This is another way of providing the 
type of revision that Varnum argues we need.  
We generally know that campuses in the 1950s were not safe havens from 
the Cold War struggles that affected the broader American community.  Red 
Scare politics had a discernable effect on the teaching of writing before and 
during the early fifties.  Toward the end of the forties and in the early fifties, 
politicians hunted out Communists and fellow travelers within our schools and 
universities.  The common wisdom about the early fifties suggests that professors 
during the early Cold War era were afraid to bring political issues into the 
classroom—no matter how “objectively” they might be able to do it.  There is 
certainly truth to this assertion, but this gloss on the history, rhetoric, and 
pedagogy of the period minimizes the tragic manner in which the political and 
cultural climate suppressed the pedagogical potential of this age.
While many historians have looked at the effects of McCarthyism on 
campuses, many of them have looked only at individual cases.4  While these cases 
are very valuable, they do not help us see the influence of McCarthyism on 
rhetoric and writing generally.   The two studies that have looked globally at the 
effects of McCarthyism on universities have focused on how the aggregate of 
individual cases affected universities on the whole, and not on any one particular 
4
 Three fascinating case studies are Lionel S. Lewis’s The Cold War and 
Academic Governance: The Lattimore Case at Johns Hopkins, David R. Holmes’s 
Stalking the Academic Communist: Intellectual Freedom and the Firing of Alex 
Novikoff, and Charles H. McCormick’s This Nest of Vipers: McCarthyism and 
Higher Education in the Mundel Affair, 1951-52.  
12
disciple.5   The only study to date that has looked at the effects of McCarthyism 
on one particular disciple is John McCumber’s Time in the Ditch.  
In this study, McCumber analyzes the effects of McCarthyism on the field 
of philosophy.  Arguing that there was a tremendous “philosophical payoff” (xix) 
for philosophers to disengage from the political and cultural sphere in order to 
focus on “a timeless, selfless quest of truth” (127) in the McCarthy era, 
McCumber constructs a “post-McCarthy paradigm.”  “I call this paradigm,” he 
writes in his conclusion,
“situating reason” to draw attention to an odd fact about us human beings: 
that although we are, as individuals and groups, always parts of larger but 
temporary states of affairs, we vary between awareness and forgetfulness 
of that fact.  We may need to be reminded both that we are situated and of 
what the salient constituents of our current situation are.  (164)
Though he never explicitly mentions rhetoric, it deals directly with “situating 
reason.”  In many ways, this project finds itself in conversation with the ideas that 
McCumber’s project illuminates (just as rhetoric and philosophy have been in 
conversation since Plato and the sophists).  McCumber’s study, however, turns 
out to be more of a point of departure for this study because this project, finally, 
centers on what makes effective and ethical writing instruction.
While McCumber focuses on the purges of McCarthyism in the university 
system from 1949-1960, this study looks more broadly at Red Scare politics6 and 
5
 These are Ellen W. Schrecker’s highly influential No Ivory Tower: 
McCarthyism and the Universities and Lionel S. Lewis’s Cold War on Campus: A 
Study of the Politics of Organizational Control.  
13
its effects on university writing instruction.  This study begins in 1934, when 
anticommunism more forcefully re-emerged due to Depression-era conflicts, and 
ends in 1954, when McCarthy’s political power started to wane.  Analyzing that 
historical period in terms of its rhetoric, I extrapolate from that history to the field 
of English (specifically writing instruction as it would eventually evolve into 
composition and rhetoric), and investigate the possibilities of a context-driven 
pedagogy that could emerge from this historical and rhetorical moment of time.  
“So long as the Cold War lasted and engaged our passions and political 
identities,” James Cronin argues, “scholarship suffered” (iv).  We are now at a 
time when we can see more specifically how the early Cold War, and specifically 
Red Scare politics, affected our discipline.  This project will argue that the Cold 
War circumscribed our field because the political climate at the time did not allow 
teachers to employ the best aims and methods that are found in a contextually 
bound relationship between humanist, empirical, and progressive teaching 
philosophies.  More specifically, the political climate of the Cold War reduced 
humanist teaching philosophies to formalist ones, empirical teaching philosophies 
to objectivist ones, and progressive teaching philosophies to permissive ones.  
These reductive terms forced teachers to choose between conflicting, mutually 
exclusive epistemologies at the expense of effective and ethical teaching.  
6
 With some exceptions, I use the term Red Scare politics when not referring 
directly to events relating to McCarthy.  As the historian M.J. Heale argues in his 
McCarthy’s Americans: Red Scare Politics in State and Nation 1935-1965, 
McCarthyism, as a term, “sits poorly with a story which began before the Second 
World War and continued after the Wisconsin senator’s death” (xv).  
14
Because this project argues that the best teaching occurs when there is a 
contextually bound relationship between humanist, empirical, and progressive 
teaching philosophies, a great deal hinges on how precisely these three terms are 
defined.  This argument also requires a working definition of a “contextually 
bound relationship” between these three terms.  The latter task may be the easier 
one, for by this I simply mean a relationship between the terms that is based on 
the individual and dynamic needs of any group of students in any particular 
composition classroom.  This relationship is easy to define, but as the conclusion 
to this work will make clear, difficult to achieve in actual practice.  
Humanism, empiricism, and progressivism, however, are neither easily 
defined nor achieved in practice—even under ideal circumstances.  I try to define 
these terms precisely, nevertheless, even knowing how much wrangling the 
definition of these terms might unleash.  It should be pointed out very early in this 
work that the formulation of these terms would not have been possible had it not 
been for James Berlin’s Rhetoric and Reality , as well as his further 
epistemological refinements in Rhetorics, Poetics and Cultures.  In some ways, 
this study will paint with a broader brush than Berlin’s; in other ways, a finer one.  
This project utilizes more general terms than Berlin’s, but cites more specific 
historical, and especially more narrative-historical examples.  This project covers 
a much smaller historical time period than Berlin’s, and because it does so, it is 
able to provide historical case studies in a way that Berlin’s broader historical 
projects cannot.  The more general nature of my terms clearly limits the scope my 
15
conclusions can cover, but the specificity involved with each particular case gives 
power, I contend, to my illustrations.  
I have wrestled with the question of whether or not these three categories 
are dangerous terministic screens, ones that filter out aspects of the Cold War 
climate that do not conform to these classifications.  I am aware that the end result 
of this project would have been different had I used, for example, idealism, 
rationalism, and materialism as three terms for reading the same historical 
period.7  There are several responses to this criticism.  Kenneth Burke always 
dealt indirectly with any terms that did not fit into his pentad’s five classifications.  
I chose humanism, empiricism, and progressivism, as well as their corresponding 
reductive terms, because the historical materials that I researched suggested those 
terms to me.  As with all categorical systems, however, the terms often overlap.  
Occasionally, and especially when I look at particular teaching practices, the 
7
 This project would have been different, also, if I would have tried to trace my 
three terms more specifically back to classical rhetoric throughout.  There are 
similarities between my classification system and George Kennedy’s, for 
example, but there are also important differences.  Technical rhetoric corresponds 
to objective rhetoric fairly directly, but empirical rhetorics are different enough in 
the twentieth century to warrant a new classification system.  There are also 
similarities between humanist rhetoric and philosophical rhetoric, of course, but 
the tendency of philosophical rhetoric to “to stress the validity of the message and 
the effect on an audience” (14-15) invites us to compare philosophical rhetoric to 
progressive rhetoric as well.  Likewise, if sophistic rhetoric “emphasizes the 
speaker rather than the speech or audience and is responsible for the image of the 
ideal orator leading society to noble fulfillment of national ideals” (14), then we 
cannot help but see some of the “great mind” theories we associate with 
humanism today as sophistic.  Because of the radical difference between classical 
and modern rhetoric, then, I refer to classical rhetoric, in this work, only as a 
means to greater rhetorical and historical understanding, not as an end, not as a 
way to help us better understand the classical.  
16
categories seem to shift.  These shifts, interestingly enough, help illustrate 
different types of contextually bound relationships between our three terms.
The best way to begin defining, then, is to start with the ways in which the 
broader terms differ from what I contend is their corresponding reductions.  First, 
empiricism differs from objectivism because empiricism is, as David Wallace 
defines it, “the attempt to describe human behavior (or other phenomena) 
according to a definable, limited system” (103).  Empiricism proves to be 
important to composition studies because, though it is a limited system, it can tell 
us a great deal precisely because it is definable and measurable.  On a more 
pragmatic level, it is an important epistemology to incorporate into the teaching of 
writing precisely because of the authority it lends to arguments.  
Objectivism, as Berlin defines it, “assert[s] that the real is located in the 
material world.  From this perspective, only that which is empirically verifiable or 
which can be grounded in empirically verifiable phenomena is real” (7).  
Objectivism is closely related to David Wallace’s definition of positivism, which 
he defines as “the belief that universal laws describing human behavior (or other 
phenomena) can be derived from sense observations” (103).  While I 
wholeheartedly agree with Wallace’s argument that we must disassociate 
empiricism from positivism (as he defines it) in our field, I refer, throughout this 
dissertation, to the phenomena that both Berlin and Wallace call “positivism” as 
“objectivism.”  This is in order to correct the equating of objective theories of 
rhetoric, which were pervasive during the Cold War period, with the theories of 
17
the far more radical group of positivist philosophers beginning with Comte.  For 
Comte, as Raymond Williams explains: 
positivism was not only a theory of knowledge; it was also a scheme of 
history and a programme of social reform.  In this broader sense, 
positivism became in England a free-thinking and radical as well as a 
scientific movement.  Indeed, because it was so concerned with 
understanding and changing society, it was met by the charge that it was 
not scientific enough, or not objective enough.
(Williams, Keywords 239)  
Positivist epistemologies, ones that were concerned with free-thinking and radical 
social reform, were not at all pervasive during the Cold War period, and should 
not be equated with current-traditional rhetoric, as they often are.  Objectivist 
rhetorics, however, were often used to help maintain the status quo in the Cold 
War political environment.  
In the classroom environment, then, objectivism is a reduction of 
empiricism because while the latter focuses more on logos than it does on pathos 
and ethos, it does not do so to the exclusion of those terms.  In other words:  
empiricism acknowledges that it is a particular type of persuasion, with its own 
set of mutually agreed upon discourse conventions.  Objectivism, paradoxically, 
is a reduction precisely because it pretends to reflect universal truth at the expense 
of the broader rhetorical elements of ethos and pathos.  Very often, in the Cold 
War climate, objectivism uses scientific authority as a mask for authoritarianism.  
Objectivism also separates us from the process of openly and continuously 
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searching for truth, as it works with the assumption that language reflects an 
already present truth.
Humanism is more difficult to define than empiricism.  I make no claim, 
therefore, that this definition is the right one for all cases.  Generally speaking, 
though, humanism as it relates to composition studies seems to focus less on its 
opposition to religion and more on what Williams describes as a combination of 
“post-Enlightenment ideas of history as human self-development and self-
perfection” (150) and “a particular kind of learning associated with particular 
attitudes to culture and human development or perfection” (150).  Stephen North 
also writes about the “humanist tradition’s reliance on what can be broadly 
defined as dialectic—that is, the seeking of knowledge via the deliberate 
confrontation of opposing points of view” (60).  Berlin often refers to humanists 
when he discusses liberal culture and subjective rhetoric.  According to Berlin, 
subjective rhetorics “locate truth either within the individual or within a realm that 
is accessible only through the individual’s internal apprehension, apart from the 
empirically verifiable sensory world…”  (RR 11).  This project will combine 
these three perspectives in order to say that, for our purposes, a humanist teaching 
philosophy is one that attempts to improve students by having them engage in 
dialectic with themselves, oftentimes through the reading of a cultural text.
Although Berlin associates subjective rhetorics with liberal culture and the 
“aristocratic and elitist rhetoric that appeared in certain Eastern colleges during 
the first two decades of [the twentieth] century,” (11) this project hopes to take a 
broader view of the humanist reliance on “cultural texts” without ignoring the 
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potential for elitism that such a term evokes.  The term “cultural text” was almost 
as controversial in the early Cold War era as it is today.  Many of the arguments 
we will explore about what types of readings should or should not be used in a 
composition classroom often cluster around the strife that this term evokes.  In 
this project, the term “cultural text” does not necessarily refer to a prescribed 
body of literature, in the belletristic sense, but this project does not argue for the 
absolute exclusion of literature in the composition classroom either.  Though the 
idea is not popular in the field of rhetoric and composition today, several 
engaging proposals from the early Cold War era include a broader, more 
culturally based, conception of literature for the purpose of teaching first-year 
writing.
In contrast with these more culturally based conceptions of literature, 
formalism is concerned with a product, that which is a record of a dialectic that 
has already taken place, usually within the mind of a “great writer.”  Often there 
is an attempt in formalist thought—at least as I use it in this dissertation—to 
divorce form and genre from the cultural realm.  In literature, the “great masters” 
already embody these forms.  In composition, the forms are even more abstract.  
They simply exist as modes—narration, exposition, description, and argument—
as ends in themselves.  Much as objectivist teaching philosophies invite students 
to see language as something that should reflect an already present truth, formalist 
teaching philosophies invite students to use language to fulfill the requirements of 
an already present form.  Just because formalism is a reduction of humanism, 
however, does not mean that humanists have no use for form, any more than 
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empiricists have no use for objectivity.  Humanist teaching philosophies use form 
as a means to further dialectical thinking within an individual, to bring him or her 
to better thoughts.  
Progressive teaching philosophies may be the most difficult of the three 
broader terms to define.  In one sense, we can begin to define progressivism by 
emphasizing a difference between humanist and progressive teaching 
philosophies as they relate to dialectic.  Progressive teaching philosophies differ 
from humanist ones in that they are more explicitly involved with moving 
dialectic from the individual realm into the social one.  Berlin refers to this turn as 
transactional:  
Transactional rhetoric is based on an epistemology that sees truth as 
arising out of the interaction of the elements of the rhetorical situation: an 
interaction of subject and object or of subject and audience or even of all 
the elements—subject, object, audience, and language—operating 
simultaneously” (RR 15)
In addition to this, he sees progressive education as “an extension of political 
progressivism, the optimistic faith in the possibility that all institutions could be 
reshaped to better serve society, making it healthier, more prosperous, and 
happier” (RR 58).  Even though they focus on the social turn, however, there is 
also in progressive teaching philosophies, as Applebee makes clear, a concern 
with “the immediate needs and the characteristics of the student” (191).  
It is precisely these two seemingly paradoxical concerns that make 
progressive teaching philosophies so difficult to define (not to mention to 
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practice).  In progressivism, individual and social concerns are connected through 
interaction.  Lawrence Cremin points out that Dewey wanted schools “that would 
nurture in individuals ‘a personal interest in social relationships and control, and 
the habits of mind which secure social changes without introducing disorder’” 
(172).  He also points out: “[Jane] Addams saw education reaching out into the 
community, as a ‘means of propaganda’” (177).  It may be that the difficulty of 
achieving this balance between the social and the individual concerns of 
progressivism led to the reduction of progressive teaching philosophies to 
permissive ones.  
Permissiveness is the only term from which we can draw directly on our 
historical material for a definition.  Arnold E. Needham defines permissive 
education as “student-selected, student-planned, individually planned, activities in 
communications, as distinct from committee-planned and committee-imposed 
assignments” (13).  He further states that 
the permissive also denotes… an ‘atmosphere’ or classroom setting in 
which the instructor and the members of the class accept, and do not 
reject, each other at their current levels of achievement in the language 
arts.  A two-way, or interpersonal, relationship prevails; all those 
concerned are taken where they are and as they are.  All truly student-
centered work in communications would have to begin at this point and 
work outward, as if along the radius of a series of concentric circles.  (13)
This is, of course, a fundamental tenet of progressive education, minus the 
broader social concerns.  It focuses on the student-centered aspects of progressive 
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educational philosophies, but does not focus on the goal of improving society or 
institutional structures.  It is, therefore, a reduction of progressivism.    
This dissertation will show that, when taken on the whole, these 
reductions circumscribed our abilities as teachers to effectively and ethically teach 
writing.  Chapter I sketches Red Scare politics as it relates to rhetoric and writing 
instruction.  Beginning with a narrative exploration of one historian’s decision to 
sign a loyalty oath in the state of New York in 1934, it illustrates how Depression-
era conflicts helped lay the groundwork for Cold War anticommunism.   Faith in 
the “superior virtues of persuasion,” as Becker called them, helped mediate the 
controversial line between reform and revolution in America.  Kenneth Burke’s 
early rhetorical theory serves as an engaging point of rhetorical contrast to 
Becker’s position.  In 1935, Kenneth Burke gave a speech to the Communist-led 
American Writers Congress that helps us more thoroughly understand Burke’s 
influence on the field of composition and rhetoric.  
Burke’s speech serves as a departure point for discussing how liberal 
anticommunism helped create a middle ground between communist philosophy 
and the countersubversive forms of anticommunism that were already present 
before WWII.  The belief in the “superior virtues of persuasion” placed rhetoric at 
the center of debates between liberal and conservative anticommunists.  The 
emerging propaganda analysis movement played a central role in helping to shape 
the field of writing instruction during this time, and it, too, was tied to 
anticommunism, in that its purpose was to give citizens a means to filter out 
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fascist and communist propaganda.  On a larger scale, it eventually helped fuel 
Red Scare politics.  
It is interesting that these debates emerged at the same time that some 
scholars were trying to decide what to do with the first-year composition course.  
The chapter concludes with Herbert Weisinger’s pre-war proposal for the first-
year composition course.  Weisinger argued that communist and fascist critiques 
of democracy could help students more fully understand what it means to live in a 
democracy.  Because his proposal brings together issues of propaganda analysis, 
objectivism, anticommunism, and the meaning of a humanistic education, I 
conclude this chapter with a thorough investigation and description of his 
proposal.  
Chapter II begins with Signi Faulk’s proposal for first-year composition.  
Emerging after the war, Faulk’s proposal contends that first-year composition 
could improve student writing at the same time that it promoted “international 
understanding.”  I then argue that this proposal would have enjoyed little success 
because of the specific pressures of Red Scare politics.  Returning, then, to our 
discussion of Kenneth Burke, I outline his rhetorical projects as they relate to 
emerging Cold War conflicts.  After WWII, academics were beginning to witness 
the first academic freedom cases of the Cold War period.  The University of 
Washington case proves to be most significant not only because it was one of the 
earliest (1948), but because it was highly publicized and set the precedent for 
universities across the country.  Most interesting, in terms of rhetorical analysis, is 
the role that objectivism played in these six academic freedom cases.  Raymond 
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B. Allen, the university president, rationalized the firing of three tenured 
university professors who had been members of the CP during the thirties by 
“proving” that they had failed to live up to their duties as academics solely by 
being members of an organization that demanded unquestioning loyalty.  A 
Toulmin analysis of Allen’s arguments explains how objectivism helped mediate 
the logical inconsistencies of his position.
The chapter branches out to an exploration of “Vital Center” liberalism, 
which had difficulties maintaining a balance between its commitment to civil 
liberties and its commitment to anticommunism.  Then, from several composition 
historians, I glean descriptions of nineteen fifties classrooms and contextualize 
these descriptions in terms of previously discussed Cold War conflicts.  
Authority, it turns out, gets redefined in the fifties classroom.  Before the Cold 
War, knowledge had the potential to be obtained through an open, ongoing 
process.  During the McCarthy era, students were taught to shape their thoughts 
and actions toward an already existing authority.  In other words, scientific truth 
became a mask for authoritarian truth.  Objectivism is precisely the mask that 
Raymond B. Allen wears in the academic freedom cases at the University of 
Washington.
Chapter III explores what we can discover from our journals and from 
textbooks about composition theory and practice in the early fifties.  An analysis 
of two popular textbooks (McCrimmon and Brooks and Warren) illustrates the 
tension between empiricism and its reductive term objectivism, as well as 
humanism and its reductive term formalism.  Generally speaking, however, we 
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can learn more about the field of composition and rhetoric during this time by 
looking at two of the major journals in the field of English (CCC and College 
English) and by the work of scholars who identified themselves as rhetoricians.   
The “Workshop Reports of the 1950 Conference on College Composition 
and Communication” prove that the scholars who were engaged in the 
professional development of our field did not work from entirely current-
traditional assumptions about language production.  It also proves that early CCC
work was involved in more than service related advice or composition lore, as 
North would put it.  Teachers were, instead, actively engaged in developing a 
philosophy of first-year composition.  This philosophy stood in opposition to the 
way that anticommunists viewed language production in the academy, but would 
have been impossible to implement fully into real composition classrooms 
because of the political climate.  
Because many rhetorical scholars have analyzed McCarthy’s speeches, 
this study only highlights them for the sake of understanding how they relate to 
the role of knowledge production in the university.  Taking a cue from Roger 
Gilles, I argue that the McCarthy era was no time for rhetorical scholars to 
celebrate sophism.  Weaver’s conservative rhetoric was no doubt a response to 
McCarthyism.  Kenneth Burke’s refinements of his own earlier rhetorical 
philosophy represent a liberal response.  Both Burke and Weaver were key 
players in the early CCCC workshops.  Burke outlined a philosophy of first-year 
composition at the first convention that has intriguing implications for our study 
as well. 
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In 1954, the year that McCarthy’s would finally be censured by the Senate 
and denounced by many liberal and conservative citizens alike, the field of 
English finally addressed the problem of communism, anticommunism, and Red 
Scare politics.  In February of this year, Harlen Adams, president of NCTE, 
addressed the council in Los Angeles and announce the council’s “first full 
statements on a controversial social problem” contained in the pamphlet 
Censorship and Controversy.  This chapter continues by describing how this 
pamphlet fell in line with Cold War epistemological assumptions (members of the 
Communist Party were unfit to teach, it argued), but also how it attempted to pull 
away from them.  College English also responded this same year with a printed 
symposium titled “Controversial Materials in the Classroom.”  This series of 
articles proves that Red Scare politics had a discernable effect on the way that 
teachers taught first-year composition because roughly half of the responses to 
this symposium dealt with what materials could and should be used in the first-
year composition classroom.  This chapter describes these responses and analyzes 
them in terms of the epistemological assumptions they portray.  
I conclude this project by investigating how these epistemological 
assumptions still affect the field of composition and rhetoric today.  As more than 
an afterthought, I seek to find ways to resist the type of repression that Red Scare 
politics illustrates.  I look for ways to resist the pressures of formalism and 
objectivism on our field, pressures that keep us from creating a contextually 
bound relationship between humanist, empirical, and progressive teaching 
philosophies.  Finally, I build on the objectives that were presented at the second 
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Conference on College Composition and Communication and argue for a theory 
of composition based on a progressive vision of democracy.  By combining the 
best elements of humanist, empirical, and progressive teaching philosophies, this 
vision stands directly against both the internal and external sources of repression 
that we, as composition teachers, face in our everyday teaching lives.  
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I: Humanists, Progressives, and Objectivists Before the War
“Anything may be true—the irrational quite as probably as the rational!  
So speaks the model of 1935” (54).  
--Austin Warren, reviewing Burke’s Permanence and Change
“Thus, a profound cultural aversion to communism also underlay 
McCarthyism.  It was this detestation that gave politicians broad leeway 
to pursue anti-Communist endeavors.  A related factor was the nation’s 
underdeveloped appreciation of the importance of civil liberties for 
repudiated minorities.  Public opinion polls gave evidence of the high 
threshold level of political intolerance in the 1930s—a time of rising 
international tension but long before the alarums of the Cold War.
Indeed, to understand the “ism,” the right which gave it birth, and 
the decade of the 1950s, we must first examine the 1930s, the energetic left 
of that decade, and its real and imagined legacies.” (10)
--Richard M. Fried, from Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in 
Perspective
If we begin with the relatively safe assumption that the fifties were more 
conservative times than the thirties, we can say that something happened to 
writing instruction during the early Cold War period.  Like the rest of American 
culture, we could argue, writing instruction took a more conservative turn.  It is 
more difficult, however, to argue more precisely what happened or why.  Keeping 
in mind that we want to prove that, within the realm of writing instruction, 
humanism, empiricism, and progressivism were reduced to formalism, 
objectivism, and permissiveness, we must first explain the ways that these 
reductive forces existed in our culture before the Cold War got underway.  
As in the fifties, widely diverse political and social cultures conflicted 
with each other in the thirties.  The two opening epigraphs to this chapter 
illustrate this conflict.  While one model of thought led Austin Warren to write, 
“Anything may be true, the irrational as well as the rational!” and to attribute this 
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pluralism to the atmosphere of a decade, there was also, as Richard Fried makes 
clear, a whole atmosphere of public opinion that stood in direct opposition to this 
model of thought.  As we will see later in this chapter, the thirties brought on 
more radicalism than our country had seen since its revolution, but institutional 
pressures kept the nation’s politics from shifting very far left, even during the 
worst years of the Depression. 
Regarding writing instruction, some of what we see happening in the early 
fifties is a response to the legacies of the thirties, but some of it is also a response 
to a practical need, given birth by a growing population of under-prepared 
students, for more effective teaching methods (Bartholomae 41).  Later in this 
project, we will illustrate how both of these responses helped to shape the first 
meetings of the Conference on College Composition and Communication in the 
1950s.  We will see that the legacies of the thirties conflicted with the national 
agenda emerging in the early Cold War period and that the conference itself was 
brought about because composition and communication teachers needed more 
professional solidarity with each other as well as a more cohesive way of teaching 
a rapidly growing student population after WWII.  From its very beginnings, the 
service-oriented reality of the first-year composition course conflicted with both 
the progressive and the humanist ideals held by many of its teachers.   
Before we explicate these conflicts, however, we must first outline some 
of the major conflicts of the thirties as they relate to university epistemology.  
Generally speaking, the conflicts that are most relevant to Cold War writing 
instruction are between traditional humanism, a newly re-emergent progressivism, 
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and a consolidating empiricism.  These conflicts did not simply emerge in the 
fifties.  For example, many of the antiradical forces that we see arising in the early 
fifties—ones that we tend to attribute to “McCarthyism”—were already well in 
place during the thirties, long before McCarthy arrived on the political scene.  Our 
understanding of writing instruction in the early fifties, therefore, requires that we 
outline: 
1. America’s radical and antiradical traditions (including the progressive, 
the popular front, and anticommunist movements); 
2. the mediating role that propaganda analysis and General Semantics 
played between those traditions; 
3. how that mediation influenced writing instruction before WWII and 
helped to shape the communications and composition movements; and
4. how humanists in the field of English responded to the communication 
and composition movement.
While I do not want to over-idealize the thirties, they were more radical 
and experimental times, and this radicalism spilled over into writing instruction in 
very interesting—and effective—ways.  While some classes were taught from 
what we would now call a current-traditional paradigm, Berlin contends that these 
theories were rivaled by 1) expressivist theories that celebrated the individual, and 
2) “transactional approaches that emphasized the social nature of the human 
experience” (RR 58).  While expressivist theories emerged from romanticist 
notions, transactional rhetoric emerged from progressive education, which “was 
an extension of political progressivism, the optimistic faith in the possibility that 
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all institutions could be reshaped to better serve society, making it healthier, more 
prosperous, and happier” (58).   During the Depression, Berlin argues, “the social 
reformism that had been the main concern of progressives before [WWI] again 
became dominant” (60).  Berlin is certainly correct when he argues that different 
epistemologies were in play during the 1930s, but what Berlin does not outline is 
the way that academics during the thirties were pressured toward the gradual 
acceptance of more centrist philosophies even during these more radical times.  
He also fails to show us a particular picture of the main academic debates of the 
thirties between humanism, empiricism, and progressivism.  Because I hope to 
show how institutional pressures led academics toward conformity, I will begin 
with two particular cases:  the case of Carl Becker, and the case of Kenneth 
Burke.    
Carl Becker’s case centers on an essay he published after signing a loyalty 
oath in 1934, and Kenneth Burke’s centers on a speech he gave to the American 
Writers’ Conference in New York, 1935.  Becker’s case, in some ways, was not at 
all unusual.  In the mid-thirties, teachers were required to sign loyalty oaths in 
many parts of the country, but Becker’s case proves most relevant because his 
essay introduces some of the key ideas that emerged later in the early Cold War 
period.  It also proves interesting to those of us in the field of writing instruction 
because of the particular function that rhetoric played in issues of institutional 
loyalty.  Burke’s case also proves to be relevant to rhetoric studies, but for 
different reasons.  Many cite Burke as someone who is “foundational” to our 
field.  His talk to a Communist-led organization, and its members’ fundamental 
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rejection of his proposal, I contend, solidified the direction of his rhetorical 
theory.  By analyzing this talk, and noting the places where his rhetorical theory 
intersects with the rhetorical implications of the Carl Becker case, we will get a 
better picture of the legacies of the thirties.  This will, in turn, give us better 
ground for understanding the early Cold War period in the following chapters.
Accepting the Consequences: Carl Becker and the Virtues of Persuasion
In 1934, years before McCarthyism took hold, the historian Carl L. Becker 
signed an oath, drawn up by the State of New York, swearing his support for the 
Constitution of the United States.  This oath, spawned by the radicalism that the 
Depression had brought to college campuses, was fairly vague.  Although the 
question of whether or not one was a Communist was not explicitly part of the 
New York loyalty oath, the question was probably on many people’s minds.  The 
United States faced the greatest economic turmoil it had ever known.  “For 
many,” Richard M. Fried argues, “the Depression signaled the final collapse of 
capitalism that Marx had predicted” (10).  Nevertheless, the majority of 
Americans vehemently opposed economic revolution.  Sirgiovanni argues that for 
most of the twentieth century, “deep, often uncompromising hostility to domestic 
Communists and fellow travelers, coupled with dread and loathing for the Soviet 
Union, fairly describes the views of millions of Americans since the Russian 
Revolution of 1917” (1).  Even during the Depression, many Americans believed 
that while economic reforms were needed, a revolution was far from a cure.  
Though the thirties were a time when government more directly involved itself in 
the economy, Americans were very sensitive about any type of plan that seemed 
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even socialist.  The Communist Party, therefore, was no real threat in the early 
thirties.  “Though conditions were ripe for radicalism,” Fried argues, “the early 
1930s found the Communist Party (CP or CPUSA) weak and isolated” (11).  This 
fact raises an interesting question: if the CP was so weak, and the majority of 
Americans wanted no part of revolution, then why were loyalty oaths necessary?  
The answer lies in understanding the strength of America’s antiradical 
tradition, as well as understanding the more violent and chaotic aspects of some 
brands of radicalism in America.  “Deeply rooted in America’s political and 
social culture,” Sirgiovanni argues, “[the antiradical tradition] involves an 
insistent, often exaggerated belief that vast internal conspiracies are afoot to 
undermine the American way of life, to deprive people of their liberties, and to 
supplant freedom with dictatorship in the United States” (15).  Not only was this 
belief in conspiracies central to our own revolution against England, it continued 
throughout the eighteenth century with a fear that the more fundamentally class-
based French Revolution would spread to America.  It also fueled a deep distrust 
of Freemasonry, spawning the Anti-Mason movement.  In the nineteenth century, 
this belief in conspiracies led to a deep distrust of the Irish and German Catholics 
who were immigrating into the country, to a determination to defeat the great 
“Papist menace.”  Americans in the South believed that slaves were close to 
revolution and that Industrialists in the North were attempting to incite this 
violence.  Industrialists in the North feared revolutions from exploited labor.  The 
development of trade unions only increased this fear.  (Sirgiovanni 16-20)
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While it is true that antiradical fears are often exaggerated, there certainly 
have been cases where a violent radical fringe threatened the American way of 
life.  As Allen F. Davis argues in his biography of Jane Addams: “Free Speech 
and radical ideas became more difficult… after the assassination of President 
McKinley by Leon Czolgosz, an avowed anarchist” (116).  At the turn of the 
century, memories of the 1886 Haymarket Riot were still vivid enough that 
Chicago police “rounded up and arrested hundreds of people, most of them 
immigrants suspected of holding radical views” (117).  Here, as is often the case, 
the collective response to this violent radical fringe repressed nonviolent people 
who ascribed to progressive, nonviolent ideals.  
Collectively, then, we can say that Americans still held remnants of the 
type of fears that Sirgiovanni mentions through the twentieth century, and even 
greater fears about anarchism in the early twentieth century.  The greatest 
antiradical fear of the mid-twentieth century, however, was the belief that 
communist forces were at work in America in an attempt to undermine 
democracy.  “For most of the present century” Sirgiovanni argues, 
Communism has been the bete noire of those Americans who have 
believed their country to be imperiled by enemies from within—and 
beyond.  Members of the Communist Party have been subjected to 
unsparing criticism and official persecution, on the grounds that they are 
under secret orders from the U.S.S.R. to help overthrow the U.S. 
government.  (15)
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So by 1934, when Becker signed his oath (along with other teachers and 
professors in New York), many people perceived an internal communist threat, 
despite the CP’s relative unpopularity, and despite some remorse on the part of 
the country as a whole about the first Red Scare.  This was particularly true in 
New York, which had what Richard Fried calls the “longest tradition of 
antiradicalism” (104).  Issues of how to ensure teacher and student loyalty had 
been debated in the legislature since 1919, but a loyalty statute had only been in 
effect once before in New York’s history, and it only had a short life of two years 
before Governor Al Smith repealed it in the early twenties.  But the early thirties 
saw the very worst of the Depression all across America:  “By 1932 
unemployment gripped almost one third of the workforce.  As jobs were lost, 
home mortgages were foreclosed, and farms were taken, the Depression seeped 
upward, eroding the middle class and nibbling at the wealthy” (R. Fried 10).  
Strikes broke out across the country, resulting in deaths in Michigan and an 
outright attack on striking World War I Veterans in Washington, D.C.  
When Roosevelt took office in March 1933, Edmund Wilson reported in 
the New Republic that people were eating out of garbage dumps in Chicago.  
Though Roosevelt pushed his New Deal vigorously on the nation, no one knew if 
his ideas would help the economy.  Many people feared that, by getting the
government so directly involved in the economic affairs of the nation, he was 
undermining the basic tenets of market capitalism.   Despite the fact that the CP 
opposed Roosevelt and that most New Dealers “detested Communism,” 
conservative critics called the New Deal policy “a blueprint for the bolshevization 
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of America” (Sirgiovanni 27).  Roosevelt’s popularity did, of course, shift 
America’s politics to the left, at least for a short time, but even during Roosevelt’s 
prime, antiradical forces—particularly those that saw Roosevelt’s politics as too 
much like those of the Progressive Party—constantly pushed the nation’s 
economy and ideology back toward the center.  
By the early thirties, college campuses, however, started to see 
progressivism reemerge.  Jane Addams, who was nearing the end of her life and 
who had been surrounded by controversy all through the twenties, was to be 
“showered once more with honors, praised beyond reason, and treated, again, as a 
saint” (Allen Davis 282).  The progressive emphasis on non-violence also 
reemerged.  Ellen W. Schrecker argues: 
the international tensions that accompanied the Depression and the rise of 
Hitler lent a real sense of urgency to the anti-war fervor that was sweeping 
the nation’s campuses.  In a 1933 poll at Columbia University, 31 percent 
of the undergraduates declared themselves absolute pacifists and another 
52 percent maintained that they would not fight unless the United States 
itself was invaded.  At the same time, thousands of students all over the 
country signed the Oxford Pledge, a pacifist import from Great Britain that 
stated, “We pledge not to support the United States government in any war 
it may conduct.” (Schrecker 28)  
While many had high ideals, the early thirties were a time of sacrifice for many, 
and the undergraduates, graduates and faculty members in the universities were 
not exceptions to this.  Professors’ salaries were cut as much as fifteen percent.  
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Many were fired or reduced to lecturer status.  Though the number of graduate 
students increased during the early thirties, many could not find jobs they could 
afford to take upon graduation (Schrecker 29).  So 1934 was not a year when 
many professors could afford to take a principled stand against a loyalty oath.  It 
is probable that the historian Carl Becker, and others like him, signed the oath to 
keep his job.  After all, general wisdom suggests that we may have to give up 
some of our freedoms during politically difficult times.  
Becker, who often wrote with great precision, was vague when writing 
about his decision to sign the oath.  To him, it meant
nothing except this: that teachers in New York State are obliged to 
acknowledge in writing that they are obligated by the obligations imposed 
upon them by the duties they have assumed, and by the obligations 
imposed upon all citizens by the Constitution of the United States and the 
Constitution of the State of New York.  (qtd. in Schrecker 69)
But a year later, in 1935, Becker published Everyman His Own Historian: Essays 
on History and Politics.  One of the essays contained in this collection (“The 
Marxian Philosophy of History”) revealed that questions of communism were 
clearly on his mind.  Written in the form of Socratic dialog between a liberal and 
a Communist, the essay attempts to prove
(1) that an intelligent person may regard Marxian philosophy of history as 
an illuminating interpretation of the past without subscribing to it as a law 
of history, and (2) that even if convinced that the Marxian doctrine is a 
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valid law of history, one might still with excellent reasons refuse to 
support the communist cause.  (Becker 524)  
The dialogue itself is fascinating, explaining how a historian can accept Marx’s 
interpretation of the past without accepting his vision of the future.  What may be 
most important about the dialogue, however, is that it attempts to define the 
differences between liberals and Communists.   “I refuse to join the Communists,” 
the liberal asserts, “because, while I sympathize with their desire to make a better 
world for the mass of the people, I have no faith in the methods which they 
propose for obtaining this object” (532).  In other words, the liberal does not want 
revolution, nor does he want conditions to be ripe for revolution.  These words 
had deep implications during the worst years of the Depression.   
Furthermore, the liberal believes “that all the great and permanently 
valuable achievements of civilization have been won by the free play of 
intelligence in opposition to, or in spite of, the pressure of mass emotion and the 
effort of organized authority to enforce conformity in conduct and opinion” (532).  
The liberal always prefers the free play of intelligence to a dictatorship, “whether 
it be the dictatorship of a Stalin, a Mussolini, or a Hitler” (533).  But the 
Communist argues that what appears to be a free society will resort to a 
dictatorship when “confronted by the rising power of the proletariat” (534).  
“What then,” the Communist asks, “will become of freedom of speech and the 
appeal to persuasion?  Since you sympathize with objectives of the Communists, 
will you not then be forced to join them?  Why wait till then?” (534).
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But when confronted with the possibility of joining a bourgeois 
dictatorship or a proletariat dictatorship, the liberal finally argues that there is a 
third solution.  The conclusion to the dialogue is worth quoting in full:
Liberal: I might still refuse to join either side.  I might persist in the futility 
of expressing my faith in the superior virtues of persuasion.
Communist: That would have serious consequences for you.  You would 
be suppressed.
Liberal: True enough.  But I might accept the consequences.  I might 
choose to be suppressed rather than to support what I object to.  In short, I 
might, as a last refuge from imbecility, become a Christian and practise 
the precept that it is better to suffer evil than to do it.  (536)
This argument was important in the mid-thirties, given the social, political, and 
economic uncertainty of the time.  It underscores the desire of many liberals to 
separate from more radical, revolutionary philosophies.  Signing a loyalty oath, 
despite Becker’s argument that the gesture did not mean much, clearly meant a 
great deal.  Signing a loyalty oath was an affirmation that one would stand behind 
the Constitution, even to the point of suffering.  
What Becker and other liberals like him could not have fully understood at 
the time was how important these gestures would become once the Cold War got 
under way, how the creation of liberal anticommunism would only help to fuel an 
atmosphere of distrust, and how that distrust would eventually shape the 
epistemological assumptions behind our university systems.  The final effect had 
tremendous reverberations for those of us involved in the interdisciplinary field of 
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writing studies.  This effect was particularly felt by the first-year writing course, 
one of the few courses required of all students, the course responsible for the 
intellectual orientation of the student and for introducing the student to the 
fundamentals of persuasion and effective writing.  
What is most significant to us in the field of rhetoric and composition is 
the way that Becker ties his argument to the concept of persuasion.  In his essay, 
he makes it explicit that the liberal has “faith in the superior virtues of 
persuasion.”  He opposes the “free play of intelligence” to “the pressure of mass 
emotion and the effort of organized authority to enforce conformity in conduct 
and opinion” (532).  This forced choice between faith in the virtues of persuasion 
and the pressure of mass emotion relates in several ways to our three 
epistemological terms.  
First, it relates directly to the ways that humanists conceive dialectic.  
Through an individually motivated choice, Becker’s liberal chooses to suffer evil
at the hands of organized authority rather than succumb to the pressures of mass 
emotion.  This notion of subjectivity does not really allow for individuals to 
collectively stand up against organized authority, as it would in a more 
progressive epistemology.  Under progressivism, one could argue: “I might 
choose to work together with my fellow men and women and in a communal 
attempt to change the world,” but this possibility does not exist in Becker’s 
schema.  Second, it relates to objectivist epistemology because, as we will see in 
Chapter II, a great deal of Cold War epistemology relates to a type of subjectivity 
that has at its center an autonomous subject who is able to make objective 
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decisions without the influence of outside forces.  Objectivist epistemology, by 
becoming an academic law instead of part of an empirical method, will have 
enormous implications because it will, ironically, help organized authority 
enforce conformity in the university setting.  It will play a central role in reducing 
traditional humanism to formalism and progressive epistemology to a permissive 
method of teaching.
It is important to point out that this had not yet happened in the mid-
thirties.  One of the primary functions of rhetoric during this time was to give all 
subjects the ability to defend themselves against outside forces, whether they be 
communistic, anarchistic, or fascistic forces, or whether they be other types of 
negative forces like emotion.  But during the thirties this belief was not 
necessarily an academic law, it was simply part of an emerging field called 
propaganda analysis.  Harold Lasswell, if not the first then one of the first 
propaganda theorists, published an essay titled “Propaganda” in 1931.  In it, he 
refined his 1927 Propaganda Technique in the World War to apply more 
specifically to the process of education.  
In this essay, he defines propaganda as “the technique of influencing 
human action by the manipulation of representations” (13).  His work invites 
readers to reconceptualize the classical philosopher/sophist debate by separating 
the process of education from propaganda.  “The inculcation of traditional value 
attitudes” he argues, “is generally called education, while the term propaganda is 
reserved for the spreading of subversive, debatable, or merely novel attitudes” 
(13).  He also draws a distinction between deliberation, which “implies the 
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consideration of a problem without predisposition to promote any particular 
solution” (13) and propaganda, which is “concerned with eliciting such 
predispositions” (13).  The stakes are much higher, however, in the modern age 
than they were in classical times.  Propaganda, after all, calls into question issues 
of nationality and the state:  
Propaganda thus assists in making a fiction of the national state and in 
fabricating new control areas that follow activity areas, intersecting old 
control areas in every direction.  Thus propaganda on an international 
scale is one important medium for transmitting those pressures that are 
tending to burst the bonds of the traditional social order” (23).  
Lasswell further contends that propagandists show “indifference to formal 
democracy” (24) because they believe that human beings “are often poor judges 
of their own interests, flitting from one alternative to the next without solid 
reason” (24).  
While there is not space in this chapter to consider whether or not 
Lasswell believed that human beings were helpless against the effects of 
propaganda, we can say that by drawing a clear-cut distinction between education 
and propaganda, his terms parallel the forced choice in academia between the 
“free play of intelligence in opposition to, or in spite of, the pressure of mass 
emotion and the effort of organized authority to enforce conformity in conduct 
and opinion” (532) as defined by Becker.  By creating an exclusive space for 
education, where faith in the superior virtues of persuasion resides, audience 
issues often get repressed.  Though Lasswell does acknowledge that the 
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propagandist must consider the values of his or her audience, he seems to show 
less faith in the ability of audiences to evaluate the motive and purpose of the 
propagandist.  While we can argue that he hoped to give his readers this ability by 
writing his essays, his arguments oftentimes seem fatalistic.  Later in this chapter 
we will see how the overall effect of propaganda analysis, when coupled with the 
rapid change brought about by newly developing mass communication channels, 
oftentimes only fed an atmosphere of distrust in America.  This distrust, in turn, 
led more left-leaning scholars to either fall into silence or more explicitly state a 
commitment to centrist politics in America, even if doing so turned out to 
contradict the principles of formal democracy.   
An Unapologetic Propagandist:  Kenneth Burke in the Thick of Things
Kenneth Burke’s approach to the newly developing field of propaganda 
analysis contrasts sharply with Becker’s case.  In 1935, Burke did not take the bait 
that the political climate laid out for him concerning propaganda.  In fact, in a 
speech he gave to the American Writers Congress titled “Revolutionary 
Symbolism in America,” he radically alters the definition of propaganda by 
complicating Lasswell’s binary between education and propaganda.   Long before 
literacy theorists questioned the assumptions behind what we would now call 
“cultural literacy,” Burke gives us a new lens through which to view traditional 
and subversive values.  For Burke (as it is for Addams), all education is 
propaganda, but effective propaganda has to consider the needs and values of the 
audience it is trying to reach.  As we will see, this understanding of propaganda 
offended communist intellectuals, who wanted to stand on a narrowly defined 
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revolutionary ground.  They were not willing to sacrifice their objectivist position 
for what must have seemed like a practical need.  A careful investigation of this 
speech will show that it was more than pragmatic.  It invited a new conception of 
artistic persuasion, upsetting the binary between propaganda and education—and, 
by extension, rhetoric and poetics.  
At first glance it appears that Burke’s speech unapologetically calls for the 
use of propaganda by communist writers.  To some degree, this is true.  Burke 
contends that the CP is making a mistake by using “the worker” as a symbol to 
bring about social change in America.  Burke proposes, instead, that Communists 
use the symbol of “the people” when trying to persuade Americans.  “I should 
emphasize the fact,” Burke writes,  
that I consider this matter purely from the standpoint of propaganda.  It 
may be that the needs of the propagandist are not wholly identical with the 
needs of the organizer.  Insofar as a writer really is a propagandist, not 
merely writing work that will be applauded by his allies, convincing the 
already convinced, but actually moving forward like a pioneer into 
outlying areas of the public and bringing them the first favorable 
impressions of his doctrine, the nature of his trade may give rise to special 
symbolic requirements.  Accordingly, it is the propaganda aspect of the 
symbol that I shall center upon—considering the symbol particularly as a 
device for spreading the areas of allegiance.  (269, italics his)
Burke understands the function of propaganda analysis in the culture at large, but 
because he speaks to a group of communist writers, he knows that they will not 
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fear revolution.  Ostensibly, a group of communist writers hopes that economic 
revolution is near.  
Burke speaks directly to this hope, using Lasswell as a point of departure:  
“Lasswell holds that a revolutionary period is one in which the people drop their 
allegiance to one myth, or symbol, and shift to another in its place” (268).  But 
Burke argues that it is more complicated than this, because 
when a symbol is in the process of losing its vitality as a device for 
polarizing social cooperation, there are apt to be many rival symbols 
competing to take its place.  A symbol probably loses its vitality when the 
kinds of cooperation it promotes—and with which its destiny is united—
have ceased to be serviceable.  The symbol of bourgeois nationalism is in 
such a state of decay today, for instance—hence the attempt of 
Communists to put the symbol of class in its place.  (268)
Burke suggests here that the right moment has arrived to consider what symbols 
will be most likely to win in a competition between rival symbols.  “In suggesting 
that ‘the people,’ rather than ‘the worker,’ rate highest in our hierarchy of 
symbols,” Burke says, “I suppose I am suggesting fundamentally that one cannot 
extend the doctrine of revolutionary thought among the lower middle class 
without using middle class values—just as the Church invariably converted 
pagans by making the local deities into saints” (269).  Here, Burke makes no 
apologies for trying to extend the doctrine of revolutionary thought, but does 
acknowledge that revolutionary thought has to find its grounding in a local 
context, even if that grounding changes the nature of the thought itself, as it once 
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did with Christianity.  This shows an acute awareness of how effective 
propaganda works, that is, how it works as the art of rhetoric.  
Burke follows Lasswell’s contention that the propagandist must consider 
the needs and values of his audience before launching a propaganda campaign. 
“The propagandist may pursue his task not only on the ordinary ‘common sense’ 
level,” Lasswell contends, “but also on a level leading to the underlying emotional 
life of those whom he desires to influence” (19).  For Burke, this is absolutely 
essential, for he notes that the working classes in America have very little desire 
to stay working class.  Hence the need for what he calls “propaganda by 
inclusion,” one that contains both the elements of the working class struggle and, 
in Burke’s words, “the ideal incentive, the eventual state of unification that is 
expected to flow from within it” (272).  
Burke’s desire, however, leads him to add a second thesis to his argument, 
and this thesis radically alters the meaning of propaganda.  His first thesis, that the 
symbol of “the people” is better than the symbol of “the worker” for the purposes 
of propaganda, gets complicated by his second, 
that the imaginative writer seek to propagandize his cause by surrounding 
it with as full a cultural texture as he can manage, thus thinking of 
propaganda not as an over-simplified, literal, explicit writing of lawyer’s 
briefs, but as a process of broadly and generally associating his political 
alignment with cultural awareness in the large.  (273)  
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Burke hopes that his audience, even if it does not accept his first thesis, will 
accept his second one.  While the first thesis looks at propaganda from a 
rhetorical standpoint, his second looks at it from a poetic standpoint.  
As many historians have pointed out, his audience accepted neither his 
first thesis nor his second one.  Many attacked him for his use of terms like 
symbolism and myth (275).  Others compared him to Father Coughlin, General 
Douglass, even Hitler and Rosenberg for suggesting that “the people” be used as a 
symbol for communist propaganda.  
According to Burke, Joseph Freeman, one of the leaders of the AWC, 
stood up after his speech and announced, “We have a traitor among us!” (cited by 
Lentricchia 22).  Though there is no way to prove whether or not this happened, 
we know from the published version of the “Discussion of Burke’s Speech” that 
Freeman argues: 
The symbol of the people came with the bourgeois revolution.  The 
bourgeoisie demanded the abolition of class privileges.  Therefore it had 
the following of all the people.  Then it turned out that the people were 
divided into classes.  The word people then became a reactionary slogan—
not because of any philosophy of myths, but because it concealed the 
reality, the actual living antagonism between the social classes […] If the 
proletariat can become a dangerous political myth in the hands of the 
reaction, how much more dangerous is the vague symbol of the people.  
We must not encourage such myths.  We are not interested in the myth.  
We are interested in revealing the reality.  (277)
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Others point out in their responses to Burke that the term “the people” has been 
used for reactionary purposes in recent history.  Father Coughlin and General 
Johnson had condemned recent strikes in California by saying that the workers 
were “holding up the people” (qtd. in Simons 276).  Hitler and Rosenberg had 
apparently argued: “let us not talk any more about the workers, let us talk about 
the people” (qtd. in Simons 276).  Others along with Freeman condemn Burke for 
talking about the working class in terms of myths and symbolism while the 
working class struggle takes place in reality.  
For our purposes, it is worth noting that Freeman’s idea of “revealing the 
reality” was directly related to the Marxist reliance on empiricism.  Clearly, 
writers and scholars like Freeman saw science as a way to divorce their theories 
from charges of being propagandistic, or being thought of as “mere rhetoric.”  In 
the sense that they exiled rhetoric, these intellectuals worked with objectivist 
epistemological assumptions.  This may help explain why they failed to fully 
engage Burke’s point. “I was not disappointed in the response I expected when 
bringing up this subject,” Burke rejoins,
But I wish that some one had discussed the issue from my point of attack, 
the problem of propaganda.  I think we are all agreed that we are trying to 
defend a position in favor of the workers, that we are trying to enlist in the 
cause of the workers.  There is no issue about that.  The important thing is: 
how to make ourselves effective in this particular social structure?  I am 
trying to point out that there is a first stage where the writer’s primary job 
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is to disarm people.  First you knock at the door—and not until later will 
you become wholly precise.
The response of Burke’s critics, in fact, proves that his overall concern was valid.  
The writers at the conference were interested in theories about class struggle, but 
when issues of how to implement those theories were introduced, they fell back 
into intellectual posturing over their objective methods.  Burke’s critics failed to 
engage the primary purpose behind his speech: how to most effectively 
propagandize to a larger audience.  Burke was aware when he gave his speech, 
and so made it explicit, that his “suggestion bears the telltale stamp of [his] class, 
the petty bourgeoisie,” (273) but this did not change his overall purpose, which 
was to give communist philosophy a wider audience than the already convinced.  
Frank Lentricchia argues that what Burke’s critics had the most trouble 
swallowing was the following idea: 
that a revolutionary culture must situate itself firmly on the terrain of its 
capitalist antagonist, must not attempt a dramatic leap beyond capitalism 
in one explosive, rupturing moment of release, must work its way through 
capitalism’s language of domination by working cunningly within, using, 
appropriating, even speaking through its key mechanisms of repression.  
(Simons 284)
This was only part of the picture, though.  Burke spoke, after all, not to journalists 
but to what we now would refer to as creative writers.  His “implied bruising 
point,” Lentricchia argues, “was that the proletarian novel was both a literary and 
a political indulgence: applauded by the already convinced, unread by the 
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working class, quietly alienating to the unconvinced…” (Simons 285-6).  It is 
clear from his speech that Burke wanted literature to be social action, working 
cunningly within capitalist culture to change it from within.  
This desire cannot fail to engage us in the field of writing instruction.  In 
Rhetorics, Poetics and Cultures, Berlin argues that “social-epistemic rhetoric 
starts from Burke’s formulation (1966) of language as symbolic action, to be 
distinguished from the sheer motion of the material” (82).   Social-epistemic 
thought did not begin with Burke in the mid-sixties.  With Burke, it began early in 
his career, as evidenced by his desire to disrupt what Berlin so succinctly calls the 
rhetoric/poetic binary, not only in the field of English studies, but in the broader 
culture as well.8  Burke wanted to reach a culture beyond the field of English, but 
he was, as he said in his response to his critics, “speaking technically before a 
group of literary experts” (279).  This is why he was surprised at their anger at his 
using the term “myth” when referring to the working class.  “A poet’s myths,” he 
says, “… are real, in the sense that they perform a necessary function.  They so 
pattern the mind as to give it a grip upon reality” (279).  In Burke’s early 
philosophy, rhetoric is not a superior virtue we should have faith in, as it is in 
Becker’s schema.  It is, instead, a way to give communist intellectuals a stronger 
grip on the reality they hope to change.  His explicit use of the term propaganda 
proves that he was not sheepish about using rhetoric as an outright attempt to 
8
 Social-epistemic rhetorical thought, as Susan Kates makes clear in her Activist 
Rhetorics and American Higher Education: 1885-1937 did not begin with Burke, 
either.  Her overview of the pedagogical practices of Mary Augusta Jordan, Hallie 
Quinn Brown, Josephine Colby, Helen Norton, and Louis Budenz proves that 
many progressive educators were the precise embodiment of social-epistemic 
rhetorical theory and pedagogical practice.
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influence culture.  Just as Jane Addams saw education as propaganda, Burke saw 
rhetoric as an art of propaganda.   
While our two cases only give us a partial picture of the 30s, they should 
give us a sense of two rhetorical extremes.  Becker’s case illustrates a rhetorical 
space where intellectuals are either forced into silence, or if we take Becker as his 
word, where they can continue to express their “faith” in the free play of 
intelligence and the superior virtues of persuasion.  Whichever interpretive slant 
we choose to take, this decision creates a space for intellectuals to remove 
themselves from active political and social engagement.  Burke’s case illustrates 
the opposite rhetorical stance.  It invites academics to consider how all art—high 
or low—persuades, and to conceptualize this art for specific social ends.  
These two extremes outline a fundamental question for teachers: if the 
first-year composition course is responsible for introducing students to the 
fundamentals of language and persuasion, to what theory of language and 
persuasion should the teacher introduce them?  Should it be one that invites 
students to tighten their grips on reality and work toward social change, as it 
would be in progressive education?  Should it be one that invites them to loosen 
their grips on social contingencies and enter the realm of reason as mediated 
through their individual subjectivities, as it would be with humanist education?  
Or might it be even more prudent to have students focus on more empirical 
measures altogether?  While that is one of the central questions this dissertation 
hopes to answer, we can say at this juncture that Burke’s case complicates this 
question by changing the nature and meaning of persuasion and propaganda.  
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Burke’s philosophy expands propaganda to include a wider range of persuasive 
techniques—most significantly, inquiry.  In order to see this, we will have to 
move beyond his speech.  
In the “Preface to the First Edition of Counterstatement, (1931)” we 
discover that four years before Burke gave his speech to the AWC, Burke draws a 
distinction between inquiry and pamphleteering:  
There is pamphleteering; there is inquiry.  In so far as an age is bent, a 
writer established equilibrium by leaning (either as his age leans, or in the 
direction opposite to his age)—and this we might call “pamphleteering.”  
A writer will also desire to develop an equilibrium of his own, regardless 
of external resistances—and this we might call “inquiry.”  His actual work 
will probably show an indeterminate wavering between the two positions; 
he himself will not be sure just when he is inquiring and when he is 
pamphleteering.  And he may not be wholly satisfied by the thought of 
doing exclusively either.  (vii)
Knowing that Burke foregrounds inquiry in his rhetoric, we can reread an 
important part of his speech with new eyes.  “Much explicit propaganda must be 
done, but that is mainly the work of the pamphleteer and political organizer” 
(270).  What then, is the goal of the imaginative writer if not to engage in inquiry?
In the purely imaginative field, the writer’s best contribution to the 
revolutionary cause is implicit.  If he shows a keen interest in every 
manifestation of our cultural development, and at the same time gives a 
clear indication as to where his sympathies lie, this seems to me the most 
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effective long-pull contribution to propaganda he can make.  For he thus 
indirectly links his cause with the kinds of intellectual and emotional 
engrossment that are generally admired.  (271)  
This is fascinating because inquiry becomes not an end in itself, but a way of 
achieving the type of respect for an ideal that Burke knows will be needed in both 
the academic and the broader civic realm.  This example helps explain why the 
writer may not be satisfied being either a pamphleteer or an inquirer, but would 
want to vacillate between the two extremes.   
History Requires that We Lean: What Led Some Academics to Take a Stand
These two cases, while they give us only a partial picture, provide relevant 
insights into the cultural and academic conditions of the mid-thirties.  By the time 
Becker published his essay, the rising threat of fascism called into question any 
argument that suggested faith in abstract virtues of persuasion was superior to 
political action.  By 1935, some left-leaning scholars no longer saw the possibility 
of remaining in the realm of inquiry; some found it necessary to enter the more 
political realm of pamphleteering.  
In 1935, while Hitler was rapidly strengthening Germany’s military 
powers, and Stalin was forcibly industrializing the Soviet Union, Congress tried 
to protect America from another war by passing laws that would attempt to ensure 
America’s neutrality.  The U.S.S.R. responded to the desire on the part of some 
leftists for action by changing its course in its attempts to spread communism.  
While the Soviet Union did not “by any objective standard… pose much of a 
threat to the distant United States,” there was, in 1935, an “abrupt change of 
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direction: henceforth,” the Comintern ordered, “all Communist parties were to de-
emphasize the class struggle and seek ‘collective security’ with all antifascist 
forces against the growing Hitler menace” (Sirgiovanni 29).  Ironically, the 
Comintern understood what communist writers in the United States failed to 
understand when listening to Burke’s speech: class struggle would always fail to 
engage Americans, who assume that class is not an issue in the land of 
opportunity.  The Comintern’s shift toward establishing a Popular Front 
movement would have a much broader appeal to socialist-minded liberals.  
Richard Fried argues that the CP of this period enjoyed some success because 
“they embraced the democratic symbolism of the decade” (13) and that “the Party 
enticed intellectuals chiefly by its stalwart anti-fascism” (13).  But he also notes 
that the Popular Front influence was not truly significant.  “If American 
communism enjoyed its ‘heyday’ in the 1930s, this was only in comparison to its 
earlier—and subsequent—experiences” (31).  It is important that we not forget 
this fact when we look at the effects of anticommunism on writing instruction.  
American academics who gravitated toward the Communist Party during the 
Popular Front period were not part of a significant threat to American culture or to 
democracy.  In fact, most academics who identified with the CP during this period 
did so because they believed that fascism was a greater threat.
Schrecker writes more specifically about the slow process that many 
academics took to convert to communism during this time.  She notes that some 
scholars who believed in Marxism did not join the CP, while others converted to 
competing socialist visions.  During the Popular Front period there was a “critical 
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mass of radical students and teachers that made it easier for a politically 
concerned academic to transform his theoretical attachment to the left into an 
organizational one” (33).  Some of the cases she cites suggest that joining the CP 
was akin to an “adolescent ritual, one that seemed to give entrée into the most 
attractive social cliques” (34), but most academics joined because they were 
concerned about “the spread of fascism and the subsequent failure of Western 
democracies to stand up against it” (35).  The question, after all, was not whether 
it is better to suffer evil than to do it, which were the terms around which Carl 
Becker framed his argument.  The question more likely on many academics’ 
minds was: “which totalitarian force is it better to align with, a fascist one or a 
communist one?   Which is the lesser of the two evils?”  
For Jewish intellectuals especially, it became unthinkable not to actively 
oppose fascism.  Joining the Communist Party was a way to more actively oppose 
it at that time, though one could not have taken such a decision lightly.  The 
Communist Party was, after all, a revolutionary organization.  It did demand 
unquestioning loyalty on the part of its members.  Nevertheless, some academics 
decided that they could no longer, as Becker’s liberal did, express faith in the 
superior virtues of persuasion.  
This does not mean, however, that these academics tried to persuade their 
students to become radicals.  Schrecker argues that the vast majority of professors 
during the thirties and forties kept their party memberships secret, inside and 
outside the classroom.  They did not do this in order to indoctrinate students 
clandestinely.  In fact, teachers made little to no attempts to proselytize in class.  
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Many professors did not deny that they taught their courses from their own 
political perspectives.  “Taught,” Schrecker argues, “not indoctrinated.  The 
distinction is important, for whatever the intellectual quality of the Marxism these 
teachers purveyed, they all struggled to present it in an unbiased way” (44).   
While we cannot be sure in what ways these particular teachers avoided 
indoctrinating their students, we can say that the distinction between teaching and 
indoctrination will be at the heart of Cold War epistemological struggles.  While 
we must wait until the conclusion of this work for a full discussion of this 
distinction, Schrecker’s point about teachers struggling to present their materials 
in unbiased ways illustrates that even the most radically minded teachers in the 
thirties felt compelled to be neutral in the classroom.  
Putting Something Across: Objectivist Theory Gains Ground
In 1936, Roosevelt won re-election with a landslide victory, government 
became more a part of American life, and America passed two more neutrality 
acts, even though Roosevelt warned that if aggression kept proceeding America 
would be attacked.  In university culture, objectivist theory started to gain a great 
deal of ground.  We can see how by looking at the rhetorical theory of I.A. 
Richards, the broader cultural movement spearheaded by the Institute of 
Propaganda Analysis, and the composition theory of Hayakawa.  Generally 
speaking, these objectivist theories coincided with a gradual increase in Red Scare 
related paranoia.
I.A. Richards published The Philosophy of Rhetoric, a collection of 
lectures he gave at Bryn Mawr, in 1936.  Though these lectures do not specifically 
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mention pre-war arguments for neutrality, they prove relevant to our subject for 
several reasons.  First, he begins by bemoaning the present state of rhetoric 
studies in America:  
Today it is the dreariest and least profitable part of the waste that the 
unfortunate travel through in Freshman English!  So low has Rhetoric 
sunk that we would do better to dismiss it to Limbo than to trouble 
ourselves with it—unless we can find reason for believing that it can 
become a study that will minister successfully to important needs.  (3)
Apparently, Richards did not believe that first-year English was important enough 
to warrant further study on its own grounds, so he urged that rhetoric “should be a 
study of misunderstanding and its remedies” (3).  
Unlike Burke, who grounded his rhetoric in persuasion by way of 
identification, Richards grounded his rhetoric in semantics:
To account for understanding and misunderstanding, to study the 
efficiency of language and its conditions, we have to renounce, for a 
while, the view that words just have their meanings and that what a 
discourse does is to be explained as composition of these meanings—as a 
wall can be represented as a composition of its bricks.  We have to shift 
the focus of our analysis and attempt a deeper and more minute grasp and 
try to take account of the structures of the smallest discussable units of 
meaning and the ways in which these vary as they are put with other units.  
Bricks, for all practical purposes, hardly mind what other things they are 
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put with.  Meanings mind intensely—more indeed than any other sorts of 
things.  (10)   
Richards had the admirable goal of dispelling the idea that words can mean 
anything separate from their contexts.  The idea he called the “Proper Meaning 
Substitution” was the primary cause of misunderstanding.  
Though this aspect of his project is admirable, his project has objectivist 
implications because it attempts to suppress rhetoric.  “Persuasion is only one 
among the aims of discourse,” Richards argues.  “It poaches on the others—
especially on that of exposition, which is concerned to state a view, not to 
persuade people to agree or to do anything more than examine it” (24).  The belief 
that exposition is the highest form of discourse grew in popularity in this 
historical moment, both inside and outside of the academy.  
In 1937 the Institute for Propaganda Analysis (IPA) published “How to 
Detect Propaganda.”  This essay simplified Lasswell’s ideas about propaganda 
and introduced them into the public forum.  The IPA defines propaganda as the 
“expression of opinion or action by individuals or groups deliberately designed to 
influence opinions or actions of other individuals or groups with reference to 
predetermined ends” (518).  Propaganda is different than “scientific analysis” 
because 
the propagandist is trying to ‘put something across,’ good or bad, whereas 
the scientist is trying to discover truth and fact.  Often the propagandist 
does not want careful scrutiny and criticism; he wants to bring about a 
specific action.  Because the action may be socially beneficial or socially 
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harmful to millions of people, it is necessary to focus upon the 
propagandist and his activities the searchlight of scientific scrutiny.  
Socially desirable propaganda will not suffer from such examination, but 
the opposite type will be detected and revealed for what it is.  (518)  
The essay then offers the reader seven common “propaganda devices” (which are 
actually logical fallacies) and argues that these fool us because “they appeal to our 
emotions rather than to our reason.  They make us believe and do something we 
would not believe or do if we thought about it clearly” (519).  As in Lasswell, we 
see a reduction of the rhetorical triangle to logos, and—in this case—a more 
intense devaluation of pathos.  Pathos, in this schema, is not an appeal to the 
values and attitudes of a particular audience, but is emotion alone.  Emotion is 
dangerous because it can persuade us.  This is the reason Berlin can rightfully 
argue that the techniques of propaganda analysis are objectivist.  By reducing 
pathos to emotion, they intentionally suppress the idea that an audience has 
diverse values.  This reduction is a sophisticated technique.  It allows a skilled 
analyzer to classify all information that does not conform to the status quo (an 
acceptable definition of reason), as either emotion or as even more pernicious 
outside forces, wafting the poisonous air of propaganda.  
The IPA’s schema appealed to conservatives, but also many liberals as 
well.  For conservatives, it helped maintain the status quo.  For humanist liberals, 
it emphasized reason.  Even more ironic, though, is the fact that the IPA’s schema 
essentially mirrors the position of the communist intellectuals who spoke against 
Burke.  They too were saying, “We are scientists, not propagandists.”  In addition 
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to these broad appeals, propaganda analysis appealed particularly to writing 
teachers because it gave them something specific to do in the classroom.  The 
essay ends with an assignment for readers to start looking for the seven devices in 
newspapers.  “A little practice with the daily newspapers in detecting these 
propaganda devices soon enables us to detect them elsewhere—in radio, news-
reel, books, magazines, and in the expression of labor unions, business groups, 
churches, schools, political parties” (524).  This practical activity matched up with 
an important component of American intellectual life at this time, for intellectual 
life in America at this point in history was often tied to the idea that America 
could and should separate itself from the world through the superior virtues of 
persuasion.  
Whether utilized by the left, right, or center, propaganda analysis was a 
type of “rhetorical isolationism.”  It allowed its practitioners to separate 
themselves from negative perceptions of rhetoric by disavowing socially 
undesirable aspects of propaganda.  Of course, in the broader cultural realm, the 
right and the left disagreed about what types of propaganda were socially 
beneficial and what types were not.  While the IPA argued that these disputes 
could be resolved by employing the “searchlight of scientific scrutiny,” politicians
would discover later more politically motivated ways of detecting Communists.  
As we will see later in this project, the assumptions behind propaganda analysis 
helped to drive Red Scare politics, though—most ironically—reason fell entirely 
out of the picture: inquiry became inquisition.  
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Red Scare politics gained ground years before McCarthy arrived on the 
political scene.  In 1938, the same year that Hitler moved into Austria, the House 
of Representatives created a Special Committee on Un-American Activities under 
“arch-conservative Martin Dies of Texas” (Albert Fried 16).  What is most 
interesting about this committee is that, instead of addressing the question of 
fascism in America, it primarily pushed its partisan agenda under the guise of 
anticommunism.  Sirgiovanni explains it best when he contends that: 
Although the committee did accumulate some useful information on pro-
Nazi elements in the United States, Chairman Martin Dies… turned 
HUAC into a forum for attacking the New Deal and the network of 
Communist spies and sympathizers who supposedly had infiltrated the 
government under FDR friendly aegis.  But his ranking Republican 
colleague, J. Parnell Thomas of New Jersey, was just as extreme: He 
condemned the New Deal’s Federal Theatre and Writers Project for 
producing plays that were “sheer propaganda for Communism” (32).
Clearly, propaganda analysis was not only for academics; politicians used it as 
well, not for objective, scientific purposes, but in this case for a very specific 
political one: to return America to its pre-Depression, pre-New-Deal status.  
Just because propaganda analysis was used for self-serving ends, however, 
does not mean that it was an entirely bad cultural phenomenon.  It only means that 
propaganda analysis was sometimes used deceptively, as propaganda in its own 
right.  The same line of reasoning can be used when thinking about the effects of 
propaganda analysis on the field of writing instruction.  One of the most 
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influential developments for writing instruction before the war was the semantic 
theory of Hayakawa.  By reading his text, Language in Action: A Guide to 
Accurate Thinking, through the broader cultural analysis we have developed so 
far, we can more fully understand how propaganda analysis affected writing 
instruction before and after the war. 
In the mid-thirties, Berlin reports, Alfred Korzybski “was attempting to 
apply the techniques of scientific empiricism to the study of language” (93), and 
Hayakawa would apply Korzybski’s linguistic theories to English composition 
classes.  In 1939, Hayakawa published Language In Action.  Dealing directly with 
how words persuade us, it argues that semantics can help us understand how 
human beings react to words and how to keep ourselves from being manipulated 
by them.  We are not only affected by the words we use but by our “unconscious 
assumptions about language” (xi).  Hayakawa argues that most of our 
assumptions about language have not been exposed to “scientific influence” and 
are, therefore, “naïve, superstitious, or primitive” (xii).  His book hopes to do the 
following: 
… to present certain principles of interpretation, or semantic principles, 
which are intended to act as a kind of intellectual air-purifying and air-
conditioning system to prevent the poisons of verbal superstition, 
primitive linguistic assumptions, and the more pernicious forms of 
propaganda from entering our systems.  (xii)
The book also argues that the political climate of the time requires more scientific 
measures because we now live in an environment “shaped and partially created by 
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hitherto unparalleled semantic influences: commercialized newspapers, 
commercialized radio programs, ‘public relations counsels,’ and the propaganda 
techniques of nationalistic madmen” (xii).  This argument for the use of more 
scientific measures is, of course, extremely rhetorical, even though it claims to be 
scientific and therefore devoid of rhetoric altogether.  
Hayakawa’s metaphor of poisonous air suppresses the importance of ethos 
in rhetoric, contending that subjects have no other way to analyze the source of 
arguments without the use of science.  This places Hayakawa within the 
objectivist camp, but some aspects of Hayakawa’s philosophy are fuller (i.e., 
more empirical, in our terminology) than Berlin and others give him credit for 
being.  Hayakawa is interested in showing “language in action” (7).  Like 
Richards, he rails against the idea that “we often talk about ‘choosing the right 
words to express our thoughts,’ as if thinking were a process entirely independent 
of the words we think in” (7).  Hayakawa also hopes to bring about the use of 
science to improve our understanding of the way language works in process, the 
ways that “language makes progress possible” (13).  In addition to this, he sees 
language as a means of inquiry: “If a person is worried about ethics, he is not 
dependent merely upon the pastor of Elm Street Baptist Church, but he may go to 
Confucius, Aristotle, Jesus, Spinoza, and many others whose reflections on ethical 
problems are on record” (14).  
Despite these constructivist leanings, though, Hayakawa distrusts rhetoric, 
in some places implicitly (he refers to oral cultures for instance as “backward 
cultures” (13)), but in most cases explicitly.  Take, for example, the way that he 
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opposes the “verbal world” with the “extensional world:”  “Let us call this world 
that comes to us through words the verbal world, as opposed to the world we 
know or are capable of knowing through our own experience, which we shall call 
the extensional world” (16).  The verbal world stands in relation to the extensional 
world “as a map does to the territory it is supposed to represent” (16).  “If a 
child,” he goes on to explain, 
grows to adulthood with a verbal world in his head which corresponds 
fairly closely to the extensional world that he finds around him in his 
widening experience, he is in relatively small danger of being shocked or 
hurt by what he finds, because his verbal world has told him what, more or 
less, to expect.  He is prepared for life.  (16)
According to this theory, if the verbal maps do not correspond to the extensional 
world, the child could wind up in a madhouse.  Rhetoric, in this formula, gets 
equated with false reports.  “By means of imaginary or false reports, or by false 
inferences from good reports, or by mere rhetorical exercises,” he argues, “we can 
manufacture at will, with language, ‘maps’ which have no reference to the 
extensional world” (17).  General Semantics promises to reduce the potential 
harm of rhetoric, and—ironically—the potential harm of education:
Indeed, many are worse off than the uneducated, because while the 
uneducated often realize their own limitations, the educated are in a 
position to refuse to admit their ignorance and conceal their limitations 
from themselves by their skill at word-juggling.  After all, education as it 
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is still understood in many circles is principally a matter of learning 
facility in the manipulation of words.  (17)  
This concept of word-manipulation will become very important after the war, as 
several scholars will speak out against its use when writing about the first-year 
composition course, but it was a concern for other scholars who wrote before the 
war, as we will see later in this chapter when we look at Herbert Weisinger’s pre-
war composition proposal.  
What is important at this juncture is that Hayakawa argues: “At its highest 
development, the language of reports is known as science” and “by ‘highest 
development’ we mean greatest general usefulness” (31).  From this, Hayakawa 
presents writing exercises that are explicitly designed for “the exclusion of 
judgments” and “the exclusion of inferences.”  Of course, these exclusions are 
good things for students to learn to do, especially when students understand that 
these exclusions fulfill a particular discourse convention.  If these exclusions—
combined with the assertion that “judgments stop thought” (38)—become the 
highest form of writing development, however, then humanists and progressives 
both lose out:  writing instruction gets divorced from ethics altogether.   There is 
no room, in Hayakawa’s objectivist epistemology, for rhetoric to become a means 
of coming to judgments.  
Losing Ground: The Fragmentation of the American Left
At the same time that objectivism gained ground in the realm of writing 
instruction, progressives lost ground in the broader political realm.  In a letter to 
Kenneth Burke, Malcolm Cowley argued that the greatest blow to the American 
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left was Stalin’s decision to sign the Nazi-Soviet pact in August, 1939.  Historians 
tend to agree.  Sirgiovanni reports that the anticommunist forces grew stronger in 
the brief period before America joined the war and aligned itself with the Soviets 
(24), and Sidney Hook, who was “once a Communist or fellow traveler himself” 
(Albert Fried 51), became a major spokesman for the left, urging liberals to rid 
themselves of any communist leanings.  Schrecker explains that “as early as 1939 
[Sidney Hook] had warned the academic world to cleanse itself of Communists or 
risk ‘playing into the hands of a native reaction which would like to wipe out all 
liberal dissent’” (105).  This argument was not without merit.  Communists had, 
after all, aligned themselves with Hitler, a move that seriously undermined the 
Communist Party in America.  Earl Browder, the head of CPUSA had “recently 
assured followers that there was less chance of this occurring than of his being 
elected president of the US Chamber of Commerce” (Sirgiovanni 33).  The Hitler-
Stalin pact ended the Popular Front, and gave more credence to anticommunist 
liberals.  
There is some evidence that teachers in the field of English responded to 
the changing political landscape.  For example, the purpose of literature in a 
democracy was questioned in a 1939 MLA document, “Statement of the 
Committee of Twenty-Four.”  Mara Holt argues that individualism won out over 
collective thinking in this document because collective thinking began to be 
associated with the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939.  The writers of this document saw 
great danger in focusing on social values:
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The individual, thus submerged in the social mass, is merely a cipher, a 
helpless unit whose thought, feeling, and action are determined by 
impersonal forces over which he has little or no control… Whatever the 
errors of rugged individualism in the economic sphere, the concept of 
political democracy assumes the efficacy of rugged individualism on the 
plane of the spirit.  (qtd. by Holt, 544)
In the field of English then, we can see that some scholars responded to the 
political atmosphere at the time by reinforcing a rugged individualist brand of 
humanism in the American academy.  Whether or not this was a concerted effort 
on the part of English departments to divorce themselves from progressive 
politics, we definitely know that these writers wanted to divorce their field from 
the social emphasis that was central to progressive education.  Berlin implies that 
“The Statement of the Committee of Twenty Four” sets the groundwork for 
literature programs to be “seen as serving the individual and acting as a safeguard 
against collectivist notions that might threaten the ideal of ‘rugged individualism 
on the plane of the spirit’ and finally, on the plane of politics” (RR 111).  Any 
political environment that would allow literature to serve in this function only 
threatens to marginalize the more practical and socially based composition course.
Although rhetoric and composition functioned, usually separately in many 
institutions, the field of composition and rhetoric was not yet defined.  
Nevertheless, these tensions between humanist and progressive epistemologies 
certainly affected first-year composition pedagogy during this time.  Many 
humanists within English departments argued that composition courses were 
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unnecessary, and few humanists were excited about teaching them.  Oscar James 
Campbell, one of the members of the Committee of Twenty-four, argued that the 
first-year composition course should be abolished, and his argument reveals many 
elitist assumptions about the function of the university and university English.9
While it may be true that some humanists did not want to teach the course 
because it was based in practicality—an offense to the elitist sensibilities of a 
humanism based in belles lettres instead of rhetoric—I contend that other 
humanists may have solely been reacting against what first-year composition 
becomes when the political atmosphere makes it imprudent to bring debatable 
topics—topics that require judgment—into the classroom.  In other words, these 
humanists were responding against composition as it was conceptualized under 
the reduction of humanism to formalism.  
The calls for the abolition of the composition course would fail, in part, 
because the diversity of students increased and there was a strong push for general 
education requirements before World War II.  Berlin argues that this push was a 
“response to the Depression and the threats to democracy posed by fascism from 
abroad…” (RR 92).  Our analysis of Hayakawa makes it clear how the 
composition course fit into our national agenda at this time.  In addition, the 
broader communications movement, of which the composition course was often 
seen as a part, fit this need as well.  As Russell asserts, “the communications 
movement was interested in discerning how ‘good communication may differ 
from bad’—questions that Hitler’s propaganda machine had dramatically brought 
9
 See Russell’s “Romantics on Writing” and Crowley’s Composition in the 
University.
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to the nation’s attention” (CH 258).  Russell explains that “As America drew 
closer to World War II, the treatment of critical thinking in content learning took 
a backseat to the more pressing issue of its importance in understanding threats to 
democracy, such as propaganda…” (258). Generally speaking, therefore, the early 
composition and communication movement drew some of its power from this 
national need.  The field of General Semantics, and Hayakawa’s appropriation of 
that field, allowed the composition course to define itself in a realm separate from 
the literature course, which drew more on humanistic values than empirical ones.  
Paradoxically, however, the course also was circumscribed by its reliance 
on this national need.  By aligning itself so closely to the national agenda, the 
composition course limited itself to the exclusion of judgments in classroom 
writing, leaving it with little but the scientific value of reporting.  Because of the 
political atmosphere at the time, the progressive and the traditional humanist 
belief that students can learn more effectively by engaging political topics in the 
classroom was a less viable position for teachers to take up.  This made the course 
less interesting to teach for most in the field of English studies, which only 
strengthened scholars’ resistance to teaching the introductory composition course.  
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine the dilemma that most first-year 
composition teachers found themselves in at this time.  The world was rapidly 
changing and the country was drawing closer to entering another world war.  
Speaking generally, humanist teachers wanted to pass on a love for great 
literature; some were beginning to do this through a reliance on the New Critical 
method, thereby focusing more on formalism.  Progressive teachers wanted to 
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empower students to help create a better world and better institutions by working 
in dialog with student interest and concerns; some were focusing only on the 
progressive method, thereby focusing on the permissive.  In both cases, the 
political atmosphere seemed to be in conflict with the broader desires of 
humanists and progressives, asking instead for an emphasis on reporting objective 
ideas clearly and meaningfully, and on analyzing subversive materials—two skills 
that would keep the world safe for democracy.   
Humanists, however, had a safer perspective from which to argue for their 
desires than progressives in this political climate.  At the beginning of the 40s, 
things were getting much worse for CP members in American culture, and 
progressive ideas were often conflated with communist thought during this time.  
In 1940, the 76th Congress passed Public Law 670, which would later be known 
as the Smith Act.  This law gave the federal government “sweeping and undefined 
authority to go after groups it deemed subversive” (A. Fried 15).  The Smith Act 
made it “unlawful for any person--
(1) to knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty, 
necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any 
government in the United States by force or violence, or by the 
assassination of any officer of any such government;
(2) with the intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any
government in the United States, to print, publish, edit, issue, circulate, 
sell, distribute, or publicly display any written or printed matter 
advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or 
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propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United 
States by force or violence;
(3) to organize or help to organize any society, group, or assembly of 
persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or 
destruction of any government in the United States by force or 
violence; or to be or become a member of, or affiliate with, any such 
society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof.  
(qtd. in Albert Fried 15)
With the passing of the Smith Act, we witness a transformation from mere 
propaganda analysis to concerted action against propaganda.  America had not yet 
gone to war, but in its own isolation, it had attempted to keep enemies out by 
defending its ideological territory with law.  This act would become the basis for 
the anticommunist witch hunting that would follow the war, so it is worthwhile to 
consider a few of the questions that this act would have raised for teachers at the 
time.
While no academics were jailed before the war for teaching subversive 
materials, the teaching clause that was in the Smith Act would have been very 
intimidating.  Indeed, if such a law were in effect today, many would wonder if 
they could go to jail for introducing Marx, for instance, in the classroom.  “In 
1941,” Richard Fried reports, the Smith Act “enabled the government to jail 
eighteen Trotskyists for the high crime of being Trotskyists” (15).  How would 
academics know whether or not they were next?  How does one define the terms 
“advocating,” “abetting,” “advising,” or “teaching” revolutionary materials?  
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Could the introduction of Marxist materials in the classroom be construed as 
teaching the “duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing the 
American government,” even if the purpose of introducing these documents 
would be to critique Marxism?  Would publishers of the Communist Manifesto be 
the next group to become liable under this law?   To have these types of questions 
raised at the same time that many universities were making the first-year 
composition course a requirement undoubtedly affected the teachers of the course 
and the direction that the course would take in its future.  
Considering the Times: A Remarkable Proposal
In the age of the Smith Act, few people publicly raised the possibility of 
introducing controversial materials into the classroom, the kind of materials that 
could have engaged student lives and taught them the principles of argument.  
That is why Herbert Weisinger’s proposal in College English, in 1941, is such an 
exemplary case. He responded to critiques of the first-year composition course 
with a radical proposal for its time.  
Weisinger was already at the University of Michigan in 1941 when he 
published “A Subject for Freshman Composition” in College English.  An 
optimistic proposal, it gives the teachers of required composition courses a way of 
fulfilling the needs of the course, as well as the intellectual interests of the 
teachers and of the students alike.  Weisinger’s article begins by reflecting on the 
uncertainty that some teachers feel when trying to put together material for the 
composition course.  “As soon as the teacher of composition tries to collect 
suitable materials for his course,” Weisinger writes, 
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he discovers that English composition has no subject matter.  Whatever 
the subjects of discussion he chooses, he is informed that he is poaching 
on the preserves of the economics teacher or political science teacher or 
science teacher.  In desperation, he finally devises a curriculum which has 
a little of everything and consequently nothing of anything. (688)
 This concern can still be found amongst composition teachers today.  
Weisinger’s response is interesting because he turns to the notion of “clear 
thinking,” a goal often associated with objectivist teaching, in order to argue that 
the teacher of composition ought to be able to draw on materials from all fields of 
study in the composition course.  “If the principle that good writing is the result of 
clear thinking is to be at all realized,” Weisinger argues, “the teacher of 
composition must assert his right to draw on whatever materials he needs, 
regardless of the fields of specialization he must treat…” (688). In this case, 
Weisinger uses the eighteenth-century idea of perspicuity—“good writing is the 
result of clear thinking”—to bring political material into the classroom.  
This political use of the concept of objective rhetoric underscores Berlin’s 
argument that epistemologies often worked at cross-purposes during this time.  To 
Berlin, objectivist theories of “rhetoric make the patterns of arrangement and 
superficial correctness the main ends of writing instruction” (RR 9), yet, 
throughout his essay, Weisinger uses objectivist approaches for a different end.  
He argues that a composition teacher “has the right to consider in his classes not 
the technical information and the specific techniques of investigation of the 
several fields of study but their general significance in terms of human needs and 
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aspirations” (688).   He moves us into the realm of emotions (needs) and ethics 
(aspirations), which are of primary importance to Berlin’s transactional theories 
of rhetoric (i.e., precursors to social-epistemic theories of rhetoric).  In this case, 
the teacher of composition is directly involved in assessing and teaching students 
to assess the form, content and methods of the fields they will eventually enter.  
“While the teacher of composition is not a scientist,” Weisinger argues, “he can 
consider the problem of scientific method; while not a historian, he can trace the 
development of significant ideas; while not a political economist, he can discuss 
the merits of competing governmental forms” (688-89).  This vision of 
composition gives the teacher a very broad range of materials, setting the criteria 
for what enters the composition classroom as that which “will be most useful to 
the student in enabling him to arrive at some understanding of the world in which 
he lives” (689).  He ties this vision of the composition course specifically to “the 
task of the larger intellectual orientation of the first-year student,” (689) and then 
proposes that the composition course be structured around a “theory of 
democracy” (689).  
Of course the idea of connecting writing courses to democracy was not 
new.  Berlin argues that in the early nineteen hundreds there had been 
transactional rhetoric courses that had the specific goal of preparing students to 
live in a democracy.  “This rhetoric was the most complete embodiment of John 
Dewey’s notion of progressive education, reflecting his conviction that the aim of 
all education is to combine self-development, social harmony, and economic 
integration” (47).  But a closer investigation of Weisinger’s course proves that 
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this is a new type of democratic rhetoric. 
This could easily have been because 1941 was a highly politically charged 
year in the United States.  It reflected a political situation that Americans had 
never found themselves in before.  Weisinger’s article was published in April, so 
Russia was not yet, but only a few months away from being, an ally in WWII.  
The U.S. had not yet extended its Lend-Lease program to Joseph Stalin, but it was 
unofficially involved in a war with Germany in the north Atlantic.  The citizens of 
the U.S. were, by this time, generally behind FDR’s plan of action for involving 
America more directly in a worldwide defense of democracy.  So the overall end 
of Weisinger’s proposal, we can assume, would have met with approval during 
this time.
We can also assume that his means would have fallen in line with 
generally accepted teaching methods.  The first section of the course is empirical 
in nature.  It involves studying “the pitfalls of language,” “the pitfalls of 
thinking,” and “the perversion of language and thinking” that had been discovered 
by the Institute of Propaganda Analysis.  It also relies heavily on the traditional 
formalist modes: exposition, description, argumentation, and narration.  The 
course contains a unit on defining democracy, a unit of description—“what has 
happened to democracy,” a unit of analysis (or exposition)—“why has this 
happened”; and a unit of evaluation—“proposals for the revivication of the 
concept of democracy” (690).  What becomes fascinating here is that through the 
idea of reviving democracy, Weisinger effectively blends elements of General 
Semantics (objectivism), and current-traditional rhetoric (or more particularly 
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formalism through the use of the modes), with the overall social goal of 
transactional rhetoric for democracy.  This blending, I contend, takes formalism 
back into the realm of humanism, and objectivism back into the realm of 
empiricism.  Weisinger also defines democracy in a way that would have been 
appealing to both humanists and progressives at the time.  He optimistically 
asserts that students will most likely come up with definitions of democracy that 
include the following things:
Belief in the right of all members of society to security and work; belief in 
equality of economic, cultural, and social opportunities for all members of 
society; belief in equal interest, responsible participation, and control by 
all members of society in the process of government; belief in the use and 
efficacy of reason and science in coping with the problems facing society; 
belief in the idea of the brotherhood of nations and permanent world-wide 
peace; belief in the dignity of the individual as a human being. (690)
Even more interesting is the fourth unit of analysis, “Why democracy has failed to 
live up to its expectations.”  Weisinger contends that readings for this unit “ought 
to be from the chief contemporary antagonists of bourgeois democracy, namely, 
fascism and communism.  The fascist materials ought to include the attack on 
capitalist economic organization and its dependent institutions” (691).  This 
reflects faith, on Weisinger’s part, not only in democracy, but also in the ability of 
students to appreciate and come to a stronger and deeper belief in the power of 
democracy.  
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But he does not forget that there will be members of his audience who 
believe (or will have to deal with those who believe) that this is beyond the realm
of where an English teacher should be traveling:  “Perhaps it will be suggested 
that [the composition teacher’s] job is to teach sentences, paragraphs, and 
organization” (693).   He does not argue against this point.  Instead he concedes 
this point by stating 
exactly, but how is it possible to teach the writing of sentences which say 
precisely what they are intended to say, paragraphs which develop a point 
cogently and economically, and papers which argue a proposition through 
logically without considering the thinking of which the papers are but the 
expression?  In short, the writing is the thinking.  (693)  
While this would appear to be an objectivist theory of writing instruction, when 
we look more carefully at this quote in context we see that he simply turns an 
objectivist theory of writing instruction on its head.  Most interestingly, he does 
so for a very particular political purpose:  “I should like to recommend a shift 
from the accumulation of facts for their own sake to the humanistic interpretation 
of those facts” (693).  While those of us in the field of composition and rhetoric 
will most likely feel uncomfortable with an unqualified use of the term 
humanism, the impulse behind Weisinger’s recommendation—getting students to 
interrogate the concept of democracy in order to create a more fully democratic 
culture—is profound.  That Weisinger was able to propose this by blending 
objectivist philosophy and with the goals of transactional rhetoric may mean that 
this proposal gives us new ground for early composition theory.
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Of course, Berlin is also right, though he never mentions Weisinger’s 
proposal, when he argues that courses like these could work at cross purposes.  
Weisinger quips that his course is “barely disguised propaganda for democracy” 
(693).  One wonders how much ground toward social change could be made in a 
course that was structured the way his was.  Its emphasis on the modes limits 
students to definitions and proposals for the revivication of a concept, not toward 
specific actions.  Nevertheless, Weisinger rails against the idea that 
the function of a university is to find, record, and transmit information to 
students without in any way giving them a clue as to how to synthesize 
that information into a useful and fruitful method of gaining further 
knowledge and of applying that knowledge to the problems with which 
they as citizens come in contact.  The modern university assumes that if 
enough facts are thrown at enough students over a long-enough period of 
time, they will receive an education.  But, as I have tried to show, facts in 
themselves are of no significance unless they can be brought together into 
the making of positive attitudes and beliefs, and for this task the university 
refuses to take any responsibility. (693-694)
In this quote, we see Weisinger identifying himself with the progressive goal of 
reforming institutional structures through his teaching.  This blending and 
bending of categories exemplifies a contextually bound relationship between 
humanist, empirical, and progressive teaching philosophies.  
Proposals like this could have had enormous potential in the field of 
composition and rhetoric had it not been for the stifling fears of Red Scare politics 
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in the early Cold War era.  Some social change, even if marginal, could have been 
brought about had not rhetoric and composition programs across the county been 
stifled by Red Scare politics.  Our struggles with the Soviet Union could have 
helped us more fully interrogate the meaning of democracy in our writing 
classrooms, and this interrogation could have improved our students’ conceptions 
of democracy at the same time that it improved their writing.  Once Red Scare 
politics were fully underway, however, this potential was suppressed.  
Weisinger believed that academic process could only bring students to a 
fuller conception of democracy if it contained the specific agenda of interrogating 
and more fully defining the construct of democracy.  He did not believe in a strict 
objectivism, as we will see that “McCarthy’s academic henchmen” (a term I 
borrow from McCumber) did.  He wanted academics to deal with controversial 
questions in an ethical way, and to bring into question the methods of scientists. 
In his proposal, Weisinger argues that:
When modern liberalism first began to assert its claims it had to remove 
the process of searching for truth from the hands of an ecclesiastical 
totalitarianism and so raised the slogan of pure science.  But what was 
intended was the secularization of knowledge only and not the divorce of 
science from society; indeed, the seventeenth-century English scientists 
exerted all their efforts to follow the Baconian dictum to produce fruit, 
that is, knowledge useful for the advancement of mankind.  What has 
happened is that the modern university has taken over the slogan but has 
forgotten the circumstances under which the slogan was raised.  (694)
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Weisinger did not know, and could not have known in 1941, how much greater 
the divide between “the slogan and the circumstance under which the slogan was 
raised” would become.  He could not have known what disastrous effects this 
divide would later create, but his conclusion seems remarkably apt considering 
the damage that would follow.   The university, Weisinger argues, 
has traded honesty for respectability, truth for expediency, the world as it 
ought to be for the world as it is.  For the university must never 
compromise with the world; what it believes in, because it has come to 
those beliefs as a result of the most rigorous and honest thinking it is 
capable of doing, it must stick by regardless of what others, whatever their 
position and power, may think.  (695)
Before the war, a scholar optimistically reoriented the ground of the first-year 
composition course, overturning apolitical assumptions about epistemology by 
combining the best of humanist, empirical, and progressive epistemologies.  He 
proposed a course that would have been interesting to teach, and which had the 
potential to change the way our students think about democracy.  He proposed 
such a course because he believed that scholarship could stand up against power.  
This was, of course, before we entered WWII, before we knew about the 
Holocaust, before the atomic bomb, and before Hiroshima.  Proposals like his 
would finally reemerge, years later, but this faith in scholarship would be 
irrevocably altered, challenged by the questions of a newer, less certain, age.  
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II: Humanists, Empiricists, and Progressives After the War 
“It is the magician’s bargain: give up our souls, get power in return.  But 
once our souls, that is, our selves, have been given up, the power thus 
conferred will not belong to us.  We shall in fact be the slaves and puppets 
of that to which we have given our souls”
--from C.S. Lewis’s The Abolition of Man, 1947
“…for it is but a step from treating inanimate nature as mere “things” to 
treating animals, and then enemy peoples, as mere things.  But they are 
not mere things, they are persons—and in the systematic denial of what 
one knows in his heart to be the truth, there is a perverse principle that 
can generate much anguish” 
--from Kenneth Burke’s Rhetoric of Motives, 1950
Before America entered the war, Weisinger’s proposal explored the 
possibilities of using what we would eventually call Cold War conflicts in the 
first-year composition classroom.  Unapologetically democratic, his proposal 
argues that “the university in a democracy should teach the meaning of 
democracy” (695).  “But this is not propaganda,” he insists, “for democracy is the 
only philosophy which dares include in it the use of scientific method, which 
alone, of all methods of inquiry, is capable of self-examination” (695).  As we 
saw in the last chapter, Weisinger believed that the humanities could bring about a 
better understanding of the role of science in a democracy, but as the quotation 
above makes clear, he also believed that the self-examination inherent in 
empiricism was essential to democracy.  This optimistic stance was proposed 
before Hiroshima, before the destructive potential of science would fully sink into 
the consciousness of the American academic mind.  Few scholars after Hiroshima 
would suggest that the self-examination inherent in the scientific method would 
be enough to keep political power in check. 
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Generally speaking, the Cold War tension that most affected writing 
instruction centered on the reduction of empirical epistemology to objectivist 
epistemology.  As we will see, administrators used the power of objectivist 
discourse to protect universities from the potential encroachments of politicians.  
As objectivist epistemologies gained power, academics within the university 
appropriated objectivist discourses for their own purposes.  Political authority 
overlapped scientific authority, further removing it from the realm of ethics.  In 
order to understand how objectivist epistemology affected writing instruction, we 
must, in this chapter, do the following:  
1) Show how objectivist epistemologies helped protect universities from 
the Cold War political climate.
2) Examine the ways in which humanism responded to these objectivist 
pressures with formalist theory.
3) Illustrate how the left responded to this changing political climate by 
disassociating itself from progressive politics.
With these goals accomplished, we will be able to see, in a general way, how 
these responses affected writing instruction.10
Despite the growing awareness that unbridled scientific inquiry had 
destructive potential, science continued to play an important role in the shaping of 
our field in the early Cold War period.  In fact, it became the paradigm that 
composition studies would eventually shape itself around in the Cold War period.  
Science also played a role in shaping popular culture after the war.  Despite 
10
 The next chapter will be dedicated the specific ways these responses affected 
writing instruction.
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Hiroshima, most Americans trusted science.  According to one poll, 75% of 
Americans supported Truman’s decision to use nuclear force (Diggins 51).  Many 
also felt that the bomb saved us from having to invade Japan, and, as Cold War 
conflicts emerged, many felt that it saved us from having to go to war with the 
Soviet Union.  There were humanists, however, who hoped post-war conflicts 
could be resolved through better communication and through better cultural 
understanding.  There is evidence that this hope existed in the field of writing 
instruction.  
In January 1947, Signi Falk published “International Understanding: An 
Experiment in Freshman English” in College English.  From Faulk’s perspective, 
the war had helped us see that “now more than ever the world is very much with 
us, and more than ever have we the need for a greater understanding and a greater 
knowledge of other peoples, other ways of living, and ways of thinking different 
from ours” (196).  Like Weisinger, Faulk felt that the first-year composition 
course could “lay the groundwork for a more active world citizenship” (196), but 
Faulk’s assumptions were different than Weisinger’s.  
Weisinger’s proposal argues that students need to understand other types 
of governments so that they will be immune to other ideologies.  By 
understanding criticisms of democracy, students can more fully define and even 
improve the existing state of democracy.  Faulk’s proposal, on the other hand, 
assumes that students need to be citizens of the world by obtaining “knowledge of 
other countries and other peoples, the kinds of work they do and their chances for 
making a decent living, how they worship and how they play, and something of 
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their lives expressed in the best of their recent writers” (196).  In this way, Faulk’s 
proposal is a precursor to the types of multicultural theories of composition we 
see today.   Faulk comments on the interdisciplinary nature of the first-year 
composition course and its potential for drawing on world history, human 
geography and world literature in order to establish more active citizenship on the 
part of students.  Under Faulk’s plan, students in composition would study works 
about China, India, Russia, Africa, and Latin America, covering areas as broad as 
history, art history, economic theory, education, and anthropology—in addition to 
fiction and poetry.  
This rather large body of material gets limited, Faulk argues, by the 
teacher’s focus on the “service nature” of the course:  “To help students learn how 
to study, particular attention is given to material which requires them to take 
notes, to outline, to make summaries, and to write” (197).  There is less specificity 
in Faulk’s proposal about how to focus on writing than there is in Weisinger’s.  
Faulk’s proposal, nevertheless, is engaging.  As early composition theory, it 
suggests that the first-year composition course is responsible for the intellectual 
orientation of the student, not just a skills or a belles lettres course alone.  But this 
proves to be the last time in the early Cold War period that any writer in College 
English, CCC, or PMLA looks this optimistically at the possibility of learning 
about Russian culture.  
At the time, “international understanding” did not seem like an 
unreasonable suggestion.  The United Nations had been formed in 1945, and 
many Americans hoped it could bring international peace (Diggins 75).  The 
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United Nations had included education as part of its agenda.11  Faulk suggested, 
as a way of beginning the course, that teachers use the readily available pamphlets 
published by the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR).  This was also a reasonable 
suggestion.  After all, the IPR wanted to promote the same type of international 
understanding that scholars like Faulk wanted to promote in their classrooms.  
This agenda, however, differentiates Faulk’s proposal from the multicultural 
theories of composition we see today.  The assumption that education alone 
brings about international understanding ignores the way that education 
perpetuates the ideological agenda of the institution that hopes to bring 
“understanding” about.  An assumption such as this, which can still be seen in 
documents as recent as Unesco’s World Education Report 2000, fails to critically 
reflect on the way economic and military power inevitably conflicts with the hope 
of understanding.  
In March, 1947, two months after Faulk published this proposal, Truman 
appeared before Congress and promised that America would be responsible for 
intervening on the part of countries that were resisting Communism across the 
11
 Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads:
1. Everyone had the right to education.  Education shall be free, at least in 
the elementary and fundamental stages.  Elementary education shall be 
compulsory.  Technical and professional education shall be made 
generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all
on the basis of merit.
2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human 
personality and to the strengthening of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.  It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among 
all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the 
United Nations for the maintenance of peace.
3. Parents have a prior right to choose what kind of education that shall be 
given to their children.  (qtd. in World Education Report 2000, 91)
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globe.   His speech, described by most historians as exaggerated, was meant to 
“‘scare hell’… out of Congress and the Public” (Diggins 76).  It did, apparently, 
and indirectly led to Truman’s signing into law more stringent anticommunist 
domestic policy.  Truman could not ask Americans—and their tax dollars—to
support anticommunism abroad without doing something to assuage the 
anticommunists who argued that there was a threat within our own borders.  
In March 1947, Truman signed Executive Order 9835, which established 
federal loyalty review boards.  Albert Fried contends that this action “more than 
anything else [would] launch McCarthyism on its inexorable course” (28).  He 
argues that the Truman Doctrine and the loyalty review act worked in conjunction 
with each other:
The Truman Doctrine, it will be remembered, condemned communism 
everywhere because its adherents subverted their governments for the sake 
of Soviet expansion and conquest.  Such being the internal danger, it 
logically followed, all public agencies, state and local, and private 
institutions for that matter, must create their own loyalty review boards, 
with or without even the modicum of due process that the Truman one did, 
must acquire whatever material they could lay their hands on concerning 
people’s lives, habits, beliefs, associations, and relatives. (24)  
This conjunction of the Truman Doctrine and the loyalty review act created a 
fear-driven, downward spiral in America.  Looking for Communists everywhere, 
Americans’ anxiety about communism increased.  Because of our increasing 
anxiety, there was a greater need to look for Communists.  “A large component of 
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McCarthyism,” Fried argues, “was this process of cause and effect, effect and 
cause, feeding on each other” (25).  This process, we will discover, influenced our 
universities as well by persuading most of us to disengage our lives and our 
classrooms from the political sphere. 
But Faulk, suggesting that teachers begin a course in international 
understanding with pamphlets from the IPR, could not have known this would 
happen.  Faulk could not have imagined that, four years later, Senator Pat 
McCarran’s newly formed Internal Security Subcommittee would, in Schrecker’s 
words, 
swoop down on a barn in western Massachusetts and haul its contents 
back to Washington.  The committee’s loot, the files of a private research 
organization called the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), would show, so 
McCarran and his staff believed, how Communist agents had managed to 
engineer the loss of China. (161) 
Indeed, many Americans and many legislators believed that China had been ours 
to lose.12  Citizens looked for someone to blame.  Republicans not only blamed 
the Truman administration for this “loss,” they argued that it was the result of a 
12
 Edward Said’s book Orientalism and the rhetorical implication of his theory 
explains a great deal about how our conceptions of this “loss” helped open the 
realm for McCarthyism.  The need for America to more actively engage in the 
process of “dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient,” (3) 
was heightened when Soviet Russia “gained” China.  Russia would become, Said 
would argue, “a clever totalitarian enemy who collected allies for itself among 
gullible Oriental (African, Asian, undeveloped) nations” (107).  America had to 
respond with economic and political carrots and sticks to gain as much of this 
undeveloped territory as possible.  Rhetoric played, and continues to play, a 
central role in this process.
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conspiracy that was inextricably tied to progressive politics and the New Deal.  
Because many academics had been involved with the IPR, this case, Schrecker 
argues, assured academics that they were not immune from the House and Senate 
investigations that were mushrooming around them.    
By the time the IPR had been raided, however, many academics already 
knew that they were not immune from the effects of anticommunism.  After all, 
anticommunism had never really disappeared in America, even when Russia was 
our ally in the war.  In fact, some of the most rabid anticommunists had grown 
louder during WWII, perhaps because they were not getting the attention they had 
once enjoyed.  Most academics could remember that before Pearl Harbor, many 
Americans were delighted when Germany invaded the Soviet Union.  For some, it 
helped ensure that we could stay neutral in the war.  “If we see that Germany is 
winning we ought to help Russia,” then Senator Harry Truman had argued, “and 
if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany.”  This would, Truman argued, 
“kill as many as possible” (qtd. in Sirgiovanni 35).  Other Americans maintained 
throughout the war that Russia was a greater threat to democracy than Germany.  
(Diggins 8)13
Also, academics may have been continuing to watch the career of Texas 
representative Martin Dies, who (as explained in the last chapter) had been 
13
 But many leftists also opposed American involvement in the war.  Many, who 
had seen Wilson’s Fourteen Points violated after WWI, did not believe that war 
could ever make the world “safe for democracy.”  “In the twenties, Diggins 
argues, “the impression grew that America had been seduced into the war by 
bankers, munitions producers, and British propaganda” (9).  John Dewey wrote: 
“No matter what happens, stay out” (9).  
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leading the Special U.S. House Committee for the Investigation of Un-American 
Activities since 1938.  Though historians generally agree that his red-baiting had 
more to do with his hatred of New Deal and progressive politics, he had pushed 
his anticommunist agenda all through the war and afterward.  Sirgiovanni writes:
Dies used the committee as his personal vehicle for waging a demagogic 
crusade against a supposed Communist-directed plot to subvert the 
liberties of the American people.  War or no war, this was a mission that 
Dies firmly believed was far too important to be sidetracked merely 
because it might injure the feelings of a military ally.  (50)
Dies was considered a hair-shirt by many who served on House committees with 
him; he assumed that anyone who had supported Roosevelt’s progressive policies 
were acting under the worst motives possible.14
Given this political climate, it seems reasonable to assume that most 
academics in the writing classroom would have shied away from Signi Faulk’s 
rather optimistic proposal, and the fact that the IPR pamphlets would eventually 
be unavailable would be the least of these reasons.  A much safer approach to 
teaching composition in the newly developing Cold War period might have 
seemed to be to approach it through ostensibly apolitical means.  This was one 
reason why, after the war, General Semantics and propaganda analysis would 
come “to be regarded as useful in the teaching of language in speech and 
composition classes as well as in the communications course” (Berlin 94).  As had 
14
 One of his harangues compelled literary critic Malcolm Cowley, who was 
working at the time as Chief Information Analyst for the Office of Facts and 
Figures, to resign.   
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been the case before the war, the assumptions behind propaganda analysis 
mirrored the assumptions of our culture.  If there was fear and a certain paranoia 
in our assumption that large amounts of material entering our nation was designed 
specifically to subvert us, now, with the threat of nuclear war, the stakes were 
even higher.  Propaganda analysis allowed us to resist and neutralize the threat.  
During the war, the United States had engaged in one of the largest 
propaganda campaigns the world had ever known.15  After the war, propaganda 
played an important role in managing the fears that Americans had of increasingly 
destructive weapons.  As Guy Oakes explains: 
This plan constituted a system of emotion management that would 
suppress an irrational terror of nuclear weapons and foster in its stead a 
more pragmatic nuclear fear.  Civil defense programs would then be in a 
position to employ nuclear fear in their programs of human resource 
management.  Nuclear fear, properly channeled, would motivate the public 
to deliver the domestic support that was regarded as essential to the policy 
of containment.  (276)  
The manipulation and management of fear, in other words, helped the government 
move forward with its plans for keeping the USSR within its newly defined realm 
of influence.  It was important that citizens not be terrified of nuclear weapons, 
only afraid of the USSR and its potential for using them.  Civil defense had to 
convince the people that they could protect themselves.  Popular 
acceptance of deterrence as an admissible policy for achieving national 
15
 For a full discussion of this campaign, see Jessica A. Mayerson’s “Theater of 
War: American Propaganda Films During the Second World War.”
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security depended upon the credibility of the proposition that even if 
deterrence failed, the consequences would still be tolerable.  (291)
While much of this propaganda would not come about until the early fifties, once 
it was widely known that Russia had the bomb, the groundwork for this type of 
propaganda campaign was being set as early as 1947, as justification for the 
policy of containment (Diggins 81-82).
As we saw in the last chapter, the Institute for Propaganda Analysis stated 
that any particular type of propaganda “may be socially beneficial or socially 
harmful to millions of people” (518).  “It is necessary,” therefore, “to focus upon 
the propagandist and his activities the searchlight of scientific scrutiny.  Socially 
desirable propaganda will not suffer from such examination, but the opposite type 
will be detected and revealed for what it is” (518).  At this juncture in history, we 
see tensions between science, scrutiny, and the national agenda.  J. Robert 
Oppenheimer, who had originally approved Truman’s decision to use the bomb, 
“soon afterwards anguished about his decision, reminding his colleagues that 
physicists now had to recognize that they ‘have known sin’” (Diggins 51).  It is 
difficult, in this case, to know what would have happened had Americans 
demanded that the searchlight of scientific scrutiny be placed on propaganda that 
helped manage our fear of nuclear annihilation, but the propaganda campaigns 
that we conducted in America give further evidence that the relationship between 
science and authority was becoming increasingly rhetorical.  
The tensions that were brought about by this new relationship were most 
likely clear to many academics at the time.  While our government was in the 
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business of analyzing materials that could be considered subversive to our 
government and our Constitution, it was creating, through nuclear science, a much 
greater threat—one that was essentially being repressed, or “managed.”   Despite 
the fact, therefore, that in 1948 Henry Wallace’s Progressive Party drew “large 
audiences under the banners of peace and freedom,” (Diggins 105) progressive 
academics most likely suspected this venom would soon be turned toward our 
schools.  
That is precisely what happened in July 1948, during the Canwell 
Committee’s investigations of subversive activities at the University of 
Washington.   This investigation is important, Schrecker argues, because it set a 
precedent, nationwide, for university investigations.  Because this case is essential 
to our understanding of the effects that the Cold War had on universities, and 
therefore writing instruction, we will need to carefully analyze this case, 
historically and rhetorically.  
 “The Objective Quest of Truth:” The University of Washington Case
In order to understand how Red Scare politics affected writing instruction, 
we must first analyze the structure of Red Scare politics, the procedures that Red 
Scare politics hinges on, and the way that the responsibility for “disciplining” 
communist and fellow traveling professors often shifted from one type of 
committee to another.  “It helps to view McCarthyism as a process rather than a 
movement,” Ellen W. Schrecker explains, because
it took place in two stages.  First, the objectionable groups and individuals 
were identified—during a committee hearing, for example, or an FBI 
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investigation; then, they were punished, usually by being fired.  The 
bifurcated nature of this process diffused responsibility and made it easier 
for each participant to dissociate his or her action from the larger whole.  
Rarely did any single institution handle both stages of McCarthyism.  In 
most cases, it was a government agency which identified the culprits and a 
private employer which fired them.  (9)
The University of Washington case is significant because it is not only one of the 
first cases of McCarthyism in U.S. higher education, it also exemplifies the 
process that Schrecker describes.  Therefore, an analysis of it will help us see how 
Red Scare politics worked and why it was so effective.   
It will also give us a clearer picture of the objectivist pressures on writing 
teachers.  “McCarthyism was,” as Schrecker argues, “a peculiarly American style 
of repression—nonviolent and consensual... Its mildness may well have 
contributed to its efficacy” (9).  While this is certainly true, its nonviolent and 
consensual style also relied, we will see, on a particular type of objectivist 
epistemology.  This epistemology, in conjunction with the threat of disciplinary 
repression, had a great effect on writing instruction in the early Cold War period. 
As Schrecker explains, in the late forties there was great pressure for 
universities across the country to remove radical professors from their positions:  
The federal government’s loyalty-security program acted as a catalyst.  It 
transformed the Communist Party from an unpopular political movement 
into a threat to national security, and in the process legitimized the
practice of weeding out suspected Communists from the payrolls of other 
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American employers.  College teachers, it was quickly becoming clear, 
would not be immune. (93)
The American Association of University Professors (AAUP), sensing this 
pressure, decided to take a stand on this issue, and they supported in theory the 
rather bold argument that membership in the CP was not “in and of itself” 
grounds for dismissal, as long as membership in the CP continued to be legal in 
the United States (94).  The University of Washington was to be the first testing 
ground for this theory.    
The House Un-American Committee (HUAC) hearings at the University 
of Washington began July 19, 1948, and lasted only a week.  The committee 
found that there had been “few Communists at the University” (96).  
Nevertheless, these hearings had profound effects not only at the University of 
Washington, but also at universities across America.  Out of the eleven professors 
who were subpoenaed (six were members of the English Department), three were 
cited for contempt because they “refused to answer any questions about their 
political beliefs or associates” (96), and three refused to talk about who their 
associates were.  The remaining five admitted to having once been members of 
the Communist Party and were willing to name their associates.   
Raymond B. Allen, the university president, “realized that whatever the 
university did would have far-reaching implications” (Schrecker 97).  Allen was 
in a dilemma.  He knew that he “had to ensure that the University observe all the 
procedural requirements of academic freedom and take no action until the accused 
professors received a fair hearing from a committee of their peers” (97).  Allen 
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also knew, because of pressure from both the public and from the Regents of the 
University, that he would have to “redefine academic fitness in such a way as to 
exclude members of the CP” (97).  Allen met this objective by “showing that the 
professional requirements of ‘competency, honesty, and attention to duty’ were 
not ‘compatible with the secrecy of the Party’s methods and objectives, with the 
refusal of Communists to hold their party membership openly, with the 
commitment to dogmas that are held to be superior to scientific examination’” 
(97).  This strategy was decidedly easier than that of proving that the teachers had 
somehow taught subversive materials in their classes.  The HUAC, after all, had 
produced no evidence in this matter.
The university used the Committee on Tenure and Academic Freedom 
(CTAF) to hold hearings for the professors who had not fully complied with the 
HUAC requests, the three who would not tell if they had ever been Communists 
and the three who would not name names.  The two who admitted to being active 
members of the Communist Party—a medievalist in the English department and a 
philosopher—were fired, despite the CTAF’s recommendation to keep them on.  
One professor, a psychologist who refused to answer any of the questions posed 
to him by the university committee, was also fired.  This decision had the CTAF’s 
approval.  The three professors who refused to name names were kept on, but they 
were put on probation for two years after signing an affidavit that they were no 
longer in the Communist Party.  This decision received national attention, and 
Schrecker argues that “Allen took upon himself the task of explaining what 
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Washington had done and became a national spokesman for the movement to 
eliminate Communists from academic life” (104).  
A closer investigation of Allen’s documents proves this to be true in ways 
that are compelling to those of us in the field of rhetoric and composition.  Going 
so far as to publish the record of the tenure cases at the University of Washington 
as a book titled Communism and Academic Freedom, Allen redefines freedom 
with rhetorical complexity: “If the subsequent history of American education 
confirms the rightness of the University [of Washington]’s decision,” he writes in 
his introduction,
it will be because the further experience of free minds in a free society 
proves that academic freedom means not alone the right to hold unpopular 
views but the obligation to hold views which, shaped by the accumulation 
of tested evidence, are subject to no dictation from outside the mind of the 
holder. (19)
In other words, Allen explicitly argues that his decision will be considered right 
and just if academic communities in the future believe that academic freedom 
means that 1) professors must hold views that are the result of an accumulated 
body of tested evidence, and 2) that these views emerge from those findings, not 
from outside forces.
This statement reveals at least one thing about Allen’s position.  It shows 
that his objectivist assumptions about university epistemology, his belief that 
knowledge exists in an objective, empirically verifiable realm, were unexamined.  
He does not answer, for example, the types of questions we would want answered 
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in the field of rhetoric and composition:  How should a professor define “tested 
evidence”?  How much of this evidence, however it is defined, is required before 
it is considered an “accumulated body”?  And does not this accumulated body of 
evidence require dissent, in order to ensure that there is an open, continuing 
progression of ideas?  The field of medicine, to which Allen belonged, may not 
have needed to answer these questions, but the answers to these question would 
have been—as they are now—essential to writing teachers at the time.  Allen’s 
statement reveals a monolithic assumption about university epistemology, while 
the field of writing instruction, because of its interdisciplinary nature, often relies 
on multi-modal ways of thinking.16
Objectivist epistemologies have had rhetorical currency since the time of 
Locke.  Since before the eighteenth century, many scholars have revived the 
classical idea that language was a dangerous phenomenon, one that obscured the 
truth that was emerging in the scientific realm.  This led to calls for language 
reform and the belief that language could be “purified” of rhetoric.  The ideal 
form of language would be transparent, reflecting the truth that science found.  
Perspicuity would become the ideal rhetorical form, a form that was supposedly 
devoid of rhetoric.  Of course, while eighteenth-century language theorists were 
attempting, generally speaking, to foster a secular tradition that was divorced 
from ecclesiastical power, Allen used objectivist epistemology to enforce political 
power in the secular university.
16
 Janice Laurer and William Asher give a comprehensive picture of the 
multimodality inherent in our field.  Generally speaking, they discuss empirical 
inquiry as one form of inquiry amongst many, including “historical, linguistic, 
philosophical, and rhetorical” (3) modes of inquiry.
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Allen’s reliance on objectivist epistemology raises two questions for this 
study: What effects did objectivist epistemologies have on writing instruction 
and—more importantly for this study—what effects did these epistemologies 
have on writing instruction when they were formulated for this specific political 
purpose?  Of course, many scholars in the field of composition and rhetoric have 
explored how a purely objectivist epistemology hindered and continues to hinder 
writing instruction (Miller, Crowley, and Berlin).  For our purposes, it should be 
enough to say that objectivist epistemology reduces the rhetorical triangle to logos 
only.  “Rhetorical situation” and context disappear.  Issues of audience values 
(pathos) and writer credibility (ethos) are repressed.  On a practical level, teachers 
are encouraged to present essays in terms of their formal characteristics only in 
four modes—exposition, description, narration, and argument—without 
considering the fuller rhetorical possibilities of these forms.  In terms of the five 
canons of rhetoric, there is a strong emphasis on style and arrangement.  
Invention, delivery and memory become less emphasized, if at all.17  The end 
result of this type of instruction is alienation on the part of students from their 
own writing processes.  For instructors, teaching becomes primarily mechanical 
correction and checking to see that student writing “reflects” these disembodied 
rhetorical forms.  Many composition historians have dubbed this type of 
disembodied rhetoric, which is really anti-rhetorical, “current-traditional 
17
 Many writers echo the romantic view that invention is an art and cannot be 
taught.
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rhetoric.”18  This type of rhetoric robs teachers of one of the primary powers of a 
rhetorical education, the ability for students and teachers to take on perspectives 
and positions with which they may not necessarily agree and to learn to argue 
both sides of an issue for greater understanding.  This could include, of course, 
controversial, radical, or unpopular ideas.19
In order to understand what happens to writing instruction when 
objectivist epistemologies get formulated for the specific purpose of protecting 
universities from Red Scare politics, however, we have to look more carefully at 
how administrations dealt with anticommunism in American universities.  After 
all, Allen was not concerned with how his epistemological assumptions would 
affect writing instruction, nor was he interested in creating grounds for an 
academic debate.  Instead, he was working out an extremely effective rhetorical 
strategy for assuaging pressures from the public and from certain corners of 
government regarding Communists at the University of Washington. 
18
 For a discussion of current-traditional rhetoric, see James Berlin’s Writing 
Instruction in Nineteenth-Century American Colleges, as well as his Rhetoric and 
Reality: Writing Instruction in American Colleges, 1900-1985.  Also see Sharon 
Crowley’s The Methodical Memory: Invention in Current-Traditional Rhetoric
and Thomas P. Miller’s The Formation of College English: Rhetoric and Belles 
Lettres in the British Cultural Provinces.  
19
 We can see some of these fuller rhetorical impulses in Signi Faulk’s proposal 
and in Weisinger’s.  Faulk’s proposal, which hopes to achieve a greater 
understanding in the world by exposing students to cultures other than their own, 
emphasizes the experiences of other cultures, not the disembodied study of them.  
Weisinger’s proposal, which uses elements of objectivism to help students strive 
for a fuller understanding of the world, is explicitly linked to one ethical question: 
how can we use knowledge to create a better democracy?  These rhetorical 
impulses, though they are limited, get suppressed during the age of McCarthyism.  
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The reason Allen’s strategy was so effective was that it ensured that 
membership in the CP was outside the realm of academic debate.  Being a 
member of the CP did not mean one was too far to the left; it meant instead that 
one belonged to an organization that would pervert academic process.  This 
allowed him to avoid the issue of whether or not he was persecuting a small 
minority of unpopular Communists.  He shifted the focus away from that issue by 
inviting his audience to see communism as a dangerous perversion of the 
fundamental ideals of the U.S. academy.
Much of Allen’s language, we should point out, paralleled the Institute for 
Propaganda Analysis’s “How to Detect Propaganda.”  It argues, “propaganda is 
expression of opinion or action by individuals or groups deliberatively designed 
to influence opinions or actions of other individuals or groups with reference to 
predetermined ends” (518).  Propaganda, it argues, differs from scientific analysis 
because 
the propagandist is trying to “put something across,” good or bad, whereas 
the scientist is trying to discover truth and fact.  Often, the propagandist 
does not want careful scrutiny and criticism; he wants to bring about a 
specific action.  Because the action may be socially beneficial or socially 
harmful to millions of people, it is necessary to focus upon the 
propagandist and his activities the searchlight of scientific scrutiny.  
Socially desirable propaganda will not suffer from such examination, but 
the opposite type will be detected and revealed for what it is. (518)  
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Communism, Allen believed, was suspect because Communists did not bring the 
expression of their ideas into the public forum.  Meetings and memberships were 
held in secret.  They were trying, therefore, to put something across and bring 
about a specific action, which was the overthrowing of the capitalist economy in 
America.  It is important to point out that Allen is not exactly wrong on this point.  
The Comintern demanded unquestioning loyalty on the part of its members.  It 
was also a revolutionary organization that did not exclude—at least in theory—
the use of force and violence.  Indeed, anyone who belonged to a secret 
organization that met these criteria today would be considered suspect.  
Because Allen did not want to be accused of hypocrisy, he published the 
findings of the Committee on Tenure and Academic Freedom as well as his own 
recommendations.  Clearly, Allen wanted it to be clear that he was on the side of 
scientific analysis and not on the side of propaganda.  Unlike the Communist, 
who relied on secrecy, he wanted his opinions and his actions to be put under the 
searchlight of academic scrutiny.  In fact, he believed that 
if other educators will study carefully the record of the University of 
Washington cases, criticizing them and accepting or rejecting the 
reasoning we have followed, all of them may then eventually, by 
processes which are peculiar to America, to democracy, and to education, 
arrive at sound and wise solutions to these problems.  The University of 
Washington welcomes such criticism in the spirit of this great tradition of 
unfettered inquiry and judgment.  (13)
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While we can admire his faith in academic process and in democracy, what is 
finally most disturbing about this gesture is its hypocrisy.  After all, this is not 
merely an idea that is being discussed.  It is instead a record of real people who 
had already lost their livelihoods as a result of his decision.  Even more ironic is 
the proof that he did not follow his own injunction about holding views that are 
the results of an accumulated body of tested evidence.  As we will see, he only 
agreed with the Committee on Tenure and Academic Freedom when it was 
convenient for him, when he already agreed with the decisions they had reached.  
It will become clear, through a rhetorical analysis of Allen’s text, that very little 
scientific or logical argument takes place in his argument.  Allen claims 
throughout to draw his authority from science, but he draws his authority, instead, 
from his position of power.    In fact, a close investigation of Allen’s argument 
proves that he engages in propaganda of his own, wanting to bring about a 
specific action or end without considering any of the evidence that had 
accumulated in front of him.
Take, for example, the cases of Laurer Vs. Butterworth and Laurer Vs. 
Phillips.  In both of these cases, the charge that was eventually filed against the 
“respondents” was that they were members of the Communist Party, U.S.A.  After 
briefly describing the CP, and addressing the question as to whether or not it 
seemed, based on the evidence before them, that Butterworth (a medievalist in the 
English Department) and Phillips (a philosopher) would ever use violence to 
overthrow the American government (it was decided they would not), the CTAF 
boiled the problem down to “simply this:  Taking the admitted fact that 
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respondents Phillips and Butterworth are members of the Communist Party, 
U.S.A., is there a case for removal present under the Administrative Code?” (29).     
In both of these cases, the majority of the Committee agreed the administrative 
code provided no basis for recommending the removal of Butterworth and 
Phillips (29-30). 
This clearly angered Allen, and despite the fact that he drew on science to 
give credence to his position, he was not above using rhetoric to persuade his 
audience.  First, he argued that the committee was wrong to define incompetency 
as only professional incompetency.  Allen wanted the term incompetency to apply 
to any “action, condition, or attitude which interferes with the proper and 
adequate performance of [a professor’s] duties” (89).  He states that Butterworth 
and Phillips are incompetent solely because they are members of the CP:  
Clandestine activity such as Butterworth’s and Phillips’ in the Communist 
Party meant that they have forsaken their duty to protect the University’s 
integrity and to pursue an objective quest of truth in favor of a 
propagandistic mission entirely unrelated to real educational and scholarly 
effort. (90)  
In order to accept this argument, readers must first grant that Butterworth and 
Phillips engaged in clandestine activity simply because they were members of the 
Communist Party.  Butterworth and Phillips admitted to being members of the 
CP.  Earlier in his argument, Allen established that the CP was a clandestine 
organization because it required its members to keep their political affiliation with 
the party secret.  In this way, membership in the CP becomes “clandestine 
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activity.”  The danger inherent in this assumption, however, is that the term 
“clandestine activity” implies more than membership in the CP.  This sophistic 
use of metonymy, in which “clandestine activity” substitutes for “Communist 
Party membership,” allows Allen to imply action without having to prove what 
actions took place.  This politically effective trope allows Allen’s argument to 
proceed past the second, more difficult, warrant.  By blurring what clandestine 
activity actually means, Allen is more likely to convince his audience that these 
professors have “forsaken their duties” as academics.
While his definition of clandestine activity is blurry, he is very specific 
when he states what he believes to be the duty of an academic.  The duty of an 
academic, he argues, is to protect a university’s integrity and to pursue an 
objective quest of truth.  Here again, we see a tension emerging based on an 
unexamined objectivism.  Allen implies that academics have a duty to protect a 
university’s integrity by pursuing an “objective quest of truth.”  This does not, in 
any way, set back knowledge production in the field from which Allen came, but 
in the field of writing instruction, it creates many problems.  Just as scholars in 
the field of composition and rhetoric today would not see these two duties as 
interchangeable, later in this study we will see that it was precisely around the 
conflation of objectivity and integrity that writing teachers felt the most anxiety 
when responding to Red Scare politics.  
Generally speaking, teachers feared that there would be a fundamental 
confusion on the part of administrators about the definition of integrity and 
objectivity.  Teachers felt that if they brought any type of controversial materials 
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into the classroom, if they took on any positions that might be construed as 
objectionable to the community, they could be at risk of threatening the reputation 
of the university.  This could easily be confused with threatening the integrity of 
the university, as this particular case makes clear.  At the same time, teachers 
were aware that texts containing extreme, radical, and controversial ideas were a 
good way to engage students in meaningful debates, which in turn led to better 
writing.   
This issue finds little resolution during this historical period.  Ironically, 
neither Butterworth nor Phillips was ever found to have biased their teaching in 
any way.  Both seemed to be, the CTAF found, very “objective” teachers.  But 
because Allen fused the protection of the university’s integrity with the “objective 
quest of truth,” it would eventually become easier for him to “prove” that they 
were biased teachers simply because the university’s integrity had been called 
into question by the HUAC.   In terms of logic, this is known as circular 
reasoning.  Butterworth and Phillips were guilty of not protecting university 
integrity because their appearance before the HUAC threatened the “integrity” 
(i.e., the reputation) of the university.  
Of course this is not enough to argue for the firing of Butterworth and 
Phillips.  What Allen needed was a connection between people who have failed to 
protect the university’s integrity and to pursue an “objective quest of truth” to 
something related to academic incompetence.  That is why the final warrant in 
Allen’s argument becomes the most important one.  It allows him to make this 
connection.  People who fail to protect the university’s integrity and to pursue an 
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“objective quest of truth,” he contends, favor a propagandistic mission entirely 
unrelated to real educational and scholarly effort.  To accept this warrant requires 
that we accept one of the most common logical fallacies, the either-or.  In this 
case, we have to allow no middle ground in university epistemology.   Professors 
are either entirely off in left field somewhere—on propagandistic missions—or 
they are on an objective quest, not for—but of—truth.
Though it may not be well to overemphasize this point, something could 
be made of the fact that Allen chose to use the preposition of instead of for in 
relation to the objective quest on which professors should be engaged.  “The 
objective quest of truth” implies that we are passive participants in a disembodied 
academic process.  “The objective quest for truth” could imply that we have 
perspectives from which we stand when trying to find truth or argue for it, that we 
exist in our relations to truth in a constant state of dialog (or as Burke puts it:  
there is inquiry; there is pamphleteering).  Whether or not Allen intended to imply 
this with his choice of prepositions, his position on the matter is very clear.  As 
academics, he suggests, we exist in relation to truth as passive participants.  Our 
job is to report our findings to the community, not present our perspectives.  We 
can also assume that this perspective defines our jobs as teachers as well.  That 
may be why he assumes that there is no distinction between teaching from one’s 
own perspective in a classroom and trying to indoctrinate students.  
When we consider the warrants that Allen’s argument hinges on, we can 
see that he fails, logically, to connect the respondents’ membership in the 
Communist Party to their being on a propagandistic mission in their classes.  
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Through circular reasoning, Allen confuses the integrity of a university with the 
reputation of a university.  He sets up a false binary between objectivity and 
propagandistic missions, allowing no space for teachers to engage perspectives in 
the classroom, no space for rhetoric or the humanities.  And, most importantly, he 
connects CP membership to propagandistic missions in the classrom without 
giving any evidence that Butterworth and Phillips biased their teaching.  This 
means, if we assume that science is based on logical principles, that Allen’s 
argument fails to stand up to the searchlight of scientific scrutiny that he claims is 
essential to academic process.  Our analysis of this argument also proves that 
Schrecker is correct when she contends that McCarthyism is effective because of 
its structure.  Academics were, no doubt, aware of the logical inconsistencies in 
Allen’s argument.  One would not have needed training in the system of 
argumentation that Stephen Toulmin was revitalizing at this particular moment in 
history to see the inconsistencies.  If we were watching any of our colleagues 
being fired today for any of the same “reasons,” we would no doubt be aware of 
the same logical problems.  But the problems that academics faced during 
McCarthyism were not within the realm of logic; they were within the realm of 
power.  As we can see illustrated in Communism and Academic Freedom, it was 
permissible for academics to argue against Allen’s decision, but it was also 
pointless.  In the civic realm, however, it was dangerous to argue in any way 
against the demagogues of Red Scare politics.  To argue in this realm was to risk 
becoming a suspect oneself.  This would have made it more essential for 
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academics at this time to make concessions, keep silent, and pretend that 
authoritarian truth was actually scientific truth in order to keep their jobs.  
After all, academics during this time could neither turn to civil nor 
administrative law for defense.  It was not against the law to be a member of the 
Communist Party in America, but this did not protect a person’s right to hold a 
job.  As Allen argues:
It is not against the law for any American citizen to own stock in a 
company.  It would be occasion for removal, however, if it were 
discovered that a judge had prejudiced his decision by the ownership of 
stock in a company in such a case.  An important function of the 
University is to teach citizenship.  For this teaching to be in the hands of 
faculty men who secretly belong to an organization advocating the 
complete overthrow of the American system should be no more tolerated 
than the unethical and immoral behavior of the judge.  (91)
This analogy would have opened the door to an interesting debate about the limits 
of academic freedom if Allen had proven, or if the HUAC had proven, that 
Butterworth and Phillips had prejudiced their teaching in any way.  If they had 
taken an active role in recruiting students into the CP, if they had suggested to 
students that the time was ripe for an economic revolution in America, if Phillips 
had created a course packet containing nothing but modern communist 
philosophies, if Butterworth had been using Medievalism as a guise for thinly-
veiled communist propaganda, then grounds for an academic debate might have 
been set.  Some questions could have been raised in the public forum.  Not only 
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other educators, but the entire public, as Allen so optimistically asserted, “by 
processes which are peculiar to America, to democracy, and to education, could 
arrive at sound and wise solutions to these problems” (14).  We could have asked 
ourselves, “If an important function of the university is to teach citizenship, what 
does it mean to teach citizenship in America at the beginning of the Cold War?”  
But the analogy fails.  Neither Butterworth nor Phillips had tried to indoctrinate 
their students, so they were not like the judge who had decided in favor of a 
company in which she or he owned stock.  Butterworth and Phillips were found to 
be fairly “objective” teachers who also happened to be members of the 
Communist Party.  
Perhaps it is understandable why the University of Washington did not 
want to be the location for a full-scale debate in America about the limits of 
academic freedom.  No administrator wants that type of public pressure placed on 
the institution under his or her care, and one could argue that Allen had no real 
choice in this matter.  He could not afford to risk losing state support of his 
institution for a principle.  Because of the political climate around him, he had to 
sacrifice the livelihoods of two professors who were, after all, members of a 
revolutionary organization that seemed to stand in direct opposition to democratic 
principles.  But if Allen truly believed that an important function of the university 
is to teach democratic citizenship, his decision had tremendous implications 
regarding the type of citizen that universities would try to create in the early Cold 
War period.  “The great tradition of unfettered inquiry and judgment” (13) would 
be limited to the objective realm of scientific knowledge.  
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This issue cannot fail to engage us in the field of rhetoric and composition 
studies today because Allen’s conception of citizenship relies on a citizen 
becoming an object of truth.  The citizen is on a quest certainly, but it is an 
objective quest that seems to equate conformity with truth.  Allen explicitly 
reinforces this conception of the new American citizen when he responds to the 
Committee’s argument that the administrative code of the university “never 
specifically stated to the faculty that membership in the Communist Party was not 
sanctioned by the Administration” (91).  First, Allen reminds the Committee that 
he had on many occasions announced that there were no Communists teaching at 
the University of Washington and that the two defendants should have come 
forward at that point “to either disabuse the public of the untruth the President had 
expressed or to come to the President himself to admit the fact” (91-92).  Then he 
asks:  “If they did not think such membership was in disfavor, why did they keep 
their membership secret?” (92) 
They most likely kept their membership secret because they felt 
intimidated by his vehement proclamations denying Communists the right to 
teach.  They may have also felt that it was possible to be a member of the 
Communist Party and simply not adhere entirely to the CP line, or believed the 
CP line in their private lives, but kept it out of their professional ones.  We have 
to assume that Allen had considered this possibility (the majority of the professors 
in the Butterworth and Phillips cases argues this), but found that it was not 
politically advantageous to address it when responding to the case.  Regardless, it 
is clear that Allen saw a new function for universities in the early Cold War 
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period.  He had outlined this function in his inaugural address at the University of 
Washington, and felt that it was relevant to these particular cases.  Because of its 
relevance to our themes, it is worth quoting in the way that he excerpted it:
If a University ever loses its dispassionate objectivity and incites or leads 
parades, it will have lost its integrity as an institution and abandoned the 
timeless, selfless quest of truth… It is for this reason that a teacher has a 
special obligation to deal in a scholarly and scientific way with 
controversial questions… Fortunately few faculty members make this 
mistake [of not being scholarly and scientific].  If they do make it, the 
institution from which they come will lose its academic standing, as they 
will lose their security.  (93)
Allen then lets his readers know that he added the italics to this quote.  It is here 
that we see Allen at his most self-serving.  He too may be worried about losing 
his position and needs, at this point, to make it abundantly clear that he had 
done—and was willing to do—everything in his power to keep CP members out 
of the University of Washington.  So six words uttered during an inaugural 
address become a policy statement simply because, he argues, “this statement has 
never been challenged by anyone within or without the University.  I therefore 
regard it as not a mere statement of the President but as the policy of the 
University as a whole” (93).   
What is even more remarkable about Allen’s argument, however, is that it 
maintains, without qualification, that the central function of a university is to be 
on a “timeless, selfless quest of truth” (93).  In Time in the Ditch: American 
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Philosophy and the McCarthy Era, John McCumber underscores Allen’s belief in 
this type of epistemology.  It is around this phrase that McCumber centers his 
argument that the traumatic political pressures of McCarthyism forced 
philosophers to focus on the universal and the timeless, which in turn made 
philosophy lose the power to critique its contemporary situation.  McCumber 
implies that English studies suffered less damage than philosophy because people 
knew that English was needed and therefore was immune to the attacks in a way 
that philosophy was not.  This is only a half-truth.  In the early Cold War period, 
many people felt that the type of English that was needed was primarily 
objectivist.  The disciplinary pressure to conform to this type of English was 
certainly great, especially in composition and communication courses.  
McCumber is certainly correct when he argues that Allen’s statement “denies the 
teacher and scholar any other goal than finding and communicating the truth” 
(McCumber 99), but at least, in the field of philosophy, logical positivism was a 
method for examining truths.  When Allen’s statement gets translated to the field 
of writing instruction, it limits the teacher and scholar of English to no other goal 
than that of communicating an already present truth clearly and/or beautifully.  
This problem, of course, is central to this dissertation, so I will return to it later in 
this chapter, after reviewing more of the historical context of this case.
The Board of Regents sided with President Allen, so many universities, 
especially state supported ones, followed the example of the University of 
Washington.  As Schrecker explains:
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The University of Washington case had cleared the way.  As a result of 
that case and its aftermath in California and elsewhere, large segments of 
the academic community—professors and administrators alike—had 
decided that Communists were no longer fit to teach.  (125)
An investigation of publications in the field of English will show, in the next 
chapter, that we too were a part of this large segment of the academic community.  
Teachers in the field of English decided (either explicitly or implicitly through 
silence) that Communists were no longer fit to teach.  
It is difficult to know, looking back, if we could have done otherwise.  
McCarthy would later promise that he would be “‘going into the education 
system, exposing Communists and Communist thinkers… in educational 
institutions.’”  He had argued that he would be doing this, paradoxically, in order 
to “’promote freedom of thought and expression in college’” (qtd. in Schrecker 
180).   Allen most likely wanted to take care of the problem before outsiders came 
in to do it themselves.  Schrecker explains that Allen and others like him 
presented themselves as defenders of academic freedom.  In an important 
sense, they were.  For by redefining academic freedom to require the 
exclusion of Communists from the academy and explaining that necessity 
in professional, rather than political terms, they were hoping to keep 
outsiders at bay.  (105)   
Universities across the country felt they had to “cleanse [themselves] of 
Communists or risk ‘playing into the hands of native reaction which would like to 
wipe out all liberal dissent’” (105).  As it turned out, the decision that Allen made 
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at the University of Washington did protect academic freedom as it was redefined, 
but at a tremendous cost—not only to the individuals who were the subjects of 
anticommunist witch-hunts, but to the overall health of the academic community 
as well.  Like Truman, many liberals in the academy wanted to prove they were 
not soft on communism before demagogues could do more damage.  Whether 
academics had been members of the Communist Party or not, this must have 
created a stifling environment for progressive and humanist academics in 1948.  
We can also assume that first-year writing teachers, who were straining for 
political, economic, and cultural currency in the academy, would have found it 
even more difficult to employ the full potential of rhetoric in the writing 
classroom.  
Despite Truman’s progressive stances on racial equality and his reelection, 
anticommunism expanded exponentially at this time.  Schrecker argues that state-
level anticommunism applied considerable force to teachers after Truman’s 
reelection.  New York, Massachusetts, Illinois, Maryland, Pennsylvania, 
California, Oklahoma, and Georgia enacted loyalty oaths in the late forties.  
Obviously, the environment that the oaths and the well-publicized trials created
struck fear into anyone who had ever associated with the Communist Party.  But 
what is even more important is that the objectivist epistemology that universities 
used to protect themselves against anticommunist attacks affected teachers as 
much as the attacks themselves.  As the rest of this chapter will show, writing 
teachers felt an internal need to conform to objectivist epistemology at the 
beginning of the Cold War era.  Much of this need can be attributed to the effects 
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of Red Scare politics.  Anyone who had seen or heard the HUAC hearings knew 
that their methods had little to do with facts.  Because of the structure of domestic 
anticommunism during this time, it was either pointless or dangerous to try to 
argue one’s case.  This may have caused some professors in the field of English to 
fall into silence during this time.  Others, as we will examine later in this chapter, 
may have attempted to divorce themselves from politics by employing the 
methods of the New Critics; and others may have decided that it would be wise to 
prove their commitment to the American way of life by espousing their own 
brand of liberal anticommunism.
Anticommunist Liberals: the Move Toward the Vital Center
One of the most vocal of these professors was Sidney Hook, the very same 
“recent interpreter of Marx” and source for much of the communist voice in Carl 
Becker’s imaginary dialog.  “Once a Communist or fellow traveler himself,” 
Albert Fried explains, “Hook for years had been damning Communism and its 
soft-headed dupes—i.e., popular fronters—in the name of his own reading of 
Marx” (51).  Interestingly enough, when Brooks and Warren published Modern 
Rhetoric in 1949, they included Becker’s dialog in a section on “Articles of 
Propaganda and Opinion.”  This section represents many of the issues we have 
covered so far regarding liberal anticommunism: the Institute for Propaganda 
Analysis, Becker’s dialog, and the theories of Sidney Hook are included, but there 
are also works by Arthur Koestler, B.F. Skinner, C.S. Lewis, and Dorothy 
Canfield.  
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What is ironic is that all these articles point toward a liberal idea of 
anticommunism without including real works of communist thought.   Becker’s 
dialog, of course, is no real dialog at all: the cards are already stacked against the 
Communist.  Becker creates a dialog between a liberal and a Communist.  The 
Communist employs Hooks’s interpretation of Marx to convince the liberal to 
accept his position, but the liberal refuses, in exactly the same way that Hooks’s 
reading of Marx requires the liberal to refuse the Communist’s position.   
Likewise, the IPA creates a world view that encourages students to use scientific 
method to free themselves from the dangers of outside influences, but it does so in 
a less comprehensive way than does Lasswell’s writings on propaganda.  
Skinner’s article makes a case for behavioral science as a way of achieving “the 
ultimate goals of democracy” (536); C.S. Lewis comments upon the baseness of 
human beings; and Koestler argues that “it is time for the American liberal to 
grow up” (555) and face the ambiguities of living in a cold world age.  “Western 
democracy,” he argues, “is not white but gray” (554), but he believes that the gray 
world of democracy is better than the total darkness of communist Russia.  
Finally, Dorothy Canfield, while she strains toward some type of resolution 
between cultures, only emphasizes understanding between individuals.  “We can 
feel friendly,” she argues, “only with people with whom we have a good deal in 
common.  The real barrier to international good-will is that we do not realize that 
there are such people in every nation and every race on earth” (568-569).  
Because she believes that there are also “evil people” in every nation and every 
race on earth, all six essays reflect the basic assumptions of Vital Center 
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liberalism.  Brooks and Warren, by recreating the fundamental character of this 
type of liberalism in Modern Rhetoric, may have helped to ensure the economic 
success of their popular textbook.
Given what we know about the political climate at this time, Vital Center 
philosophy would have appealed to academic liberals, but this appeal has deeper 
roots.  Cronin argues that 
the legacy of New Deal reform and wartime planning, and its success in 
generating good jobs and decent wages, meant also that anticommunist 
liberalism could present itself as a politics of growth, as the political 
philosophy justifying and underpinning Keynesian policymaking, the 
mixed economy, and the welfare state.  (9)  
After the war, academics could gravitate toward the center as a way of arguing for 
economic growth in a mixed economy, which included further funding of the 
academy.  This funding, through the strengthening of the welfare state, could also 
help the government take a more active role in helping the working class, and 
because this type of liberalism was anticommunist, academics could try to stand 
simultaneously against communism and more conservative demagogues like Dies 
and, eventually, McCarthy.  A new brand of humanism, Vital Center liberalism
was a safer orientation from which to stand than progressivism, not to mention 
socialism or communism.  As Fried explains, the Vital Center formula, “posited 
the relevance to politics of the notion of ‘original sin.’  [It] warned of man’s will 
to power, a menace which could never be eliminated, and of the fallacy of utopian 
thought, which failed to take human weakness into account” (12).  What is 
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unfortunate about this position is that, while it may be intellectually comforting, 
and politically and economically safe, it is a repressive form of liberalism, for 
reasons that become clear when we look at Arthur Schlesinger’s 1949 book The 
Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom.
Outlining the basic assumptions of Vital Center liberalism, the book 
defines what being a liberal in the Cold War age should mean.   Because this book 
helps us understand this brand of liberalism so thoroughly, it will help to 
investigate the ways it relates to rhetoric and its use of rhetoric.  In this book, 
Schlesinger attempts to “report on the fundamental enterprise of re-examination 
and self-criticism which liberalism has undergone in the last decade” (vii).  
Liberals who grew up under Roosevelt’s New Deal, he argues, did not have the 
same type of faith in communism that liberals of a previous generation had held.  
Roosevelt had restored the liberal’s hope that democracy could and would take 
care of its own (viii).  “The Soviet experience,” he argues, “on top of the rise of 
fascism, reminded [his] generation rather forcibly that man was, indeed, 
imperfect, and that the corruptions of power could unleash great evil in the world” 
(ix).  Because of this realization, liberals and conservatives alike “discovered a 
new dimension of experience—the dimension of anxiety, guilt and corruption” 
(ix).  It is on this ground that Schlesinger built a new type of liberalism, a type 
that he believed would be “under attack from the far right and the far left” (ix) in 
America.  He explicitly states, however, that he will spend a great deal more time 
discussing how communism is the enemy of liberalism than is fascism.  
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It is ironic that the far left was considered to be a greater enemy to the left 
than the far right, but this irony underscores the reason that Vital Center 
liberalism failed to stand up against the more conservative pressures that were 
shaping the academy at this time.  Anticommunism in America created a climate 
that would not allow for real dialogic thought.  This is because liberal 
anticommunists—whom Powers describes as people who found the Communist 
Party both “despicable and annoying,” but who did not see subversion as a real 
threat to America—would always be overshadowed by what Powers calls 
“countersubversives.”   These people believed, wholeheartedly, that Communists 
were “infecting the country with collectivist values incompatible with American 
traditions, with the goal of eventually imposing a Soviet-style system on the 
United States” (214).  Cyndy Hendershot argues that it was the 
countersubversives and their philosophies that were “most readily embraced by 
the media” (109).  “Hence,” she argues, “the best-selling accounts of 
anticommunism tended to come from this camp” (109).  This fact cannot be 
overemphasized; it underscores the reason that McCarthy and other 
anticommunists would be able to capture so much attention in the increasingly 
important media spotlight.  
Countersubversives got attention from the media because of their 
extremism.  This media attention concerned academic administrators, who did not 
want radicalism to be associated with their universities.  This administrative 
concern affected everyday teachers, who did not want media attention brought to 
any of their teachings practices.  This is why conservative anticommunism, or 
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countersubversion, would always trump liberal anticommunism in the academic 
realm.  Administrators had to make their decisions in order to assuage the 
demands of conservative anticommunists.  Teachers had to make their decisions 
based on what could possibly happen if the general political climate got worse.  
Despite its claims for vitality, therefore, Vital Center liberalism was too 
subtle a position.  For leftist professors, becoming an object of an anticommunist 
witch-hunt was always a lingering threat, one that was always present in the 
everyday lives of teachers.   Red Scare politics disciplined us without necessarily 
being explicitly present in our lives.  The metaphorical power of 
countersubversive imagery increased the intensity of this discipline.  “In Cold 
War Motives and the Rhetorical Metaphor,” Robert L. Ivie succinctly describes 
some of the metaphors that Americans began to view the Soviet Union during this 
time:  
Summarized briefly, these vehicles illustrate the rhetorical essentials of the 
logic of confrontation.  The nation’s adversary is characterized as a mortal 
threat to freedom, a germ infecting the body politic, a plague upon the 
liberty of humankind, and a barbarian intent upon destroying civilization.  
(72)  
This logic of confrontation played itself out in many different arenas, including 
the academic one.  Countersubversives created an atmosphere in America where 
one was either with them or with the Communists.  As we know, people are more 
willing to accept the either/or fallacy on faith if they believe that times are dire.  
The anticommunist crusade helped create this ominous atmosphere in the public 
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imagination.  Against this backdrop, Vital Center liberals found it difficult to 
“sustain a delicate balance between their commitments to civil liberties and [their] 
commitments to anticommunism” (Diggins 171).  Administrators had to take 
actions that would assuage countersubversives, not the subtler liberal 
anticommunists.  Considering all this, teachers may have felt they had to take 
actions that would keep administrators happy if the searchlight of scrutiny ever 
fell on their teaching practices.  
The Center Holds (by Launching an Attack on Progressives)
Both conservative and liberal anticommunism placed enormous pressure 
on progressive teachers.  In his book, Schlesinger argues that capitalism weakens 
a nation’s resolve to face conflicts, and Schlesinger attempts to create a center that 
was not only vital, but that is infused with a masculine sense of vitality.  In other 
words, he attempts to respond to the countersubversive logic of confrontation with 
combat of his own.  For example, when condemning the United States’s reliance 
on the business community, he does not do so on the basis of the economic 
inequality to which the business community contributes.  He suggests, instead, “in
the end, there will be no one ready to go down swinging for institutions so 
abstract, impersonal and remote” (27).  To go down swinging, in this case, 
becomes an end in itself.  The left, he continuously argues, needs ideas and 
institutions for which people are willing to fight.  
This could have been a rhetorically effective strategy for his time and 
audience, especially when attacking countersubversives: 
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For the Neanderthals are alive and hungry, not to be appeased by slogans; 
they are shambling around, supporting the Un-American Activities 
Committee, campaigning against Keynesian textbooks in the colleges, 
conspiring against the trade-union movement, inveighing against free milk 
for school children and smearing all non-conformists as Communists.  
(32)  
Despite the ferocity of this attack, he saves most of his intensity for attacks on the 
left, especially the more progressive leftist elements that believe in non-violence.  
“One can admire the serenity of those who follow Gandhi’s faith in non-violence” 
he contends,  
But one must face the fact that none of these “solutions” solves very much 
except the complexes of the individual who adopts them.  They raise 
questions which must be raised; they provide the basis perhaps for a 
searching moral criticism of the existing order; but they leave the main 
forces of social chaos untouched.  A Thoreau or a Gandhi, who has gone 
himself through intense moral ordeals, has earned the most profound 
moral respect.  But it is a far cry from Thoreau or Gandhi to the ineffectual 
escapists who in their name engage in such practices as conscientious 
objection in time of war. (7)
To casually dismiss the moral ordeals that many C.O.s, who had not reached the 
literary or political status of Thoreau and Gandhi, went through during WWII was 
easy for Schlesinger to do.  There had been, after all, relatively few of them 
during WWII, and though America had not yet entered the Korean conflict in 
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1949, C.O.s would find—just a year later—that there were not many political 
platforms from which they could speak.
This attack on nonviolent epistemologies allowed Vital Center liberals to 
forcefully separate themselves from the progressive community.  Schlesinger uses 
metaphors of combat to more fully delineate this divide.  He also resorts to name-
calling, attaching the adjective “doughface” to the progressive liberal.  The 
defining characteristic of a progressive “is the sentimentality of his approach to 
politics and culture” (36).  In contrast to the Communist, the progressive is soft, 
believing in such naïve conceptions as the perfectibility of humankind.  The 
progressive, Schlesinger contends, also willfully ignores what Communists plan 
to do to America.  The “Doughface Progressive,” has many “fatal weaknesses:”
A weakness for impotence, because progressivism believes that history 
will make up for human error; a weakness for rhetoric, because it believes 
that man can be reformed by argument; a weakness for economic 
fetishism, because it believes that the good in man will be liberated by a 
change in economic institutions, a weakness for political myth, because 
Doughface optimism requires somewhere an act of faith in order to 
survive the contradictions of history.  (40-41)  
History and rhetoric both, Schlesinger argues, prove that humankind is not
perfectible.  The progressive is subject to the “endless task of explaining why, in 
spite of history and in spite of rhetoric, he does not always behave that way” (45).  
That is why, he argues, they have a weakness for totalitarianism.  People who fall 
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for the illusion of perfectibility find systems where the self gets subsumed by the 
state very attractive.  
Schlesinger argues that rhetoric continues to play an important role under 
totalitarianism:
People under totalitarian rule are hypnotized by such incantatory slogans 
into a condition of political exhaustion from which they can be stirred only 
by the most ferocious rhetoric.  Hence the mad-dog fascist-beast language 
which characterizes totalitarian oratory. (76)  
Here again we find paranoia about propaganda, but where the objectivist uses 
“pure” science to counter the effects of propaganda, throughout his book, 
Schlesinger uses, through an appeal linked directly to writing, the American ideal 
of the individual: 
Writers who accept easy social formulas may gain a superficial and 
temporary clarity about the world they live in; but they pay a price for 
allowing others to tell them what they ought to think and write.  They lose 
their own insights, and harden their talents.  Many writers who take this 
path become cynical, and even abandon writing.  They finally reach the 
point where they don’t know their own problems, and are completely 
disoriented.  The writer, it is clear, must have social perspectives—but 
they must be his own.  The susceptibility to programs corrupts the artist by 
distorting and eventually superseding the personal truths by which he is 
nourished.  (124)
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Remembering that Raymond B. Allen believed that the scholar should always be 
on a “timeless, selfless quest of truth,” we find proof that the ideal of the 
autonomous subject not only affected empirical epistemologies in the Cold War 
period, but also humanist ones.  In this case, the individual on a quest for “his 
own” truth served as ground for which a new humanist liberalism could be 
reformed.
Of course this liberalism was not really new.  Allen and Schlesinger 
represent the resurgence of Enlightenment and Romanticist epistemologies under 
different guises.  The emphasis on an autonomous subject that is engaged on an 
objective quest of truth mirrors an Enlightenment condition that Bender and 
Wellbery argue has to be present to bring about the impossibility of rhetoric.  In 
the Enlightenment, they argue, transparency and the notion of objectivity emerged 
“as the leading values of theoretical and practical discourse” (22).  Scientific 
discourse, therefore, became “anchored in ‘objectivity’” (22).  The emphasis on 
personal truths that we see in Schlesinger mirrors the Romantic condition that 
Bender and Wellbery argue has to be present to bring about the impossibility of 
rhetoric.  In the age of Romanticism, they argue, “the values of ‘authorship’ and 
‘individual expression’ came to define the literary domain” (22).  In other words, 
“imaginative discourse became anchored in ‘subjectivity’” (22).  What is new 
about this time period, however, is the way that the CP factors specifically into 
this schema.  Both the objectivism of Raymond Allen and the humanism of 
Schlesinger called for rhetoric’s exile.  In both cases the suppression of rhetoric 
was a necessary condition to warrant the exclusion of Communists—and anyone 
126
practicing anything that resembled communism—from academic and political life 
in America.  
The impossibility of rhetoric became so important during this time period 
because the Cold War was an entirely new type of war—ironically, a rhetorical 
war.  Rhetoric was inextricably involved with this war because this war did not 
require soldiers to enter combat; it required, instead, the enlistment of institutions 
on an ideological front.  In this regard, the very nature of what it meant to be a 
nation-state was changing.  It was not enough to be an American citizen.  
Citizenship in the early Cold War era meant having faith in the institutions of 
America.  The left had to find ways of unifying with the national purpose during 
this time or they would be marginalized in the same way as the pacifist minority 
that failed to enlist in the Second World War.  Schlesinger helps the left do this by 
attacking progressives outright, blaming them for weakening and dividing the 
political left because they too readily associated with Communists and communist 
philosophies.  
It is difficult to say what would have happened if academic liberals had 
argued for the belief that we, as American citizens, have a right to hold our own 
perspectives, whatever they may be, and that the government had no business 
inquiring into the private lives of law-abiding citizens.  Schlesinger firmly argues, 
given the political climate surrounding him, that “a true progressive movement 
has no chance of success unless it rigidly excludes Communists” (136), and—
depending on how one defines success—he might have been right.  
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For example, if his definition of success included giving liberals a more 
comfortable place to stand than a fundamentally leftist position, then the Vital 
Center formula was successful.  If, by success, he meant that liberals would resist 
violence in both its explicit and clandestine forms, then the Vital Center formula 
failed.  For example, he proposed that what our culture needed was a fundamental 
reformulation of the terms “right” and “left.”  They should be considered as a 
circle instead of line, as DeWitt C. Poole suggested: 
“Left” “Right”
    Gradualism
Liberalism Conservatism
            P
R
O
P
  L I B E R T Y
R
T
Y
Communism Fascism
     Violence
Figure One: Poole’s Reformulation of the Political Sphere
By using Poole, Schlesinger attempts to unite liberals and conservatives against 
communists and fascists with respect to liberty.  Neither liberals nor 
conservatives, he suggests, want a violent revolution in America.  Both parties 
believe in the importance of gradual change.  This makes the liberal goal of a 
more equitable distribution of property more palatable in the general Cold War 
climate.  While Schlesinger believes that this diagram provides an “ingenious 
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solution that reformulates the right-left classification in terms which correspond to 
the complexities of this ghastly century” (145), he does not interrogate many of 
the paradoxes that his presentation of the diagram contains.  
The first paradox revolves around his hypocritical treatment of 
nonviolence in his book.  He explicitly aligns himself against violence in this 
formulation, but throughout the book he wages war against progressives, who 
both believed in and practiced non-violence.  In fact, by definition, non-violence 
is precisely what separates progressivism from communism, but throughout the 
book Schlesinger not only attacks progressives for their non-violent tendencies 
but also praises the Communist for being “hard.”  By gradualism, then, 
Schlesinger does not mean non-violence.  We can only assume that he means faith 
in the power of the state to take care of inequities between the rich and the poor. 
The function of the state in a democracy, he argues, is to be “the means by 
which the non-business classes may protect themselves from the business 
community, if not actually launch a counterattack against long-established 
bastions of business power” (153).  To be fair, he shows an acute awareness that 
the economic status quo wrought a subtler type of violence on the lower classes, 
but he believes that gradualism will work because business classes will not resort 
to violence as Marx predicted they would.  Business classes, he implies, are as 
weak as “doughface” progressives; class conflict, therefore, is essential to 
freedom.  “It is the only barrier against class domination,” (173) he argues, 
implying that equality between the classes is essentially an unreachable goal.  
“Yet class conflict, pursued to excess, may well destroy the underlying fabric of 
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the common principles which sustains free society” (173).  The limited state, he 
believes, will help ensure that this excess is never achieved.  His stance, therefore, 
is quite different than the progressive’s.  The progressive hopes to use non-violent 
means to bring about social change.  Schlesinger considers conflict to be what 
helps ensure that culture will become more equitable in the future.  In this sense, 
while he hopes to see changes, he believes that the machinery is already in place 
to bring these changes about.  
This type of moderation would have appealed to many academic 
humanists during the early Cold War period, but moderation did little to help 
Vital Center liberals meet their stated commitments to civil rights and civil 
liberties.  Their own anticommunism served as the major roadblock.  This failure 
is exemplified with another paradox: Schlesinger’s treatment of anticommunist 
issues in his book.  While he argues, for example, against the “usual historical 
pattern regarding freedoms in America: hysteria, repression, and remorse” (196), 
he offers little that would keep that same pattern from reemerging in America (as 
had happened with the Palmer raids earlier in the century).  In 1949, he already 
knew that “the impact of these committees and of their amateur imitators can be 
seen most clearly in the field of education, which is one of the weakest links in 
the defense of free discussion” (205), but he fails to present any type of real 
“radical nerve” as a response.  
This failure can be seen particularly well when he addresses the issue of 
persuasion in the university.  “A democracy,” he argues, “in punishing efforts at 
persuasion punishes itself.  But a democracy has the obligation to protect itself 
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against hostile acts—against ‘substantive evils,’ whether espionage, violence or 
incitement, and against individuals who contrive these evils” (211).  There are not 
many people in America who would disagree with him on this point, at least in 
principle, but nowhere in his book does he attempt to outline how a democracy 
should negotiate the balance between not punishing persuasion and protecting our 
country against violence.  
He even mentions the professors who were fired at the University of 
Washington, but he never raises the essential question, “Did these professors 
really intend to commit hostile acts against democracy?”  He evades this point by 
arguing that we “must seek to strengthen administrators in the fight to prevent 
witch-hunting from spreading any further through the executive branches the 
black taint of fear which discourages independence of and originality of thought” 
(217).  This is certainly a good idea, but he does not give any suggestions as to 
how this could or should be done.  In fact, he completely undoes his own 
suggestion by insisting that Vital Center liberals “must just as resolutely reject the 
curious Doughface doctrine that prosecution of Communists or fellow travelers in 
any circumstance is a violation of civil liberties” (217).   Here again, Schlesinger 
implies faith that the machinery in place will take care of these matters.  
He concludes his argument with an affirmation of the importance of 
conflict in a democracy.  “Conflict is,” he argues, “the guarantee of freedom; it is 
the instrument of change; it is, above all, the source of discovery, the source of 
art, the source of love.  The choice we face is not between progress with conflict 
and progress without conflict.  The choice is between conflict and stagnation” 
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(255).  In no way, however, does he believe that communist thinkers, or even 
progressive ones, can contribute to this conflict or help us move forward toward a 
better goal of equality.  Schlesinger finds himself caught up in a third paradox, 
one he attempts to resolve by arguing: “in a more fundamental sense, does not the 
center itself represent one extreme? While, at the other, are grouped the forces of 
corruption—men transformed by pride and power into enemies of humanity” 
(255).  The center, he feels, allows liberals to situate themselves in such a way as 
to deal with contingencies as they arise.   
Radicalism becomes a means instead of an end, a method instead of a 
position.  “The new radicalism,” he argues, 
drawing strength from a realistic conception of man, dedicates itself to 
problems as they come, attacking them in terms which best advance the 
humane and libertarian values, which best secure the freedom and 
fulfillment of the individual.  It believes in attack—and out of attack will 
come passionate intensity.  (256)20
Our explication of Vital Center philosophy shows that at the core of this 
philosophy is a Romanticist notion of individuality coupled with an 
Enlightenment faith in reason.  At the heart of this is a belief in autonomous 
subjects, who will stand, individually, against totalitarian forces.  This philosophy 
failed to stand up to totalitarian forces in our own country, however, because it 
removed scholars from the ethical sphere entirely, allowing them to stand as 
objective witnesses in the realm of reason.  It gave them reasons not to act and 
20
 One wonders if Yeats, whom he invokes here, would have classified him as one 
of the worst or one of the best in his cosmology.
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allowed them to have, instead of a curious faith in the goodness of human nature, 
an even more curious faith in the natural goodness of the status quo.
Ad Bellum Purificandum: Transformations of Kenneth Burke
Kenneth Burke responded to the changing epistemological climate that the 
Schlesinger and Allen cases describe.  In order to see how, we will need to retrace 
our steps a little and analyze the ways that Burke transformed his rhetorical 
project during and after WWII.  In the fifties, both Kenneth Burke and Malcolm 
Cowley had difficulties at the University of Washington based on “their political 
sentiments and affiliations in the 1930s” (Jay 154).21  This is notable, considering 
the fact that Burke never joined the Communist Party, which was the basis that 
the university used to warrant the dismissal of several tenured faculty members.  
In the mid-thirties Burke wrote to Cowley: “I am a literary man.  I can only 
welcome communism by converting it into my own vocabulary… I am, in the 
deepest sense, a translator.  I go on translating, even if I must translate English 
into English” (qtd. by Jay 154).  In this particular case, Burke was writing about 
his book Permanence and Change, which he published in 1935, but the process of 
translating the objectives and tenor of communism into an approach that would be 
effective in American culture would continue to fuel the writing he did throughout 
the forties.  
21
 Malcolm Cowley was appointed Walker-Ames lecturer at the University of 
Washington in 1950, but he found himself surrounded by controversy as soon as 
he arrived, due to his association with “subversive organizations” (Jay 287) and 
later because of the supposedly lewd nature of his poetry.  In 1952, Kenneth 
Burke’s was offered a visiting assistant professorship by the English department 
that was then rescinded by the higher administration.    
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By the forties, though, Burke was finished with any and all Communist 
Party and Popular Front associations.  He did not, however, rush to renounce 
earlier associations as many liberals did.  In a letter to Malcolm Cowley, dated 
December 1, 1940 (a time when liberals, because of the Russo-German pact, were 
still clamoring in the public sphere to separate themselves from the Soviet Union), 
he exclaims:
God knows, I was sluggish about making the change from aestheticism to 
the social emphasis.  I never did make it completely.  At the beginning of 
it all, I used to say I would never join the Communist Party because, so 
long as I didn’t, they’d never throw me out—and now, at the end of the 
decade, I might rephrase it by saying that, though never having been 
hunky-dory with the Party, I now find no occasion to welch.  I am grateful 
to the party for this much: that at a time when I was in pieces, they upheld 
a program that enabled me to put myself together again.  And because of 
this service, at that time, I simply feel a slight distaste for this whole 
business of copying-making out of the welching act.  I saw enough of their 
finaglings to be discouraged long ago […] But I feel that, whatever 
reservations there are to be made about the whole alliance between art and 
politics, one should make these at a time, and in a spirit, when they can be 
made for purposes of enlightenment, and not when the writing of such 
stuff is just one last final bit of the same sort of tactics, angling for 
positions, etc.  (Jay 232)
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There is a great deal to admire in this position.  Burke was not willing, as many 
liberals were, to apologize for having once found within communist philosophy 
reasons to enter the political realm with his literary criticism.  As we saw in the 
last chapter, the rhetorical turn in his aesthetic criticism had been initially fueled 
by communist objectives, although he was not willing to leave aesthetic appeals 
behind.  This was based on a belief that more attention to aesthetics would have 
greater persuasive power with an American audience.  It must have seemed ironic 
that scholars all around him were now gravitating to the aesthetic realm because it 
provided a safe haven in an anticommunist environment.  
In this sense, then, we see Burke’s philosophical position remaining 
principled, but this does not mean that he did not adjust his philosophical stance 
to account for the new cultural conditions that were surrounding him.  A 
Grammar of Motives explicitly stated a new objective: ad bellum purificandum, 
towards purifying war.   As most Burkean critics agree: 
Burke’s 1940s writings were a reaction against formalism in general, and 
New Criticism in particular.  Anticipating by thirty years a post-
structuralist account of language, Burke in his Grammar of Motives had 
already developed insights into how the three fields of signification 
(Grammar, Rhetoric, and Symbolic)… are intrinsically related and 
inseparable from each other.  (Behr 45)22
22
 For a fuller discussion of arguments as to whether or not Kenneth Burke 
anticipated post-structuralism see Timothy Crusius’s Kenneth Burke and the 
Conversation After Philosophy.
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Burke’s theory of dramatism and its corresponding visual representation the 
pentad, which he developed in Grammar and utilized in Rhetoric of Motives, 
provided a method that not only explained how human motives are a function of 
language, but also gave the critic a way of asking better questions in order to 
create new orientations.  They did so by investigating the social and cultural 
settings of language and the work of art.    
Dramatism would provide a way out of some of the problems inherent in 
his idea of perspective by incongruities.  Debra Hawhee explains that “[Burke 
was often] concerned with crises and the forcing of new orientations, and this 
sentiment was most strongly manifested in his notion of perspective by 
incongruity” (134).  Like many what we would now call social-epistemic 
rhetoricians, Burke wanted to “expose language as a deceptive, powerful tool that 
masquerades as ‘truth’, thus engendering entire ethical systems” (136).  Burke 
was concerned with “the space where incongruous perspectives clash,” noting that 
“the state of transition is often violent, rife with trauma” (137).  He was aware of 
the ways that language enacted trauma in ethical systems.  Burke saw the written 
word as a place where this violence could be contained instead of being enacted 
upon human flesh.  Burke saw language, in other words, as “a locus for 
perspective by incongruity, a place where incongruous metaphors can be pushed 
together to create new ways of viewing the world” (141). 
In his middle period, though, Burke linked perspective by incongruity with 
dramatism.  As Stephen Bygrave argues, 
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the Burke of his middle period will explain and defend his methodology in 
terms of its holistic possibilities.  Irony may become tautology; the end of 
incongruity is congruity.  Burke does privilege his method with an 
Olympian perspective and does imply a potential for cure as well as 
merely for diagnosis.  (68)  
This Olympian perspective distinguishes Burke from many social-epistemic 
rhetoricians because his project is finally “interpretive, superstructural, and 
hopeful” (72).  Because perspective by incongruity alone has the potential for
sinister functions, 
Burke moves to … his own kind of ‘identification’ by which he claims 
that vice and virtue, normal and abnormal, upwards and downwards, 
exposition and exhortation can be reconciled, and encompassed within the 
fuller perspective of… Dramatism.  (70)  
In light of Bygrave’s argument, we must think of Burke’s philosophy as more 
than that created in the limited aspects of perspective by incongruities.  We must 
also see Burke’s incongruities within the wider comedic frame created by 
dramatism.  In the Grammar, Burke hoped to use dramatism as a way of purifying 
war.  Therefore, “the Grammar was at peace insofar as it contemplated the 
paradoxes common to all men, the universal resources of verbal placement” (23).  
And though he had not yet written Symbolic of Motives,23 he knew that 
The Symbolic should be at peace, in that the individual substances, or 
entities, or constituted acts are there considered in their uniqueness, hence 
23
 This book, never entirely finished by Burke, only exists as an incomplete, 
unpublished manuscript.
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outside the realm of conflict.  For individual universes, as such, do not 
compete.  Each merely is, being its own self-sufficient realm of discourse.  
And the Symbolic thus considers each thing as a set of interrelated terms 
all conspiring to round out their identity as participants in a common 
substance of meaning.  An individual does in actuality compete with other 
individuals.  But within the rules of Symbolic, the individual is treated 
merely as a self-subsistent unit proclaiming its peculiar nature.  It is “at 
peace,” in that its terms cooperate in modifying one another.  (Rhetoric
23)
The symbolic realm, then, constitutes the wider frame that Bygrave discusses, but 
Burke is not naïve about the symbolic realm.  He knows that existing 
simultaneously within that frame is conflict, and “insofar as the individual is 
involved in conflict with other individuals or groups, the study of this same 
individual would fall under the head of Rhetoric” (23).  We remember Burke 
primarily for his rhetoric, but we should not forget the wider symbolic 
possibilities in Burke’s philosophy. 
For our purposes, it is essential that we understand the frame that Burke 
was developing for dramatism during this time because it will later help us 
understand more fully the speech he gave at one of the earliest CCCC 
conventions, a speech about which very little has been written but which has 
profound implications for our field.  Had the timing been right, this rhetorical 
perspective could have fueled a better philosophy of first-year composition in the 
university.  But the timing for a Burkean philosophy of composition could not 
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have been worse.  In order to understand why, we must first look more 
particularly at the general climate of anticommunism and how it was affecting 
writing in the late forties and early fifties.
Humanism and Objectivism in the Composition Classroom
As many composition historians have noted, academics in English studies 
gravitated after the war toward a type of teaching based on New Criticism.  
Politically speaking, this proved to be quite effective.  For both teachers of 
literature and teachers of composition, it removed the temptations of dealing with 
political topics in the classroom.  After all, “academic humanists in the fifties had 
special reasons for wanting politics not to exist,” (Ohmann 80).  As Richard 
Ohmann argues:  
McCarthy had made activism improvident for college teachers at the start 
of the decade, and, in any case, the Cold War had reduced ideology to 
seeming inevitabilities of free world and iron curtain, while drastically 
narrowing the range of domestic political positions available… (80) 
While Ohmann is wrong to blame only McCarthy for this improvidence on the 
part of teachers to be activists, it was generally true that teachers of literature and 
those who used literature in their composition classes could use New Criticism as 
“a rationale for our divorcing work from politics, for lying low in society” (80).  
On a larger scale, New Criticism provided a convenient means for teachers to 
divorce their academic careers from political action because New Criticism also 
helped them define their careers more objectively.  As Berlin puts it, the New 
Critical method 
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was providing an approach to literature and its teaching that could serve as 
the basis for the disciple of literary studies.  This critical method promised 
a common professional purpose to unify the diverse factions within the 
English departments.  It was especially appealing because it was 
politically sage at a time when academics were becoming the objects of 
witch hunts led by the most powerful political figures in the county. 
(Berlin 107)  
Berlin argues that this was a time when English Department members “began to 
protest any method of teaching writing that was not based on the study of 
literature” (107), but we cannot assume that this was solely because of 
anticommunism.  We have to assume that many people wanted to use literature in 
their composition classes because they were interested in literature.  New 
Criticism would have given them a more solid argument and confidence for using 
this method.  It was based on seemingly scientific, objective principles.  In many 
ways, then, it related directly to Allen’s injunction that academics could protect 
the integrity of the university by pursuing an objective truth.  This truth would 
reside in the text, in the work of art as text, separated from the personal and 
political culture of the author’s life and times.  
We can also assume that the threat of domestic anticommunism and the 
trend toward objectivism that it enacted left little for composition teachers to use
in the classroom except literature.  There could neither be emphasis, Berlin 
argues, on creative writing, nor specific rhetorical contexts, nor politics (107-
108).  This is why Berlin argues that 
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this call for literature in the writing class was, at least in part, an obvious 
response to the political climate of the Cold War period, a time when those 
who called for collective solutions to social problems could be charged 
with a softness on communism.  (109-110)  
When we look at it in this light, we can see that New Criticism not only protected 
English professors from anticommunism, it protected them from the dreariness 
that composition could become under anticommunism, which was dull and 
lifeless when student writing by necessity had to be divorced from any political or 
rhetorical context.
These pressures are unfortunate because they came at a time that was 
“crucial for writing instruction … because the pace of change accelerated so 
dramatically [after the war]” (Russell 239).  Conservative critics argued then (as 
they do now) that progressive education was the reason that poor writers were 
emerging in our educational system.  Nonetheless, “the real culprit,” Russell 
contends, “was the very success of the economic and educational systems in 
raising expectations, combined with the old assumption that writing was a single 
skill, independent of specific contexts” (240).   This contention has deeper 
implications now that we have considered the objectivist pressures that were 
behind academic responses to domestic anticommunism.  The deepest part of the 
irony lies in the fact that critics attacked universities politically at the same time 
that they attacked their failure to produce good writers.  Like individual teachers, 
administrators often took the same two courses of action.  
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For example, at Harvard, administrators devised the “Redbook.”  Russell 
wryly suggests that the Harvard report
might have been titled ‘General Education for the Cold War,’ for… the 
new experiments were fundamentally conservative in character, stressing 
the great books and the great ideas of Western civilization as an antidote 
to the ideological dangers at home and abroad.  (252)
Russell reports that the Redbook devoted only two pages specifically to writing 
instruction and that it insisted on a New Critical method of “close reading and 
explication devoid of historical or ideological criticism” (253).  The faculty at 
Harvard, however, did not even follow the guidelines set forth in the Red Book 
itself.  Instead, “the faculty concluded that it would be enough simply to expose 
students to a ‘great mind at work’; questions of what, when, and how students 
wrote were left to individual instructors, and the writing instruction and grading 
were left to graduate assistants” (254).  This points to the assumption that writing 
is something completely separate from content and the assumption that 
epistemology is not socially created, but drawn instead from an empirical reality.  
It also shows that, in practice, the way that literature was taught in the 
composition course (at Harvard at least) was often based upon a rather mystical 
process, instead of on the more measurable objectives that empiricism allows.  In 
other words, the administration called for objectivism, but the literature faculty 
responded with a formalist pedagogy.
This may help explain why teachers continued to ask after WWII if 
composition classes should even exist.  As Russell argues in “Romantics on 
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Writing: Liberal Culture and the Abolition of Composition Courses,” “no other 
subject of study in the university has been so persistently and bitterly attacked” 
(132) as the composition class.  When we consider this opposition, however, 
through the lens of what we have learned so far about the effects of Cold War 
conflicts on universities, the opposition to the composition course becomes even 
more interesting.  Russell argues that the elitism that resides in liberal academic 
culture will always resist the “democratic, vocational, and scientific orientation of 
the new university” (133).  Furthermore, he suggests that, even up to the nineteen 
fifties, “advocates of liberal culture resisted the encroachments of scientific and 
professional fields as middle class barbarism, which thwarted liberal culture’s 
Arnoldian ideal of the ‘well-rounded man’” (133-4).  If this is true, we should 
consider the relationship between the pressures toward objectivism and the 
humanist/formalist resistance to the scientific and professional orientation of the 
composition course.  
This tension between liberal humanism and objectivism, after all, 
complicates our argument.  In Composition and the University, Sharon Crowley 
firmly disagrees with Berlin’s association of current-traditional thought with what 
Berlin calls positivism (and what we call objectivism).  “Given that both current-
traditional rhetoric and Freshman English were invented and maintained by 
humanists rather than by scientists and engineers” she quips, “this is an 
unsatisfactory explanation for its intellectual dominance of the required course” 
(94).  She argues that because “current-traditional rhetoric is not a rhetoric at all,” 
(94) its primary emphasis is form.  Therefore,
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current-traditional pedagogy forces students to repeatedly display their use 
of institutionally sanctioned forms.  Failure to master the sanctioned forms 
signals some sort of character flaw such as laziness or inattention.  All of 
this is fully in keeping with humanism’s rejection of rhetoric, as well as its 
tendency toward idealism, its reverence for institutional and textual 
authority, and its pedagogical attention to the policing of character. (95)
Crowley is certainly correct to point out the function of formalism within current-
traditional thought, but in this study there is no reason that Crowley and Berlin 
cannot both be right.  On the institutional front, universities responded to a 
growing population of under-prepared students by requiring more composition 
courses.  On one front, objectivist scholars—practicing the language theory of 
Hayakawa—argued that General Semantics provided the most effective way of 
teaching composition.  Humanists simply responded to this institutional need with 
formalism, a different, but also anti-rhetorical construct, one that would feed a 
component of its own belletristic agenda.  
Crowley argues that current-traditional rhetoric reached “its institutional 
high point… during the 1950s, when teachers failed as a matter of policy any 
student theme displaying more than five current-traditionally defined errors, 
regardless of quality” (96).  As we will see in the next chapter, this practice was at 
odds with the teaching philosophies of most General Semanticists.  Given this, it 
is hard not to argue that the current-traditional paradigm gave humanist teachers a 
way of turning their resentments about having to teach a skills-based course to 
middle class barbarians towards the barbarians themselves.  But this rather cynical 
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argument ignores the way that anticommunism dissuaded teachers from 
introducing controversial materials into the classroom.  Anticommunism would 
seem to be, at least for the nineteen fifties, the final nail in the coffin of rhetoric.  
Given this environment, it is understandable why literature professors used New 
Criticism as a way of trying to turn composition courses into literature courses.  
Russell points out how literature professors argued that literature could help 
“produce self-reliant individuals with ‘civilized values,” who could resist the 
coercion of anti-democratic forces and safely deal with ‘socially subversive 
emotions’” (134).  In this sense, New Criticism brought together the renewed 
Cold War emphasis on propaganda analysis with deeply held assumptions about 
the fundamental character of liberal culture.  
As we can see, the composition course faced many contrary tensions in the 
Cold War era.  Composition teachers were charged with a skills-based course, one 
that was created to fit the needs of a new business class, but one that was also 
essential to the survival of a growing population of students who had never been 
to college.  Progressives during this time might have applauded this course for its 
democratic and dialectical potential, but at the same time criticized the objectivist 
expectation for teaching only narrowly defined “skills.”  They may have also 
argued against the imposition of literature into the realm of composition because 
the teaching of “great writing” did not conform to the permissive practice of 
speaking to the individual needs and interest of the students.  Humanist liberals, 
of whom the Vital Center liberals were certainly a part, could have looked down 
on the course for the way it advanced the agenda of the business class.  
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Traditional humanists might have shared the progressive interest in dialectic, but 
would have argued for an emphasis on more literary cultural texts.  The formalists 
amongst them may have been somewhat satisfied teaching literary essay genres to 
students, even if literature was not allowed in the classroom.  We can also assume 
that objectivists, especially those who were influenced by Hayakawa’s Language 
in Action, were quite happy with the prescribed objectives and generally accepted 
methods for teaching the first-year composition course.  
Whether the course turned out to be objectivist/empirical, 
formalist/humanist, or permissive/progressive would finally depend as much on 
the objectives as on the methods of the teacher.  The course itself, because of its 
grounding in rhetoric, had the potential to invite controversial topics into the 
classroom, which gave the course both progressive and humanist potential.  It was 
generally believed by progressive educators that controversial topics engaged 
student interests, which led in turn to more effective writing instruction.  Also, 
because of its placement in English departments, the course had the potential to 
invite literature into the classroom, which gave the course humanist potential, in 
that it was generally believed by humanist educators that students could learn to 
write well and more by being exposed to great writing.  Our discussion so far 
leads us to the conclude that the progressive potential of the course was 
effectively suppressed during the early Cold War era due to objectivist 
administrative pressures and the formalist reaction of humanists against those 
pressures.  This conclusion, however, proves to be too simple.  Looking 
specifically at writing and teaching practices in the early Cold War period, the 
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next chapter will give us a more complete picture of how these conflicting 
pressures actually played out.  
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III: Humanism, Empiricism, Progressivism, and the Dawn of the Cold War  
“I merely want to look for the lost student, and I don’t know that I have a 
wraith of a chance of finding him anywhere but in a student-centered 
class.”
—Arnold E. Needham, College Composition and Communication 1.3 
(1950)
“The tradition of rhetoric is now some 2,400 years old—one of the longest 
traditions still represented in the modern curriculum.  Teachers of 
composition today fail to recognize that they and their work are a part of 
that tradition.  If a teacher is to have any perspective on his subject, he 
must know the tradition that lies behind it, know the place of himself and 
his time in the tradition, and, through this knowledge, be able to put a 
proper value on new developments in his subject as they appear.”
—Albert Kitzhaber, Rhetoric in American Colleges, 1850-1900
(University of Washington Dissertation, 1953)
In October 1950, in the first volume of College Composition and 
Communication, Kenneth Oliver published “The One-legged, Wingless Bird of 
Freshman English.”  This essay, cited by Stephen North as one of the first 
examples of a writer working in the philosophical-scholarly tradition in the field 
of composition, brings together progressivism, humanism, and empiricism in a 
way that helps reintroduce these terms as they were refined and redefined in the 
early Cold War political and social climate.  
Oliver argues that the second meeting of the Conference on College 
Composition and Communication had illustrated to him three trends in our field: 
“The ‘traditional’ formal grammar and composition approach; the General 
Semantics approach; and the communications approach” (3).  The atmosphere of 
the conference, if we take Oliver at his word, made it clear that “the formalists 
were regarded simply as hangers-on from a teaching tradition which belonged 
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strictly to the past” (3).  Rudolph Flesch’s keynote address “Let’s Face the Facts 
about Writing” contended that since “people do not speak and write formally” (3), 
composition teachers should “put an end to formal language teaching, to teach 
instead how to read newspapers and to write for them, how to write persuasively, 
and how to discover the weaknesses in other people’s persuasive writing” (3).  
The objectives that were stated at the workshop on communication courses—
which Oliver had attended—focused likewise on “immediate social purposes” and 
excluded what Oliver called “cultural uses of language—i.e., the expression of 
personal human experience via poetry, essay, fiction, or drama” (3).  Clearly 
Oliver was not comfortable with demoting writing in the academy to the more 
immediate realm of communication.
Expanding from this point, Oliver argues that the General Semanticists at 
the conference, though their methods were different, shared a similar aim:
Both of these groups tend (whether consciously or not) to teach 
negatively, i.e., to create a heightened awareness of the dangers involved 
in non-evaluative acceptance of the written word.  Neither puts much 
emphasis on the development of the capacity to express oneself more 
effectively, sincerely, or forcefully.  There is the danger that they may 
develop more cynics than intelligently responsive readers.  There is also 
the danger that cynics, given a fuller knowledge of propaganda techniques, 
may simply put that knowledge to work for cynical and selfish purposes.  
(4)  
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What Oliver responds to here—and why his essay serves as a good departure 
point for this particular chapter—is the reduction of classically humanist teaching 
philosophy to mere formalism.  Oliver’s case illustrates a different vantage point 
than we have seen so far in our investigation.  While there is a great deal to 
critique about Oliver’s stance, our explication of his philosophy will show that in 
the face of the more practically minded semantics and progressively minded 
communication scholars, Oliver asserts what I read to be an ethical-humanist 
conception of rhetoric.  It may even be possible to argue—later in this 
dissertation—that humanists like Oliver asserted this conception of rhetoric 
against the cynical and selfish purposes of McCarthyism.
As a way of starting his essay, Oliver concedes the point to semanticists 
and communication scholars that the teaching of prescriptive grammar is 
ineffective, but he concedes this point only to further his own end.  Because the 
metaphor that he uses to do so is as important as its meaning, it is worth 
describing in detail.  “…[N]either ‘communicators,’ General Semanticists, nor 
formalists,” he argues 
seems to see the problem [of teaching first-year English] with anything 
approaching a full awareness of its proportions.  It is as though the 
freshman study of language was a two-legged bird.  A few scattered 
intelligent observers began noticing, some twelve or fifteen years ago that 
the bird was hopping along awkwardly upon one leg of grammar, and 
occasionally flapping an ineffective cultural wing.  “Look,” they said, 
“that leg isn’t sound; let’s teach the bird to hop on the other one.”  So they 
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bound up the grammar-leg to keep it out of the way, and made the bird to 
walk upon the other leg.  And incidentally, seeing that the poor freshman-
bird could not fly anyway, they also bound its wings.  “Now,” they 
confidently exclaimed, “the bird will stay on the ground where he belongs, 
and will hop along much faster.  Also, it may never discover the yen to fly.  
So much the better; it will be less apt to fall and may hop in a straighter 
line.  (4-5)  
Neither the semanticists nor the communicators recognize “the value of any effort 
to soar into literary flight” (5).  This is unfortunate, he explains, because “it is the 
Homers, Dantes, Cervantes, Shakespeares, Thomas Manns, and the etceteras in 
their classification who have done most to give us a historical-cultural perspective 
of human aspirations and the dangers that beset us” (5).  This argument is 
noteworthy, I contend, because it is more than an argument for using literature in 
the composition classroom.24  It is an argument that uses as its starting point the 
way literature gives us a historical-cultural perspective of human aspirations.  
Oliver’s final goal, however, is productive.  He sees the study of literature as a 
way of teaching students to express themselves more “effectively, sincerely, or 
forcefully” (2).  In today’s parlance, we could say that Oliver wanted to give 
students a voice.  
24
 In “Fighting Over Freshman English,” John Heyda reduces this passage to this 
type of argument.  Heyda contends that Oliver is saying to the semanticist and the 
communication scholars: “You may have in your corner the latest jargon . . . but 
we have Homer, Dante, and Shakespeare.  Do you really think you can win?” 
(673) My reading of Oliver suggests that this message does not underlie his 
argument.     
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Oliver’s conception of literature parallels Kenneth Burke’s.  He does not 
see the importance of “great literature” embedded in its formalist beauty, but 
instead in the way that it gives us an ethical, historical, and cultural perspective.  
Much as Burke argued that propaganda for communism should contain as full a 
cultural perspective as possible to be effective in a bourgeois middle class 
environment, Oliver argues that first-year students must also be exposed to fuller 
cultural perspectives in the first-year composition classroom via literature.  
While Oliver is willing to concede to the General Semanticist and the 
communication scholar that texts with “immediate social purposes” can and 
should have a function in the composition classroom, (6) he contends that there 
must be room for literature as well.  This is vital in the current cultural climate, he 
argues, because literature can help students more fully develop their own 
individual points of view.  Apparently, Oliver felt that times were dire enough 
that his audience would grant him an either-or proposition:  “For either Americans 
will continue to discover and express their own personal, individual experiences, 
convictions, points of view, regardless of what sways the crowd, or collectivism 
will strengthen its hold upon both ideas and action” (5).  Later in this dissertation 
we will see that the argument that humanist education is the best defense against 
collective forces gained considerable ground in the fifties.  
Like Becker, Oliver connects his argument particularly to the realm of 
persuasion: “Persuasion is the art of assimilating points of view.  Expression: 
vigorous, effective, sincere personal expression may lead to that maturity of 
thought which can prevent persuasion from developing Hitlers and Politburos at 
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too tragic a rate among us” (5).  Oliver’s polemic, of course, is overstated.  The 
idea that any method of teaching writing can stop totalitarianism is, at best, naïve.  
Regardless of how one chooses to define literature, through formalist beauty or 
through historical/cultural understanding, it is difficult to make a connection 
between the appreciation of it and measurable social change.  
The same argument, of course, can be made about progressive and 
empirical teaching methods.  If we identify ourselves as progressive teachers, we 
have to face the fact that no matter how well we get our students to interrogate 
cultural, social and economic inequities in their lives and in the lives of others, no 
matter how effectively we create alternative models for the use of power in our 
classrooms, broader social change is more difficult, if not impossible, to measure.  
Even if our goal is empirical, we have to face the fact that no matter how well we 
empower our students to discover truths within a limited and definable system, it 
will be equally difficult to know what effect this technique has on the way that 
our students reach conclusions in their future writing lives.  
But what does this concession offer us in our teaching lives?  Does the fact 
that we must make this concession mean that we should take no action at all?  As 
early as 1932, George S. Counts addressed this question when speaking to the 
Progressive Education Association.  In “Dare the School Build a New Social 
Order?” he argues that schools should not be squeamish about imposing its 
progressive agenda on students:  
If [teachers] could increase sufficiently their stock of courage, 
intelligence, and vision, [they] might become a social force of some 
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magnitude… Through powerful organizations they might at least reach the 
public conscience and come to exercise a larger measure of control over 
the schools than hitherto.  They would then have to assume some 
responsibility for the more fundamental forms of imposition which, 
according to my argument, cannot be avoided. (188)
These impositions, he argues, should “grow out of the social situation” (190).  
Arguing that progressive education should not be content with focusing on the 
nature of the child alone, he contends that progressive education should “give to 
our children a vision of the possibilities which lie ahead and endeavor to enlist 
their loyalties and enthusiasm in the realization of the vision” (192).  Counts 
could not have known at this time how great the pressures to make concessions to 
the political climate would become.  In the Cold War climate, it would have been 
courageous indeed to stand up for a progressive vision of society, but it may have 
also been courageous to stand up for a humanist or a radically empirical one as 
well.
Chapter I showed us that the objectivist forces underlying Red Scare 
politics were already well in place before WWII.  While some radicals were 
trying to enact a progressive vision in the social, political, and academic realm, 
most gravitated toward having faith in “the superior virtues of persuasion.”   
Chapter II showed how effectively Red Scare politics created a stifling 
environment for academics who wanted to employ the best of progressive, and 
even humanist philosophies in their classrooms.  The type of objectivism we saw 
in Raymond B. Allen’s argument for firing tenured professors at the University of 
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Washington placed considerable pressures on academics toward conformity.  
While liberal anticommunism gave humanists a way of resisting these pressures 
by using rugged individualism against all types of social conformity, objectivist 
pressures often reduced humanism to formalism as well.  This chapter will 
continue to explain, but even more precisely, how the best of humanist, 
progressive, and empirical teaching philosophies were circumscribed in the 
composition classroom by the Cold War climate.  
Oliver’s case proves to be a good place to begin because, though I have 
reservations about introducing literature into the composition classroom,25 I think 
that underlying his polemic is an assumption that teachers must be free to use the 
best elements of humanism, empiricism, and progressivism in first-year 
composition.  Oliver argued for a conception of composition that would focus 
more on what students want to say and how they can say it more sincerely, 
effectively, or forcefully.  He also argued for a broader conception of literature in 
the face of epistemological assumptions that reduced his humanist-based teaching 
philosophy to formalism.  Although we do not have enough information about 
Oliver’s classes to know whether or not his argument was based on the individual 
and dynamic needs of his students, I believe that his attempts to broaden our 
25
 In the composition classroom, the use of literature can often become an end in 
itself, detracting from the writing process of students.  Texts with “immediate 
social purposes,” if not connected to the type of academic writing that students 
need to learn in the first-year composition classroom, are also dangerous in this 
regard.  This assumes, of course, that first-year composition has to introduce 
students to academic discourse.  I will address this assumption more thoroughly in 
the conclusion to this work.        
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conceptions of literature to include its relationship to culture is commendable, as 
is his focus on “voice.”  
When any part of the relationship between humanism, empiricism, and 
progressivism gets circumscribed, writing instruction suffers.  An important part 
of proving, then, that the Cold War had damaging effects on writing instruction, is 
to show more specifically how parts of this equation were repressed during the 
Cold War era.  I have been careful in this study not to take any shortcuts when 
trying to prove that the Cold War atmosphere had damaging effects on our field.  
These shortcuts could include 1) over-generalizing from singular cases or 
experiences, personal experience, or hearsay about writing instruction in the early 
Cold War period, and 2) over-generalizing about writing instruction practices in 
the early fifties by relying too heavily on an interpretation of textbook ideology.  
Just because these two methods are shortcuts, however, does not mean that a 
fuller description of these shortcuts will tell us nothing.  In fact, a combination of 
singular cases, personal experience, and an analysis of textbooks will prove to be 
the best place from which to begin our descriptions.
It is safe to assume, for example, that the Cold War atmosphere just 
described above helped to fuel the popularity of Brooks and Warren’s Modern 
Rhetoric (1949) text, as well as McCrimmon’s newly written Writing with a 
Purpose (1950).  Not only did Brooks and Warren’s text contain articles 
promoting Vital Center philosophy, as discussed in the last chapter, their 
emphasis on the modes gave humanists a way of conceding to the Cold War 
political climate and focus, if not on teaching literature, then on teaching formal 
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genres in the composition classroom.  The teaching of genres, as Crowley argues 
in Composition in the University, appealed to some humanists, at least as a 
concession for having to teach a skills-based course (94).  Modern Rhetoric would 
have also appealed to some extent to empiricists who wanted to focus primarily 
on logic in the classroom.  For Brooks and Warren, language is “first, a means of 
communication and second, a means of thinking” (6):
Writing things out, which will be the main business of this course, is 
simply a more rigorous way of talking things out.  It is a way of training 
the mind in logical thought.  For one thing, in writing we must understand 
the structure of language, what the parts of speech do, how words relate to 
one another, what individual words mean, the rules of grammar and 
punctuation.  For another thing, we must understand the principles of 
organizing a discourse; that is, how to go about explaining something, 
how to argue a point, how to tell about an event.  Once we start putting 
into words an explanation—or an argument or an account of an event—we 
have to organize the material in a way that will be readily understood by 
others.  (7)
This formal approach to rhetoric focuses very little on invention, on the way that 
texts get written.  It emphasizes the modes of discourse—exposition, description, 
narration, and argument—allowing rhetorical principles to reside primarily in a 
subject’s mind instead of being embedded in culture.  The essays and readings in 
Modern Rhetoric, on the other hand, were embedded in Cold-War culture, but, as 
I showed in the previous chapter, they were reactions against progressive, 
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socialist, and communist elements of the left.  They provided only the illusion of 
dialectic, containing primarily centrist philosophies, providing a body of material 
for students to read that was only marginally oppositional.  
In the interest of fairness to Brooks and Warren’s text, I should say that it 
mentions, at least, two issues that would have been important to humanists, 
progressives, and empiricists alike.  Addressing one of the most terrifying 
developments of the Cold War period, they write:
With the development of the atomic bomb, physicists suddenly saw that 
physics had to be thought of in relation to the whole society, in relation to 
the survival of the race.  Some physicists took the position that they would 
do no research directed toward military use; some took the opposite stand; 
but both groups were forced into thinking about their relation to the world 
outside physics, and many of them felt compelled to express their thoughts 
in letters and articles.  (5)
They also address the importance of relating business to ethics:  
More and more, the businessman, big or little, sees that business is not a 
mere matter of supply and demand, profit and loss.  It has enormously 
complicated relations to the whole of the society in which it is exercised—
from the management of the Community Chest to the conduct of national 
foreign policy.  And in dealing with the relation of business to society in 
general, the businessman who is businessman and nothing more, who 
happens to have an aptitude for making money or building up a great 
organization, may be a baby, even a dangerous and destructive baby.  (5)
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Taken together, these quotes imply that writing and rhetoric are—and should be—
connected to broader culture.  Brooks and Warren voice concerns about the 
relationship between an emerging scientific field that can bring about world 
destruction or—from the perspective of the physicist who decides nuclear 
research is necessary—peace through the threat of mutually assured destruction.  
They also show concern about the rising power of big business—corporations that 
threaten to undermine the fabric of common decency and democracy.  The book, 
however, makes no attempt to engage students directly with these concerns and 
this distinguishes the book from more progressive writing philosophies.  Brooks 
and Warren argue the following: 
The most important use of language, no matter how specialized the user’s 
occupation, is in his personal life.  A man lives with a family, with friends, 
with neighbors, with fellow church members, with people on civic or 
political committees, with the stranger on the street.  He needs to 
understand these people, to express himself to them, and to think about his 
relation to them.  So here we are back to language as, first a means of 
communication and second, a means of thinking.  We are once again 
talking about language as one way of learning how to live.  (6)  
This privileging of writing in one’s personal life as the most important use of 
language would put Brooks and Warren’s text in the humanist category, if it 
showed more concern with self-expression and personal growth throughout.  The 
overall emphasis of the text, however, is formalist because of the heavy reliance 
on the modes. 
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McCrimmon’s Writing with a Purpose (1950), on the other hand, de-
emphasizes the modes.  Argument is the only mode that gets addressed 
specifically as a genre in the book, and this is only because argument “requires 
some attention to analysis of issues and to the evaluation of authorities, evidence,
and reasoning, as well as to techniques of composition” (xi).  Instead of using the 
modes, McCrimmon uses “purpose” to organize his text.  He introduces the book 
with a rhetorical claim: 
All effective writing is controlled by the writer’s purpose.  Except possibly 
when making a memorandum for himself, a writer is always addressing a 
reader.  He is trying to do something to those readers: to inform or 
convince or delight them, to explain something to them, or to make them 
see or feel what he has experienced.  Each of these general purposes will 
exert its own influence on the selection and presentation of his material. 
(3)
This approach, of course, is significantly different than the humanist focus on 
genre and self-expression.  Purpose is directly connected to readers in 
McCrimmon’s philosophy to readers.  It is therefore more audience-based than 
Brooks and Warren’s text and is, in this way, more connected to the broader 
social and cultural sphere.  
In another way it remains disconnected from the ethical sphere because it 
focuses on purpose alone—without interrogating the ethical implications of those 
particular purposes.  Influenced by the semantic theories of Hayakawa, 
McCrimmon’s Writing with a Purpose would have appealed to objectivist-minded 
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writing teachers to an even greater extent than Modern Rhetoric.  Like Hayakawa, 
McCrimmon teaches students to distinguish between statements of facts and 
judgments.  He teaches students to learn to slant description in both directions in 
order to give a balanced impression, another Hayakawan technique.  He also 
emphasizes the importance of purposeful details, and clear and effective prose—
favoring economy of expression and the omission of “useless words.”  Despite 
these similarities, and McCrimmon’s statement that Hayakawa influenced his 
work, he does not argue, as Hayakawa does, that reports are “the highest form of 
persuasion” and that “judgments stop thought.”  His book is not, therefore, 
entirely objectivist in its orientation.  
But it is difficult to say exactly what epistemology, if not objectivism, his 
book falls into.  Purpose, after all, is important to all forms of writing instruction, 
whether it be humanist, empirical, or progressive; so the degree to which 
McCrimmon’s book could be considered outside the realm of objectivism would 
depend upon what topics he emphasizes and encourages students to take up in the 
book itself.  Generally speaking, his assignments fail to move students into critical 
literacy.  Examples of purposes that students are invited to take up include:  
praising the mayor of a small town, describing a room, explaining the time-lag 
between the onset of a rain storm and the flooding of the rivers.  In terms of 
choosing a subject, students are encouraged to write about family, friends, and 
neighborhood; hobbies and recreation; hopes and ambitions relating to college, 
marriage, and career; fears and personal prejudices.  They are also encouraged to 
write about their own knowledge and things they already know how to do.  
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The section dealing with argument, however, would have appealed to 
progressive teachers.  In one section, McCrimmon asks students to elaborate “the 
thesis that leading’s one’s own life in America requires more social courage than 
most of us have.”  In another section, dealing with opinion and belief, he asks 
students to consider such questions as “How democratic is the United States?” “Is 
capitalism efficient? “Should colleges be propagandists for democracy?” “Have 
we lived up to the Constitution?” and to argue “The case for or against strikes.”  
But a vast majority of the book, and all of the essays included as “samples” in the 
text are either personal essays or technical ones.  
This does not mean, of course, that a progressive minded teacher would 
have had no use for this text.  One of the central tenets of progressive pedagogy is 
that students should start with their own interests and experiences and move these 
experiences into dialectic with the cultural realm.  We can safely assume, 
however, that if teachers wanted to engage students with more controversial 
materials, she or he would have done so through other means than the textbook 
alone.  
Generally speaking, we can see that Brooks and Warren’s approach is a 
humanist-rhetorical approach, while McCrimmon’s is primarily an empirical-
rhetorical approach to the teaching of composition.  Does this actually tell us, 
though, that the first-year composition course was always a humanist or empirical 
enterprise in the early Cold War period?  The absence of a progressive 
educational textbook in the early Cold War period is notable, but not really that 
surprising in a primarily market-driven educational economy.  Does the absence 
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of progressively oriented textbooks prove that progressive education fell 
completely out of favor in the early Cold War period?  We cannot make that 
assumption based on textbooks alone.  Looking at textbooks only tells us a little 
about what fifties classrooms were actually like.  After all: how many of us today 
would want the content of our courses judged, fifty years from now, on what 
textbooks we used in our classes?   
This project will proceed with the assumption that while analysis of 
textbooks can tell us something, there are more effective methods for finding out 
what happened in fifties classrooms.  These are:
1. Surveying and interviewing people who taught and who took 
composition and communication courses in the fifties; 
2. Looking more carefully at written assignments in historical archives; 
and 
3. Analyzing journals from our field and extrapolating from this analysis 
the objectives and methods of first-year composition teachers.  
A combination of these three methods, in conjunction with what scholars have 
already said about writing instruction during the fifties, could give us a much 
fuller picture of what effects the Cold War played on our field.  Unfortunately, the 
type of ethnographic research required for the first two methods is beyond the 
scope of this particular study.  This dissertation, therefore, will focus primarily on 
the third method as a way of laying groundwork for further study in our field.
If we believe what composition historians have said about composition 
classrooms in the fifties, it seems that classrooms were not only current-
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traditional, they were extremely authoritarian enterprises.  Sharon Crowley 
contends that the post-war period was particularly bleak, arguing that composition 
“was quite possibly at its lowest institutional ebb ever” (103).  Generally 
speaking, she may be right; only a few articles in College English in the early 
fifties focus on the use of revision; a more contextualized, student-friendly 
teaching of grammar; and the importance of introducing multiple viewpoints in 
argument classes to more fully reflect the life-experience of students (and the 
majority of these would be written by none other than Ken Macrorie, who would 
change the way we think about composition in the sixties).  For the most part, as 
we will see, teachers and scholars in the fifties reacted against the assumptions of 
progressive education, particularly “life adjustment” curriculums that argued that 
social development was the most important element of education.  The overall 
picture, however, that Berlin, Crowley, Russell and others have given us of Cold 
War classrooms is incomplete—if not incorrect—and many composition 
historians have been working to give us a fuller picture of what mid-twentieth 
century classrooms were actually like.  
Authoritarianism from Coast to Coast: Two Cases
Mara Holt shows us in a very specific way that classrooms in the fifties 
were more authoritarian than they were in the thirties.  The case of the “Oregon 
Plan” is particularly compelling because it shows us that even an issue like 
collaborative activity—one of the hallmarks of progressive education—became 
more authoritarian in the fifties composition classroom.  While collaborative 
activities were meant to promote more equality in the classroom during the 
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nineteen thirties, they changed radically after the war.  Focusing on Charlton 
Laird’s controversial “Oregon Plan” for teaching first-year composition, Holt 
argues that collaborative practices during the fifties “promoted competition in the 
name of individualism” (541).  Indeed, Laird’s plan, when we look back at it, 
seems to be both objectivist and antagonistic.   
In Laird’s classroom, students read each other’s drafts, but solely and 
explicitly for the purpose of correcting mechanical errors.  Peer group interaction 
was secondary to the textbook and the teacher—the primary authorities in the 
classroom.  “In the 1930s,” Holt contends,
knowledge was described by the teacher as something to be attained by 
people interacting; group work was a logical extension of this view of 
knowledge.  In the 1950s, on the other hand, subject matter was invested 
with the power of knowledge, and in the classroom, the teacher was its 
authority. (542)  
Discerning an overwhelming emphasis on the teacher and the text as authorities, 
one may wonder why a teacher would utilize group work in the classroom at all.  
The answer to this question is simple.   As many composition historians have 
pointed out, workloads were becoming too great for composition teachers to 
handle.  In the early Cold War period, Laird argued that composition teachers 
could use collaborative activity to help “speed up the process of correcting 
papers” (541). 
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Generally speaking, Holt’s argument about the function of group work in 
the fifties supports the idea that the Cold War climate made composition 
classrooms more authoritarian:
In the wake of Nazism, Stalinism, World War II, and the consolidation of 
an objective view of knowledge, the group was no longer seen as a 
resource for the individual as it had been throughout most of the 1930s; it 
was now a veiled threat.  Whereas in the 1930s class the goal was 
successful group process, in Laird’s 1950s classroom, the goal was 
discovering the weaknesses of the individual.  Each student was held 
“personally responsible for any ineptitudes that remain undetected in the 
group, for any weakness not already observed.” (544)
Holt goes on to say that “Laird proudly described the relationship among his 
students as adversarial” (544).  When we combine Laird’s emphasis on finding a 
correcting weakness and corruptibility in students with his emphasis on 
adversarial combat, we can see that his epistemological assumptions reflect those 
of Vital Center liberalism.  In The Vital Center, Schlesinger repeatedly asserts 
that conflict helps keep the weakness and corruptibility of human beings in check.  
Laird’s classroom reflects this assertion in microcosm: an adversarial 
environment in the classroom, Laird assumes, helps weed out weakness and 
corruptibility in the language of students.    
Another study that centers on the issue of authority in the classroom is 
Robin Varnum’s study of “The Baird Era” at Amherst.  It reflects the same type 
of authoritarian practices that Holt describes, but in a different light.  Where Laird 
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focused on weak language, Baird focused on weak thinking.  Varnum’s study ties 
Baird’s epistemology to his political context:  “His pedagogy seems to have been 
modeled on combat and reflects American culture during the war years and the 
period of the Cold War” (3).  Baird’s course at Amherst was explicitly designed 
to disorient students.  Though Baird’s motive for this type of disorientation was to 
force students to confront the chaos of their lives so that they could learn to order 
it, many of the teachers of the course felt that it was “an authoritarian enterprise” 
(38).  One teacher looking back at the course went so far as to say that 
the political and social climate of the 1950s allowed for considerable 
abuse of students by teachers.  Students were subjected to very aggressive 
criticism, or to something almost like basic training.  But that is only one 
metaphor for an experience which could also be called “initiation.” (147-
148)  
Though some teachers of the course suggested that the course “sought to instill 
within the student himself a sense of his own authority over language,” (155) 
students looked at it a little differently.  Looking back, one student said, “‘It’s 
brutalizing, and the only time it works is if the culture at large supports this sort of 
stuff, and Amherst ‘men’ in those days were supposed to survive that’” (192).  
Varnum’s study makes it clear that the reason that Amherst men  were supposed to 
survive this type of training was that they were being primed for becoming 
leaders of society.  The type of authoritarianism that we see in the Amherst case 
is, therefore, very different than what we see in the Oregon case.  In both the 
Baird and the Laird cases, though, we find support for the thesis that writing 
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classrooms in the fifties were more authoritarian than they were in the Progressive 
Era.  The Laird case shows us the authoritarianism underlying objectivist 
philosophy; the Baird case shows us the authoritarianism underlying a certain 
type of humanist philosophy.  Both reflected the need for antagonistic 
environments for learning.  
If this were true of all our cases, we could more easily assume that 
composition theory took a more authoritarian turn and circumscribed progressive 
philosophy altogether, that language came to reflect objective (in the case of 
Laird) and subjective (in the case of Baird) authorities.  Then it would be easy to 
accept the notion that these three legs of the composition table were 
circumscribed and the Cold War atmosphere hampered writing teachers’ abilities 
to be effective and ethical in the classroom.  But there is an enormous amount of 
evidence that some composition and communication teachers operated from very 
different assumptions than we see in these two cases.  A thorough investigation of 
the first issues of College Composition and Communication reveals this evidence.  
These documents give us a much more complicated picture of writing instruction 
in the early Cold War period.  Understanding what happened there will give us a 
deeper understanding of what happened to progressivism, humanism, and 
empiricism in the early Cold War era.
A Kinder, Gentler Conference: The Early Days of CCCC
By investigating more fully the early issues of CCC, we can see that not 
all classrooms were authoritarian in the early Cold War era.  The early issues of 
CCC give us particular descriptions of the objectives and methods of first-year 
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composition and communications courses.  They also show us a more 
complicated picture of Cold War writing instruction than scholars of composition 
have given us so far.  For example, the workshop reports of the Conference on 
College Composition and Communication prove that the scholars who were 
engaged in the professional development of our field did not work from current-
traditional assumptions about language production, even during the height of 
anticommunism in America.  The reports also prove that while scholars were 
primarily concerned with composition as a course, they were engaged in 
producing a viable theory of composition as well.  
A closer investigation of the early issues of CCC also troubles Maureen 
Daly Goggins’ assertion that the early editors of CCC “published (and thus, 
encouraged) mainly practical, service-oriented essays that were largely based on 
an author’s personal experience in a specific and local program” (328).  While 
there is some truth to this, our investigation shows that teachers were also actively 
engaged in developing a workable philosophy of first-year composition.  As Chas 
R. Roberts argues in his “Foreword to Workshop Reports of the 1950 Conference 
on College Composition and Communication,” “some ideas run like a refrain 
through reports from groups working ostensibly on quite different topics.  It is in 
these that we may detect a philosophy of freshman English emerging” (3).  In this 
section, I hope to do what Roberts did not do, to expand on some of these 
common themes as they emerge in the different reports from 1950.  This 
expansion will help show how the ideals that were put forth at the conference 
would have become difficult to put into practice in the Cold War climate.
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We should make several qualifications before we expand on this 
philosophy.  First, we cannot assume that the philosophy that gets developed in 
these reports is a homogenous one.  Just because many of the ideas that emerge in 
the reports overturn the assumption that all writing instruction was based on 
current-traditional rhetoric, this does not mean that current-traditional rhetoric 
was not still practiced, or even that it was not the dominant mode of instruction.  
In fact, residual elements of current-traditional rhetoric can be found in the reports 
themselves, but the continuing emergence of social-epistemic rhetoric also exists 
there.  We can safely assume that teachers who were engaged in “the most 
extensive and concerted frontal attack ever made on the problems of teaching 
college freshman English” (3) were trying to find new ways to teach first-year 
composition effectively and ethically.  While the objectives and methods vary in 
each report, all the reports generally assume that composition and communication 
instructors should be in the business of teaching spoken and written discourse to 
students in whatever way is most helpful to the learning process of students.  
While teacher concerns are present in the reports, they are always presented as 
secondary concerns, acknowledging the fact that student performance declines 
when teachers are overexerted.  The differences that emerge, therefore, revolve 
around definitions of effective discourse and by what means effective discourse 
can be achieved.  We can discern differences between different reports, especially 
(as our opening anecdote helped to illustrate) as they are divided between 
composition and communication camps. 
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The writers of the “Function of the Composition Course in General 
Education,” for example, argue that a composition course should be organized 
around the following objectives:
1. To cultivate the ability to think logically.
2. To cultivate respect for human worth despite accidents of class, color, 
culture, or other divisive circumstances.
3. To develop taste.
4. To develop the ability to discipline emotions and to arrive at 
reasonable judgments.
5. To develop intellectual competence.
6. To cultivate a belief in the necessity for ethical behavior.  (5)
As we can see, some of these objectives are clearly outside the realm of current-
traditional rhetoric.  While the first objective favors logic and the fourth (by 
implying without qualification that emotions need to be “disciplined”) devalues 
emotion, the second and six objectives deal directly with ethics—issues of race, 
class, culture and other divisive circumstances (gender?) and the necessity for 
ethical behavior.  
Other composition reports add new objectives to our list, ones that we 
would find amenable to composition studies today.  For example, in one report, 
compositionists assert an audience-centered claim, that “the objective of the 
course as defined is to develop in the freshman the power of clearly 
communicating facts or ideas in writing to a specified reader or group of readers” 
(9).  Likewise, the idea that “the student should have something to say, and should 
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be able to communicate it clearly and effectively to any one of a variety of 
purposes” (11) shows that not only did teachers care about what students had to 
say, they also thought about how what students had to say related to why they 
wanted to say it.  
Not only are the objectives for the composition course contextually bound 
by student needs, the objectives for communications courses are even more 
connected to the social realm.  The communication theorists at the conference 
state that they hope to achieve the following objectives:
1. To teach the student that language is a form of behavior and the 
principle manifestation of personality.
2. To teach the student that language is symbolic and that communication 
involves verbal symbols, gestures, and tones of voice.
3. To teach the student to observe, analyze, and classify forms and means 
of communication in relation to the social context in which they occur.
4. To train the student to distinguish between report of sense, or 
mathematical data, and emotional language in his own and others’ 
communication.
5. To develop in the student an ability to discriminate among the various 
areas of speech and writing.
6. To develop in the student the ability to adapt his communication 
means to the social context in order to procure the intended effect upon 
his reader or auditor.
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7. To train the student to focus his attention on the speaker and not allow 
himself to be deflected from the speaker’s meaning by his own 
emotions and associations.
8. To train the student to be sensitive to, and to use, emotive devices such 
as metaphors, rhythmic patterns, and imagery in communication.  (17-
18)
As we can see, communication scholars seem to be more aware of the fact that 
logic does not have to be the first priority in the teaching of rhetorical principles.  
Logos in this schema is balanced particularly well against pathos (audience 
emotion and values) and ethos (character as suggested by personality).  This may 
be because communication courses, by nature of their dual emphasis on 
reading/writing and listening/speaking, require students to think more socially 
about communication.  The writers of additional reports about the communication 
course also include goals about citizenship.  Some teachers want “to develop 
students’ abilities to give and receive meaning conveyed in language, to the 
further end that they become effective and alert members of a democratic society” 
(15).  
What happens then if, taking our cue from Roberts, we combine the 
objectives of both disciplines, not to ignore the differences between them, but to 
assert a consensual theory of composition against which we can compare the 
political climate and its pressures?  We can see, looking back, that composition 
and communication scholars wanted students to be able to present logical and 
organized arguments, but both communication and composition scholars 
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acknowledged, in some way, that these concepts had to be connected to social 
contexts.  Both camps wanted students to be able to distinguish between the 
different appeals, knowing whether someone is trying to appeal to reason, 
emotion, or values.  If we extend the concept of taste to include understanding 
one’s rhetorical situation, then we can say that both the compositionists and the 
communication theorists wanted students to present a credible ethos.  If we 
assume that citizenship and ethical behavior are closely connected, then we can 
assume that making good citizens was an important objective to both camps as 
well.26
It is well worth discussing, before we explain why these objectives would 
have been difficult to achieve in a Cold War climate, the ways in which 
composition and communication scholars hoped to reach their individual 
objectives.  The methods these scholars proposed are worth noting because they 
are far from the objectivist, current-traditional methods that many composition 
26
 Because of the importance of science at the time, scholars present at the 
conference felt that the role of Engineering and Science sections of composition 
was important enough to warrant its own set of objectives.  These too have 
interesting implications:
1. To give students an opportunity to master “fundamentals” of English 
(agreement, clear reference, meaningful punctuation, etc.)
2. To foster constructive attitude toward communication: expression is a part 
of any course and a necessary function of the citizen.  Contrary attitudes 
are often fostered by technical specialists and the college administration 
often misdirects student attitude by emphasizing specialized learning
3. Generally: to develop a well-rounded citizen in a democratic society; 
especially: to develop disciplined, flexible minds; more especially, for 
engineers: to develop technological attitudes of benefit to society.
4. To develop skill in the basic methods of engineering; English 
composition is more useful for this purpose than any other basic course
5. To relate the discipline of imaginative literature to that of engineering.  
(35-36)
174
scholars impose on this decade.  First, there seems to be a consensus in the 
workshops against prescriptive grammar.  Teachers felt that grammar should not 
be taught as an “end in itself” (19) and that it should only be employed for 
students to be able to reach the goals of the course.  “Grammar will be used 
wherever it will contribute to either effectiveness or decency, and never when not 
related to these aims” (20).  At this time in our history, some institutions were 
dropping all formal teaching of grammar and “subsisting theme writing with 
conferences to explain errors” (20).  
Semanticists, of course, focused a great deal on the semantic method.  
They believed that “semantics is a fundamental and necessary part of all courses 
in composition and communication” (22).  They argued against traditional 
vocabulary building, against the use of imposed visions of literary taste, and 
against the teaching of abstract grammatical principles.  They affirmed instead the 
idea that teachers should lead students toward self-directed learning methods and 
toward more active reading processes, processes that include teaching students 
how to progress from lower levels of abstraction to the higher levels of 
abstraction in the composition class.  
Communication scholars employed even more progressive teaching 
methods.  Emphasizing collaborative methods to reach their objectives, 
communication scholars suggested that teachers should “encourage group projects 
rather than teacher domination” (7).  Discussions about methods generally 
focused on ways of engaging students in “conversation, group discussion, 
extemporaneous speaking of different varieties, oral reading of informational 
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materials,” (15) as well as practicing “the fundamentals of parliamentary 
procedure” (15).  More specifically, they offered the following suggestions:
1. Make as much use as possible of student leaders and chairmen in 
actual running of the class.
2. Use student leaders selected from each section to meet with the staff 
and assist in planning course projects.
3. Have a planning committee select materials from current publications 
to serve as a basis for class discussions and for further investigation 
leading to student writing and speaking.
4. Get students started talking first, leading into writing from the class 
discussions.
5. Have each section select its best speakers by student ballot and allow 
them to speak occasionally before an assembly of the entire 
communication group.  Have best pieces of writing selected by a 
student committee and published or mimeographed and circulated 
among the students.
6. Have student panels with a student leader to discuss assigned text 
material—a good way to work in practice in speaking without seeming 
to have a burdensome load of extra speech assignments.
7. Use drill sessions as opportunities to stimulate student discussion.
8. Draw all materials from sources closely related to student interests and 
needs.  (17-18)
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These are primarily student-centered methods of teaching, working with Dewey’s 
educational theories or what Hillocks would now call a constructivist teaching 
philosophy.27
When we take them as a whole, we can clearly see that these methods are 
far from current-traditional, even those of the semanticists, who often get equated 
in our literature with current-traditional teaching.  Generally speaking, the 
meeting of CCCC in 1950 shows great potential for conversation between the 
disciplines.  Despite Oliver’s assertions that humanism got devalued at the 
conference, the objectives that were stated on the composition side of the equation 
spoke both to the social concept of taste and to the ethics involved in race, class, 
and other divisive circumstances.  This concern is far from formalist and is 
remarkably relevant to composition studies today.  Elements of progressivism, 
empiricism, and humanism, our description shows, were in conversation with 
each other during this stage of our development.  While their close proximity may 
have led to more conflict, this conflict most likely led to more generative potential 
in our field.  This potential, however, would remain precisely that—just potential.  
To understand why, we must investigate more carefully the tensions between 
composition and communication courses as they relate to the Cold War 
epistemological climate.  
Sailing Only Three: The Missing C in CCCC
In “Freshman English, Composition and CCCC,” David Bartholomae 
argues that there were two pressures that led to the formation of the Conference 
27
 See Hillocks’s Ways of Thinking, Ways of Teaching and Teaching Writing as 
Reflective Practice for definitions and discussions of constructivism.
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on Composition and Communication in 1949.  The first pressure, Bartholomae 
argues, was a result of the tension between literature and composition in the field 
of English.  “Against literature,” he argues, “freshman English asserted itself as 
composition” (41).  The second pressure, he continues,
was the pressure of numbers—the numbers of students, many of them 
GI’s, swelling colleges and universities after the war, placing dramatic and 
unprecedented demands on introductory courses (courses they were said to 
be ‘unprepared to take’) and requiring the creation of a new faculty to do a 
teaching for which their English PhD’s had not prepared them. (41)  
Bartholomae also gives us this insight into our history: 
Since the 1940s there has been a continuing struggle to displace the old 
humanism—with its entrenched theories of knowledge, culture and 
pedagogy—and to replace the English of the senior professors with a new 
English.  The opposing term for composition, then, is not literature but a 
version of literary study threatened not only by composition but by other 
critical movements in the discipline: women’s studies, black studies, film 
studies, gay studies, critical theory, culture study, studies of working-class 
language and literature, pedagogy.  CCCC provided a site where English 
was open for negotiation (or renegotiation).  (42) 
Bartholomae argues that the opening talks at CCCC, given by Richard Weaver 
and James McCrimmon in 1949, provide our first outline for this debate.  These 
are fundamentally between two rival epistemologies: “Language as an 
abstraction; language as a practice” (44).  While the more conservative Richard 
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Weaver “argued that a proper education in language can lead to a unified culture, 
a refined moral sensibility, and a perception of eternal truths beyond language,” 
(43) McCrimmon’s argument was “based on the idea that linguistic difference 
should be the new ground for language theory” (43).  Because we will expand on 
Weaver’s rhetorical idealism later in this chapter, it will be well for us now to 
focus more on McCrimmon’s pragmatics.  “The early work of Hayakawa and 
Korzybski,” Bartholomae reports,
enabled McCrimmon to imagine that the notion of a proper meaning, like 
the notion of a proper utterance, was available to systemic critique.  If 
there was no necessary relationship between words and things, then there 
were no absolute meanings.  Meaning must somehow be negotiated—and 
that, the ways meanings and languages are negotiated individually and 
collectively, was what CCCC was prepared to take as its subject.  (44)
While there is much to admire about Bartholomae’s delineation, this project’s 
explication of humanism, empiricism, and progressivism suggests that more than 
two currents ran through the formation of our discipline. 
While Bartholomae wants to boil down the debate of CCC to “Language 
as an abstraction, language as practice” (44), a closer investigation of the early 
issues of CCC will show that debates over early Cold War language theory are far 
more complicated.  Our previous investigation of the strains of humanism, 
empiricism, and progressivism begs the question, what happened to 
progressivism?  This question can be answered best by looking more specifically 
at the broader political and academic culture at this time.  
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By March 1950, the time of the second meeting of CCCC, 
anticommunism was center-stage in American culture.  The Korean War was 
under way, Alger Hiss was on trial, and McCarthy had already made his now 
infamous speech in Wheeling, West Virginia.  As many historians have explained, 
the version of the speech that was recorded in the Congressional Record claimed 
that the State Department was harboring 57 subversives.  “I have in my hand,” 
McCarthy claims, “fifty-seven cases of individuals who would appear to be either 
card carrying members or certainly loyal to the Communist Party, but who 
nevertheless are still helping to shape our foreign policy” (212).  Reporters 
claimed that he had in fact said 205.  In a speech in Denver the following day, 
McCarthy changed the number to 207.  (Schrecker, Age of McCarthyism 63).  Of 
course, McCarthy had no list; he was speculating instead:  “McCarthy got the 
number 205 from a 1946 letter of then Secretary of State James F. Brynes, who 
said that 79 of 285 security risks in his agency had been ‘separated.’  Simple but 
faulty math led McCarthy to 205” (Richard Fried 123).  In fact, McCarthy had 
practically no knowledge of communism at all.  
He once dumbfounded his mentors by professing ignorance of Earl 
Browder, former head of the CP.  One tutor recalled that Joe ‘didn’t know 
a Communist from a street cleaner.’  He absorbed the lore quickly, but his 
hasty preparation often betrayed him, disturbed those whose tips he 
abused, and encouraged foes to see in him an easy target.  (Richard Fried 
121)  
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While he may have seemed an easy target, he was not someone with whom many 
people wanted to tangle.  Like most countersubversives, he was not going to use 
the realm of reason to argue, and having to talk to McCarthy or any of his 
henchmen, as we saw in the University of Washington case, meant that further 
repercussions were soon to follow, ones that would be out of the media spotlight 
but that could result in the loss of a job.
This may be why academic journals were fairly quiet on the subject of 
communism and anticommunism in the early fifties.  There are no articles 
explicitly about communism or anticommunism in the early issues of CCC, but 
there were other tensions running through the early issues of CCC that relate 
directly to conflicts between progressivism, humanism, and empiricism.  These 
factors create for us an even more complex picture of our field than Bartholomae 
shows us.  Bartholomae argues that composition studies came to see itself as 
separate organization against both internal and external forces: i.e., against 1) the 
pressure of more prestigious literature courses and against 2) the increasing 
pressure of a growing population of students.  John Heyda adds—quite 
convincingly—a third reason.  
Composition studies, Heyda argues, had to defend itself against 3) the 
popularity of the communication course.  Using Bartholomae’s two explanations 
for why CCCC formed as his starting point, he states: 
If we add a third explanation… that a separate body had to be formed to 
contend with the challenge to first-year English posed by the emergence of 
communications in the 30s and 40s, we get a somewhat more disquieting 
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picture of CCCC’s formation.  This picture becomes especially troubling 
upon close inspection of the early years of the new organization’s new 
journal, College Composition and Communication.  (665)
Here, I concur with Heyda’s assertion, but find it necessary to interrogate this 
conflict more extensively.  Heyda states that the early Cold War period was a time 
when both composition and communication “had claims… to large chunks of a 
vast but unstable expanse of academic real estate reserved for first-year literacy 
courses, and wrangling over these claims was due to take center stage” (665).  
Composition studies would eventually look toward the prestige of humanism in 
order to assert itself against the more popular communication courses.  
For example, in an early CCC article, Albert Walker contends that the 
same question is put to him every year at the conference: “Are you a 
COMMUNICATIONS MAN or a COMPOSITION MAN?” (3, emphasis his)—a 
question to which he “shuffles his feet” (3).  Like Oliver, Walker notes that 
compositionists are generally considered “bad” and communication scholars are 
generally considered “good” by conference attendees.  While there is no way of 
knowing whether this perception was valid or if it was fed by a sense of 
defensiveness on the part of compositionists, we should look more specifically at 
these terms so that we can more fully understand how this tension relates to 
humanism, empiricism, and progressivism.
Are You Now or Have You Ever Been a ‘Communications Scholar’?
Generally speaking, a survey of the first four years of CCC (1950-1954) 
shows that communication courses were more progressive than composition 
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courses, at least in terms of educational theory.  If communication courses were 
ever in line with progressive politics, however, they were not explicitly so by this 
time in our history.  In fact, scholars found it necessary to introduce a new term 
for progressive pedagogy.  In “The Need for the ‘Permissive’ in Basic 
Communications,” Arnold E. Needham defines permissive education as “student-
selected, student-planned, individually planned, activities in communications, as 
distinct from committee-planned and committee-imposed assignments” (13).  He 
further states that 
the permissive also denotes… an ‘atmosphere’ or classroom setting in 
which the instructor and the members of the class accept, and do not 
reject, each other at their current levels of achievement in the language 
arts.  A two-way, or interpersonal, relationship prevails; all those 
concerned are taken where they are and as they are.  All truly student-
centered work in communications would have to begin at this point and 
work outward, as if along the radius of a series of concentric circles.  (13)
Anyone who is familiar with Dewey’s educational theory would have to find 
some similarities between Dewey and Needham’s methods.  In Experience and 
Education, Dewey emphasizes “the organic connection between education and 
personal experience” (12) as well as a commitment “to some kind of empirical 
and experimental philosophy” (13).  Experience is the starting point for Dewey, 
just as it is for Needham.  
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Dewey, however, is more explicit about the dangers of student-centered 
teaching philosophies.  “The belief that all genuine education comes about 
through experience,” he continues, 
does not mean that all experiences are genuinely or equally educative.  
Experience and education cannot be directly equated to each other.  For 
some experiences are mis-educative.  Any experience is mis-educative that 
has the effect of arresting or distorting the growth of further experience. 
(13)  
Communication scholars at the conference were clearly engaging the empiricism 
and the student-centered methods that were a part of progressive teaching 
philosophy, but if they were still working toward progressive political goals, they 
were not talking about them in the public forum.  
What becomes ironic about this divorcing of progressive method from 
progressive ends is that the effectiveness of communication courses often got 
used for purposes with which many progressives would have been less than 
comfortable.  Though Heyda’s project has an entirely different end than this 
study, he points to many of these cross-purposes in his investigation of our early 
“turf wars.”  Citing Thomas Dunn’s early history of our field, Heyda argues that 
communication courses enjoyed success in the fifties because the military had 
found their methods so effective during the War.28  As early as the twenties, 
college teachers had noted a lack in the first-year composition courses in English 
28
 For an even more thorough analysis of the co-opting of progressive goals, see 
Katherine Adams’s Progressive Politics and the Training of America’s 
Persuaders. 
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“which had been focused on the teaching of correctness” (qtd. in Heyda 666).  
The communications movement found answers to this lack in “linguistics, in 
semantics, in the psychology and philosophy of language” (666).  While 
universities were slow to embrace these techniques, the military was quick to 
adopt and utilize the methods of the communication course.  “During the Second 
World War,” Thomas Dunn points out, “the term communication came into 
widespread use, largely from the impetus given by the special needs of war 
trainees whose preparation for receiving and giving military commands, making 
reports on activities, and directing operations both orally and in writing was not 
adequately provided by the traditional college training” (qtd. in Heyda 665).  The 
success in the communication course during the war, then, gave the 
communications course an advantage.  These techniques had been proven during 
the war and could continue to improve the communication skills of the rapidly 
growing population of G.I.s after it (Heyda 666).  
Understandably, communication scholars used this to their advantage after 
WWII.  Jean Malmstrom points out, for example, an important part of this history: 
composition courses that were based in traditional language arts, 
according to the armed services, were unrealistic, ineffective, and too 
slow.  Language, from the armed services point of view, should be studied 
as an instrument for communicating ideas in a social system.  It should 
also—and most importantly—be studied as a desperately needed tool for 
mediation—a tool for mediation at every level of our lives… (qtd. in 
Heyda 666)
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Ironically, the military was very quick to warm up to the more efficient teaching 
methods of progressive pedagogy.  That progressives, politically speaking, were 
often conscious objectors did not stop the military from employing their 
techniques.
The general thrust of Heyda’s argument, then, is that compositionists, who 
had at first attempted to define themselves against literature faculty, had to join 
forces with humanist literature faculty to defend itself against the encroachments 
of the communication course:29
If big enrollment increases just after World War II had buoyed spirits at 
the time of CCCC’s formation, by the mid 1950s, the journal’s tone would 
leave little doubt that these lifted spirits had belonged, in the main, to 
advocates for communications.  For communications, the enrollment 
boom only confirmed a place for its teachings in the new world of mass 
higher education opening for business on college campuses.  Composition, 
on the other hand, would read the boom as jeopardizing its place in an 
academy given over increasingly to providing for the mass at the expense 
of the individual.  Such differences led, soon enough, to heightened 
tensions between composition and communications.  By the time the turf 
wars between the two groups had heated up, in CCC in the mid- and late-
1950s, reference to threats to English posed by ever more dire enrollment 
projections had become commonplace.  If literature represented the 
“common enemy” in 1948, by the mid-1950s it had come to look more 
29
 Diana George and John Trimbur make a similar argument in “The 
‘Communication Battle,’ or Whatever Happened to the 4th C?”
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like a disciplinary high ground in need of defense against too much 
experimentation, “permissive” teaching, and “remediation.”  (667)   
While this split had not yet fully occurred in the early part of the fifties, the seeds 
for these tensions are clearly discernable from the outset of CCC.   In fact, some 
of them emerge in the reports themselves.  
For example, in one report the question was specifically raised: “Is there 
any room in the elementary composition course for the study of literature as 
literature—in the sense of belles lettres?”  The answer that they gave to this 
question was simply “there is not very much room! If ‘literature as literature’ is to 
be studied at all, it should be limited in amount; it should come late in the course; 
and it should be clearly designated for what it is—something apart, essentially, 
from the central material of the course” (12).  This conversation shows that the 
tension between composition and literature was based on a binary between 
literature as specialized language study and composition as general language 
study.  There was no room in this discussion for the general uses of literature in 
the cultural-historical sense that Oliver described.  
The fact, however, that these tensions between practicality and humanism 
were discernable in communication seminars as well complicates Heyda’s 
assertion that these tensions were primarily on the composition side of the
equation.  Regarding the communications course, several members of one 
workshop questioned the “practical emphasis of the course” (16).  They took the 
questioning one step further by stating that they “deplored, as ultimately 
dangerous, the loss of the humanistic aspects of the more traditional course” (16):  
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This view calls for more ‘self-expression,’ more attention to the precision 
needed to communicate personal experience accurately in themes and 
essays.  It calls also for much greater use of literary materials in reading.  
The consensus was, however, that to accomplish anything significant in 
the traditional direction would certainly entail jeopardizing the full 
program outlines above.  Furthermore, literature is so important it deserves 
a required course in its own right.  (16)
By the end of the workshop, the practicality of the course won out.  It was decided 
by these members that “approximately ninety percent of all writing should be 
expository in nature” (10).  
Intermission: Kenneth Burke Speaks to the CCCC 
When CCCC met in 1950, they invited Kenneth Burke to give a 
presentation about the nature of the composition course.  His talk represented an 
entirely different perspective than Weaver’s or McCrimmon’s the year before it.  
Kenneth Burke entered the conversation about first-year composition from a very 
unusual angle.  His talk, which he would later publish in the Journal of General 
Education under the title “Rhetoric—Old and New,” subverts the assumption that 
there is an unbridgeable gap between literary criticism and composition studies.  
Beginning with the assumption “that writing and the criticism of writing have an 
area in common,” Burke hopes that his argument, “though presented from the 
standpoint of literary criticism, may be found relevant to the teaching of 
communication” (202).  Anyone in the audience who was familiar with his 
recently published Rhetoric of Motives would have known that his conception of 
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literary criticism was relevant to the teaching of composition because it was 
primarily rhetorical in orientation.  Like Oliver, Burke was interested in the ways 
that techniques of literary criticism could be applied to a broader social context.  
Because of this highly idiosyncratic approach, Burke’s talk gives a 
radically different frame to put around the objectives and methods of composition 
and communication courses.  One reason for this is his metaphorical approach.  
As a way of beginning, Burke asks us
to imagine a dialogue between two characters: “Studiosus” and 
“Neurosis.”  Studiosus would be somewhat of a misnomer for the first 
figure, who represents a not very interested member of a freshman class 
taking a required course in composition; and Neurosis would be his 
teacher.  (202) 
Studiosus asks the teacher to defend the subject of composition, and Neurosis 
responds with an apology.  This apology falls into three stages, which Burke 
roughly equates to “an Inferno, a Purgatorio, and a Paradiso” (202).  He describes 
each stage as follows:
First would be an account of the abysmal problems that beset the use of 
language.  Next would come a movement of transition, whereby the very 
sources of lamentation could, if beheld from a different angle, be 
transformed into the promissory.  This would be the purgatorial stage.  
And, despite the mournfulness of our times, a glorious paradisiacal ending 
seemed feasible, if we did a certain amount of contriving. (202)
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Those familiar with Burke will recognize the fact that the three stages of this 
speech also outline the three stages of Burke’s rhetorical/philosophical project.  
Remembering the discussion from last chapter about Burke’s middle period, we 
can also see these three stages falling into the realms of Grammar, Rhetoric, and 
Symbolic.  
What is essential for our study, then, is to analyze how these three stages 
apply to empirical, humanist, and progressive epistemologies as they apply to the 
first-year composition classroom.  The first stage, dealing with the abysmal 
problems that beset the use of language, deals with objectivist assumptions about
language.  “The first stage would stress the great deceptions of speech… it would 
note,” Burke contends, “how men wander through ‘forests of symbols.’  Man a 
symbol-using animal.  Expiate on the fog of words through which we stumble, 
perhaps adding an image (the dog and the waterfall heard enigmatically beyond 
the mist)” (202).  While he is alluding to Baudelaire’s sonnet on 
“Correspondences” here, Burke turns from this association to the more 
“immediate social purposes” that Oliver speaks about in his polemic:
Here we would consider the problem of news: the necessary inadequacy 
of the report, even in the case of the best reporting; the bungling nature of 
the medium; the great bureaucratic dinosaurs of news-collecting; the 
added risks that arise from the dramatic aspects of news.  (202)     
Burke’s treatment of reports is not objectivist.  While the objectivist goal is to 
write the clearest, most adequate report, Burke’s goal is to demonstrate the 
impossibility of writing objectively.  Burke imagines a course that illustrates for 
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students what happens when “each day’s ‘reality’ is ‘dramatically’ put together 
for us by enterprises that comb the entire world for calamities, conflicts, and dire 
forebodings” (203).  Furthermore, he hopes to show how “such a documentary 
replica of the arena confuses us as to the actual recipe of motives on which the 
world is operating” (203).  
Burke then argues, as an “aside,” that “this is the situation, as regards the 
present state of literary criticism: When aesthetic criticism came in, there was a 
corresponding demotion of rhetoric.  Rhetoric was exiled.  And, emigrating, it 
received a home among the various so-called ‘new sciences’” (203).  What Burke 
hopes to assert is a new rhetoric in our field, “one designed to restore structures 
maimed by the vandalism of the exclusively aesthetic” (203).  By focusing on key 
terms, he argues, we can repair this vandalism.  “The key term for the old 
rhetoric,” Burke continues, “was ‘persuasion’ and its stress was upon deliberate 
design.  The key term for the ‘new’ rhetoric would be ‘identification’” (203).  
Identification for Burke is a device (as it is in classical rhetoric, when a speaker 
tries to identify himself with an audience), but it is also an end “as when people 
earnestly yearn to identify themselves with some group or other” (203).  This 
focusing upon identification as an end connects rhetoric back to an ethical realm 
within humanism:  
Here they are not necessarily being acted upon by a conscious external 
agent, but may be acting upon themselves to this end.  In such 
identification there is a partially dreamlike, idealistic motive, somewhat 
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compensatory to real differences or divisions, which the rhetoric of 
identification would transcend.  (203)
It is precisely through this type of identification that the character Neurosis is 
transformed.  “For, if identification includes the realm of transcendence, it has, by 
the same token, brought us into the realm of transformation, or dialectic” (203).  It 
is through this gesture that
Neurosis might now be renamed ‘Socraticus.”  Socraticus could point out 
how the very lostness of men in their symbolic quandaries has led to the 
invention of miraculously ingenious symbolic structures—whereas the 
very aspects of language we might otherwise fear can become engrossing 
objects of study and appreciation; and works once designed to play upon 
audiences’ passions, to “move” them rhetorically toward practical decision 
beyond the work, can now be enjoyed for their ability to move us in the 
purely poetic sense, as when, hearing a lyric or seeing a sunrise, we might 
say, “How moving!” (203-204)
Here again, though, we watch Burke move from the poetic back to the practical 
again.  After this poetic move, Burke reconsiders semantic theory, connecting it to 
the Platonic concerns with the “Upward Way (linguistic devices whereby we may 
move from a world of disparate particulars to a principle of one-ness, an “ascent” 
got, as the semanticist might say, by a movement toward progressively ‘higher 
levels of generalization’)” (204).  He also makes it clear that, through 
identification, “there could be a descent, a Downward Way, back into the world of 
particulars, all of which would be identified with the genius of the unitary 
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principle discovered en route” (204).  This process, he contends, creates a 
pyramid that moves us into the third state, his Paradiso.  In this state, “Socraticus 
might now even change his name to “Hierarchicus” where we are invited to 
“dwell upon the double nature of hierarchy” (204).  In this realm, there is the 
purely verbal ascent, with corresponding resources of identification… But there is 
also another line of ascent; and this involves the relation between the dialectics of 
identification and hierarchic structure in the social, or sociological, sense” (204).
His final goal, then, would be this: 
Here we would consider how matters of prestige (in the old style, 
“wonder,” or in the terminology of Corneille, “admiration”) figure in the 
ultimate resources of “identification.” Here we would note how our ideas 
of “beauty,” and even “nature,” are “fabulous,” concerning within 
themselves a social pageantry.  Here would be the ultimate step in the 
discussion of the ways in which man walks among “forests of symbols.”  
(204)
His presentation then continues with several extended examples of how this thesis 
could be localized in different works of literature, in different social and personal 
relations.  “Here is a grand device,” he concludes, “central to polemic, which is 
forever translating back and forth between materialist and idealist terms for 
motives” (209).  
I treat Burke’s talk as an intermission in this chapter for several reasons.  
First, it seems to be an intermission because it had no discernable effect on the 
attendees of the second Conference on College Composition and Communication.  
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Despite Burke’s radical plan of action, the workshop reports contain none of 
Burke’s suggestions.  This lack of effect is, quite frankly, understandable.  
Burke’s speech is certainly a difficult read, one that requires many readings to 
fully absorb, if this text—and the implications of it for a philosophy of first-year 
composition—can ever be fully absorbed and applied to the first-year composition 
classroom.  Only scholars who were already familiar with Burke’s 
transformations of Korzybski’s “higher levels of generalization” could have 
understood, on one hearing, the plan of action he proposed.30
His speech is an “intermission” because it takes place in a theoretical 
space both within and separate from the actual drama we could title “Cold War 
Writing Instruction.”  Burke hopes to transform composition and communication 
by merging it back with literary criticism.  This is not an argument for literature in 
the composition classroom.  It is instead, an argument for the removal of the 
rhetoric/poetic binary that causes literature and composition to live in separate 
theoretical spaces.  Burke’s critique of New Criticism, which is not merely an 
aside, of course, turns out to be a critique out of the divisions between literature 
and composition courses.  The merging of these two theoretical spaces would not 
only re-rhetoricize literature, it would re-poeticize composition and 
communication, and this, Burke optimistically contends, “would be something 
that even Studiosus might readily applaud” (205).
When we compare this speech to the one he made to the American 
Writer’s Congress in 1935, we can certainly see that Burke takes a more 
30
 See Burke’s Grammar of Motives 172-175, 238-241.
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circuitous route.  We can only speculate on the reason for his obscurity, but we 
can say that the fifties were a time when few scholars spoke directly about the 
Cold War climate in America.  Even fewer spoke about Red Scare politics, unless 
of course they were on the side of anticommunism.   In 1951, for example, 
College English published Ben Ray Redman’s review of Arthur Koestler, who 
joined the Communist Party at the end of 1931 and left it in the spring of ‘39.  
This article would have been uncontroversial, as the majority of Koestler’s work 
explains the incompatibility of intellectual and communist life, fitting in well with 
the basic tenets of Vital Center liberalism.  
“He was unable to make the sudden leap,” Redman argues,
made by so many of his fellow ex-Communists, from the bosom of one 
infallible church into the bosom of another.  He has longed, and still longs, 
for faith; but he has been unable to repeat his act of ‘intellectual self-
castration.’  He has looked to science for certainties, but he has been 
unable to find in science all the answers for which he yearns.  He has 
come to admit that the half-loaf of imperfect democracy is better than the 
full loaf of a nonexistent utopia.  (136) 
This attitude is interesting because it also shows that scholars in English studies, 
while they may not have been publicly responding to anticommunism, were
reacting to the rise of science.  One reason for this would have been the rising 
post-Holocaust, post-Hiroshima despair on the part of many intellectuals.  The 
popularity of Koestler’s The God that Failed reflected the lost optimism of all ex-
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Communists, as well as the growing awareness that grand visions were impossible 
when set face to face with the stark reality of the nuclear age.  
Of course, what composition teachers could not have known at this time 
was the role that empiricism would eventually play in our field of study.  
Composition studies eventually took up the authority of scientific discourse.  
Whether this was a response to universities’ pressure toward objectivism, or 
whether it was a reaction against the elitist assumptions behind literature courses 
that continued to marginalize the composition field, or both, our turn toward the 
“soft-sciences” of sociological and educational research helped solidify our field.  
But it is precisely because science had not yet entered this arena that we can learn 
a great deal by looking at the way rhetorical theorists dealt with the relationship 
between rhetoric and science in the early Cold War period. 
No Time to Be A Sophist: Richard Weaver and the Rhetoric of the Fifties 
No rhetorician would have been more surprised by the shift in the field of 
composition and rhetoric studies toward science than Richard Weaver.  As 
Connors argues “Weaver probably never suspected that his own field, rhetoric and 
human communication, might one day seek to cross the invisible but potent line 
separating the humanities from the sciences” (1).  Though Connors primarily 
locates this shift in our field in the seventies and eighties, we have seen that there 
was seismic activity underground that was creating this shift in the late forties and 
early fifties.  At a time when academics experienced pressures towards objectivist 
epistemologies, Weaver steered clear of objectivism by asserting a humanist-
rhetorical idealism.  As Connors argues, Weaver knew that 
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rhetoricians must be concerned with a wider realm than are scientists—for 
scientists are concerned only with facts and the relationships between 
them, while rhetorical concerns must include both the scientific 
occurrence and the axiological ordering of these facts.  We should not in 
our search for provable knowledge forget that the essential use of all 
knowledge is in aiding humanity in the search for consensually-arrived-at 
truth. (19)  
Ethics of Rhetoric (1953) sought to remedy the rising objectivism that loomed in 
the early Cold War period, but McCarthy’s presence makes Weaver’s argument 
much more complicated than Connors portrays it.  After all, one of the central 
theses of Ethics of Rhetoric, as Giles explains it, was that 
arguments from definition and analogy were the most ethical forms of 
argument and—not coincidentally—that they were arguments most 
compatible with idealists and conservatives like himself… At the other 
end of the spectrum were arguments based on consequence or 
circumstance, which Weaver linked to a relativist, pragmatic, liberal 
orientation… From Weaver’s perspective these arguments were inferior 
because of what he saw as their transience and shortsightedness.  (128)  
Science, after all, at least pretended to be in the ideal realm of truth, in the 
opposite realm of arguments based on consequence or circumstance.  So 
Weaver’s push toward a conservative idealism followed the same general drift of 
the time, but it was distinct from objectivism.  This is important to our study for a 
reason that neither Giles nor Connors mentions, namely this:  McCarthyism must 
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have played a role in leading Weaver to conceptualize rhetoric in this way.  
Weaver aligns a person’s politics with the type of argument that he or she most 
often uses, not what the end result of that argument actually is.  This Platonism 
undoubtedly was a response to McCarthyism.  After all, in this schema, McCarthy 
becomes a liberal:  “Idealistic and foundational arguers are, to Weaver, 
“conservative,” while pragmatic and relativistic arguers are “liberal”—regardless 
of what they might claim or how they might be labeled” (Giles 129).  But it is 
important that Weaver felt in his historical moment that a liberal was a person 
who did not identify with the left, but with the center, one who waited until 
circumstance dictated what stance to take in a situation (131).  When we 
remember that Schlesinger positioned himself in this way, we can see that Weaver 
avoided the trappings of Vital Center liberalism as well.  “What finally 
distinguishes conservative rhetoric is respect not for the way things are, but for 
the way things ought to be” (131).  In this light, we can see Weaver undercutting 
both McCarthy and Schlesinger, liberal and conservative anticommunism by 
extension, particularly the cynical view that humans are corrupt and base and 
thereby any conceptions of rhetoric that do not take this into account are naïve.  
Turning directly to Weaver, we cannot help but think of McCarthy when 
Weaver writes about “charismatic terms” in “Ultimate Terms in Contemporary 
Rhetoric.”  In this chapter, he defines “charismatic terms” as those that “have a 
power which is not derived, but which is in some mysterious way given” (227).  
Charismatic terms, he argues, 
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seem to have been broken loose somehow and to operate independently of 
referential connections (although in some instances an earlier history of 
referential connection may be made out).  Their meaning seems 
inexplicable unless we accept the hypothesis that their content proceeds 
out of a popular will that they shall mean something.  In effect, they are 
rhetorical by common consent, or by “charisma.”  As is the case with 
charismatic authority, where the populace gives the leader a power which 
can by no means be explained through his personal attributes, and permits 
him it use it effectively and even arrogantly, the charismatic term is given 
its load of impulsion with reference, and it functions by convention. (227-
228)
Most interestingly, the example he gives is the term “freedom,” the source of the 
greatest sacrifices in our culture and the one with the most obscure meaning.  
“The fact,” Weaver argues, “that the most extensive use of the term is made by 
modern politicians to get men to assume more responsibility (in the form of 
military service, increased taxes, abridgement of rights, etc.) seems to carry no 
weight” (228).  The term “democracy,” he argues prophetically, may be heading 
in the same direction.  
This prophecy points us to the fact that the early fifties were not a time 
that academics in English departments wanted to identify themselves as 
rhetoricians, let alone sophistic ones.  It is easy, in our now well-established field, 
to forget that the abuses of rhetoric in the public sphere gave scholars another 
reason to reject rhetoric entirely.  Rhetoric became propaganda in the most 
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negative sense.  This rejection most often took the form of moving toward 
objectivism in the sciences and liberal humanism in the arts.  While the outcome 
of this rejection had negative effects on writing instruction, it seems 
understandable that some scholars would take up this conservative position.  
McCarthy was the worst kind of sophist.  He worked solely for his own gain and 
used whatever contingency he could in order to make his claims.  
Have I Got A Job for You: McCarthy as a Sophist
McCarthyism: The Fight for America (1952) might be the worst example 
of sophism’s sinister side.  In this pamphlet, McCarthy set out to establish his 
political agenda in America and to give “documented answers to questions asked 
by friend and foe” (i).  Because both his rhetoric and the function of the university 
play a key role in this pamphlet, it is worth investigating in some detail.  The 
pamphlet begins by blaming the Truman administration for its failures to stop 
communism in China, Korea, and in Eastern Europe, then goes on to suggest that 
these failures were the result of both incompetence and small number of disloyal 
elements in governmental agencies.  When McCarthy tells his story of sitting in 
front of the Tydings committee, he sounds like a man being persecuted, instead of 
a man who is persecuting Communists and fellow travelers without evidence.  
He proudly reports that he forced “sex deviates” to resign from the State 
Department, not because they were disloyal, but because homosexuals “are
considered by all intelligence agencies of the government to be security risks 
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[because] they are subject to blackmail” (14).31  He also argues that it would only 
be unethical to use his congressional immunity to expose Communists if the 
charges were not true.  He blames Secretary of State Dean Acheson and 
Ambassador Phillip C. Jessup for the “sell-out” of China.  He continues his case 
against Owen Lattimore and General George C. Marshall.  He claims that the 
Tydings Committee was set up to thwart any real investigation and implies that 
they were doing so to protect Truman and his State Department.  Anyone who 
disagrees with him, he argues without irony, is engaged in a Communist-directed 
“smear attack” against him.
Despite the preposterousness of these polemics, it may be the final 
argument that would have seemed most disturbing to academics.  It is here that he 
promises to turn his power against institutions.  The final question that gets asked 
of McCarthy is “Senator McCarthy, what can I—an average American, holding 
no public office, and owning no newspaper or radio stations—do to fight 
Communism?”  Communists are trying to “infiltrate the education system of this 
country and control school and college publications” (101), he replies.  After 
claiming that communist professors number 3,000 in the U.S., he rallies his 
constituents by suggesting that “every man and woman in America can appoint 
himself or herself to undo the damage which is being done by Communist 
infiltration in our schools” (101).  His final rhetorical gesture is worth quoting in 
full:
31
 “In addition to the security question,” McCarthy writes, “it should be noted that 
individuals who are morally weak and perverted and who are representing the 
State Department in foreign countries certainly detract from the prestige of this 
nation” (15).  McCarthy’s rhetoric is full of this type of homophobia.  
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Countless times I have heard parents throughout the country complain that 
their sons and daughters were sent to college as good Americans and 
returned four years later as wild-eyed radicals.  The educational system of 
this country cannot be cleansed of Communist influence by legislation.  It 
can only be scrubbed and flushed and swept clean if the mothers and 
fathers, and the sons and daughters, of this nation individually decide to do 
this job.  This can be your greatest contribution to America.  This is a job 
which you can do.  This is a job which you must do if America and 
Western Civilization are to live.  (101)
Clearly, McCarthy is no stranger to hyperbole.  The entire fate of Western 
Civilization hinges on the parents of America, who can do what legislation 
cannot, get out their mops, rubber gloves, and brooms and clean up the 
educational system one school at a time.  McCarthy, it seems, was at least 
somewhat aware of the fact that the law was not on his side, but this did not stop 
him from continuing to argue (from experience, we have to assume):
I warn you, however, that the task will not be a pleasant one.  When you 
detect and start to expose a teacher with a Communist mind, you will be 
damned and smeared.  You will be accused of endangering academic 
freedom.  Remember, to those Communist-minded teachers academic 
freedom means their right to force you to hire them to teach your children 
a philosophy in which you do not believe.  To Communist-minded 
teachers academic freedom means their right to deny you the freedom to 
hire loyal Americans to teach your children.  (101, italics his)
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Though it is humorous to accuse McCarthy of practicing subtlety here, he does 
make an interesting choice when he describes teachers as having “Communist 
minds,” instead of simply calling them Communists.  This, of course, gives 
anticommunists more flexibility for grounding their claims.  After all, one of the 
favorite techniques of countersubversives was to label all progressive educators as 
Communists.  A teacher who believed that we should work toward greater 
economic equality in America could be accused of having a communist mind, 
even if he or she had never been a member of the CP.  
McCarthy closes his argument with a rhetorical use of antithesis: “We 
cannot win the fight against Communism if Communist-minded professors are 
teaching your children.  We cannot lose the fight against Communism if loyal 
Americans are teaching your children” (101).  This type of argument shows that 
McCarthy sincerely believed that knowledge was transmitted directly from the 
mind of the teacher to the mind of the student, that teachers were capable of 
radicalizing students based solely on their own beliefs.  Likewise, he believed that 
loyal Americans would keep students loyal to America. 32
32
 McCarthy’s rhetoric sounds strangely prophetic, very much like recent 
conservative rhetoric regarding the necessities for less radical professors in the 
academy, but his methods are hardly as sophisticated as some more recent 
conservatives.  David A. Hollinger’s proves this in his brilliant article “Money 
and Academic Freedom a Half-Century after McCarthyism.”  In this article, he 
traces a form of conservative reaction to liberal academia that proved to be far 
more effective than McCarthyism because, quite frankly, it had a much grander 
vision.  Hollinger summarizes a memorandum that was written by Virginia lawyer 
Lewis Powell in 1971.  The memo outlines how big business should engage in a 
four-pronged attack on academic liberal epistemology:  
First, big business should find ways to provide sustained financial support 
outside the academy for social science and humanities scholars with sound 
views… Second, big business should establish a network of popular 
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When rhetoric receives this type of treatment, an obvious avenue for 
rhetoricians to take would be to redefine rhetoric.  If nothing else, the presence of 
Richard Weaver shows that there was at least one other viable option between a 
narrow formalist humanism and objectivism.  Weaver’s rhetoric shows a response 
embedded in rhetorical idealism.  McCarthy’s rhetoric helps us see why a 
conservative Democrat like Weaver would want to put particular emphasis on the 
importance of defining our terms, why he would want to move us away from the 
worst types of argument by circumstance.  It may also be why he felt that “the 
student of rhetoric must realize that in the contemporary world he is confronted 
not only by evil practitioners, but also, and probably to an unprecedented degree, 
by men who are conditioned by the evil created by others” (232).  While 
speakers and media personalities who could effectively popularize the 
ideas developed by these scholars… Third, big business should lobby 
trustees and administrators at colleges and universities concerning the 
political ‘imbalance’ of their faculties, hoping gradually to see more and 
more conservative intellectuals integrated into these faculties.  Fourth, big 
business should urge campus schools of business administration to 
broaden their curriculum and their role in campus life. (164)  
I do not think it would have occurred to McCarthy to visualize “conservative 
think tanks,” or to orchestrate media attention to any realm that existed beyond his 
own career.  Nor could he have understood the possibilities and prestige that 
business schools could produce on university campuses, how they could change 
the entire thrust of university life from within.  
But then again, Hollinger informs us, Lewis Powell would eventually 
write the opinion that is “generally credited with providing the constitutional 
foundation for affirmative action.  Universities could take ethnoracial categories 
into account among other considerations, wrote Powell, in the interest of cultural 
diversity” (182).  The irony that Powell both “plotted for the political 
neutralization and transformation of faculties” (182) and helped give universities 
the freedom to decide on what grounds they would like to hire is not lost on 
Hollingsworth, nor is it lost on this writer, but it does point to a fundamental 
difference between two different types of arguments.  Powell is a clear example of 
Weaver’s ethical arguer.  He remains consistent to his belief that institutions of 
knowledge have a right to direct their own ideological visions in both cases.  
McCarthy, we can safely say, argued differently.        
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McCarthy clearly believed that teachers acted like absolute authorities in the 
classroom, that they imposed their knowledge from above, attempting to mold 
students to their way of thinking in whatever way was most effective, Weaver 
wanted students to “hold a dialect with [themselves] to see what the wider 
circumferences of [their] terms of persuasion [were]” (232).  If a significant
change in our culture’s direction could have been brought about by the humanist 
goal of having students engage in dialectic with themselves, Weaver’s 
conservative rhetoric might have made a difference in our culture.  
A debate between Richard Weaver and Kenneth Burke would have been 
fascinating at the second CCCC.  Instead, Weaver debated McCrimmon, and 
Burke debated Flesch.  Though Burke’s speech was deliberatively obscure, it still 
outlined a pragmatic rhetoric with progressive appeal.  Weaver had the luxury of 
being clearer than Burke because his stance was more conservative, whereas 
Burke operated from a different set of circumstances and a less popular political 
orientation.
History shows us that Burke felt compelled to change some of his earlier 
work in the current political climate.  When Burke revised Permanence and 
Change for the second edition (published in 1953), he deleted the following 
passage:
Communism is a cooperative rationalization, or perspective, which fulfills 
the requirements suggested by the poetic metaphor.  It is fundamentally 
humanistic, as is poetry.  Its ethics is referable to the socio-biologic genius 
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of man (the economic conquest of the machine being conceived within 
such a frame). (Permanence, First Edition, 344-45, as qtd. by Behr)  
Martin Behr’s Critical Moments in the Rhetoric of Kenneth Burke takes Burke at 
his word here and argues:
That Burke admits that he indeed erred by proposing that communism is 
the only possible orientation which, within industrialized societies, permits 
cooperative uses of the competitive shows us the extent to which his 
thinking has changed, that he was responding to a particular set of social, 
economic, and political circumstances.  (33)
To admit that one erred in an earlier work is one thing.  To actually delete a 
passage from an earlier work is another, but Behr is certainly correct when he 
says that the current political circumstances may have led him to delete the 
passage.  Personal circumstances may have led to its deletion as well.  Burke had
recently lost a position that the English department at the University of 
Washington had offered him for the academic year beginning in 1952.  The higher 
administration rescinded the English department’s offer after discovering that 
“there was too much concern among ‘certain influential friends of the 
University’” (Schrecker, No Ivory Tower 267). 
Ironically, this incident occurred at the same time that Albert Kitzhaber 
was working on his doctoral dissertation at the University of Washington.  The 
fact that Kitzhaber finished, in 1953, his highly influential Rhetoric in American 
Colleges, 1850-1900, gives us further proof that the early Cold War period was 
not a time of complete passivity in the realm of writing instruction.  As John T. 
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Gage explains in the introduction to the published version, his dissertation, which 
was read in Xerox form by several generations of rhetoric and composition 
scholars before finally being published in the early 90s, was “one of the important 
markers of the beginning of [composition and rhetoric as a discipline]” (vii).  “It 
is the first book-length historical study,” Gage writes, “of the subject, by a scholar 
who helped to initiate the reevaluation of rhetoric in American education that 
made the so-called ‘paradigm shift’ in composition during the 1960s possible” 
(vii).   Although a careful investigation of Burke’s letters fails to connect Burke’s 
invitation to the University of Washington with Porter Perrin, who was 
Kitzhaber’s dissertation advisor, we do know that Perrin “was among the first to 
see the relevance of Kenneth Burke’s ideas to composition” (Kitzhaber, xix).  
Here again, we see Burke in the thick of things, only this time as an absence.  
Using an analysis of nineteenth-century textbooks, Kitzhaber argues that 
an overemphasis on formal theories destroyed the potential for rhetoric to produce 
“good writing” in the classroom:
The effect of the forms of discourse on rhetorical theory and practice has 
been bad.  They represent an unrealistic view of the writing process, a 
view that assumes writing is done by formula and in a social vacuum.  
They turn the attention of both student and teacher toward an academic 
exercise instead of toward a meaningful act of communication in a social 
context.  (139)
Had Kitzhaber been able to attend the first meetings of the Conference on College 
Composition and Communication, he might have found himself in conversation 
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with many composition and communication scholars who would have agreed with 
him on this subject.  Nevertheless, this is no reason to disagree with his 
conclusion, which states:
most composition teaching today, in fact, is still being done in the shadow 
of rhetorical theory that came into prominence between 1885 to 1900.  
The “four forms of discourse,” and the Unity-Coherence-Emphasis 
formula have by no means been widely discredited even now… The ideal 
of correctness in mechanical details, which came in the later nineties to 
dominate rhetorical instruction, has today perhaps more supporters than 
any other single aspect of the rhetorical process.  (226)
While our investigation of the early meetings of CCCC proves that the scholars 
who were there did not support this type of rhetorical instruction, Kitzhaber, in 
1953, laid the foundation for composition historians that would follow him by 
asserting composition’s claim to a rhetorical tradition that refused to remove itself 
from the cultural sphere.
Curators and Custodians: The Field Publicly Responds to Anticommunism
In 1953, the same year Kitzhaber finished his response to politically 
repressive theories of writing instruction, the field of English explicitly responded 
to the problem of communism and anticommunism in a public forum.  In 
November, still many months before the Senate censured McCarthy and many 
liberals and conservatives alike denounced McCarthy’s tactics, Harlen Adams 
opened the NCTE convention in Los Angeles by reading from a letter that 
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Eisenhower had recently sent to him about the importance of English studies.  
Eisenhower writes: 
The English language is a precious heritage.  Great documents of human 
freedom, great poetry and philosophy are its treasures.  As teachers of 
English, your associates in the National Council are the custodians of that 
heritage.  More than that, you bear the responsibility for passing along to 
the youth of America a love for and an understanding of those ideals of 
our heritage which find repeated expression in our rich and flexible 
mother tongue—the ideals of peace, freedom, dignity, reverence for God, 
and respect for our fellow man.
Although the anonymous writer of “The National Council in Los Angeles” report 
suggests that “the audience listened appreciatively” (296), this does not prove that 
scholars in our field accepted Eisenhower’s argument.  This gesture does show, 
however, that the leaders of the NCTE wanted to present a conformist ethos in 
this time of uncertainty.  
Eisenhower’s letter speaks to the tensions defining the field during the 
early Cold War period.  The two metaphors that he uses tell us much about his 
beliefs and assumptions regarding language production.  English teachers, the 
letter contends, have to be both custodians of and curators for the English 
language.  The language is the treasure, and we are custodians of the building that 
houses that treasure.  As custodians, our role is to keep pure something that is 
always already present.  But the custodians also have to inculcate belief on the 
part of visitors to this museum, so we must also be museum curators.  Ironically, 
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Eisenhower unwittingly outlines the division between composition and literature 
as seen by a formalist.  The composition teacher serves as a custodian by cleaning 
up errors in student writing.  The literature teacher inculcates appreciation for 
great works of literature and philosophy.
After Adams read Eisenhower’s letter, he reported on the state of the 
NCTE.  In “Transition and Renascence,” the published version of this report, 
Adams announces that the committee on censorship had finally completed its 
pamphlet responding to what he refers to as “the problem of censorship of 
teaching materials and of controversial issues” (259).  We had, in the field of 
English, finally responded to McCarthyism with a pamphlet titled Censorship and 
Controversy.  Adams quotes extensively from the pamphlet in his address.  
Arguing that the pamphlet’s position “is a bold and affirmative one,” (259) he 
reads directly from it:
Teachers of language and literature believe that school and college 
discussion of vital problems can help young people to discover the 
underlying causes of the problems, to examine possible solutions, and to 
suspend judgment; that it will deter them from taking up extreme and 
untenable views; and that it will discourage the more common—and more 
dangerous—drift toward apathy.  Failure to face genuine issues in school 
and college brings loss of interest in education and a loss of respect for it.  
(qtd. in Adams 259)
These concerns, of course, are central to rhetoric and composition studies today, 
but we may want to know whether the writers of the pamphlet believed that 
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students should suspend judgments indefinitely, which is generally an objectivist 
goal, or whether they were meant to suspend judgment until they came to 
informed conclusions.  Likewise, while we generally assume that students need to 
be introduced to meaningful ideas and debates in the classroom, not everyone will 
share the belief that the function of education is to deter students from taking up 
extreme views.  The education that gets described here is one that helps maintain 
the status quo by keeping students from taking up radical positions.  Not only is 
this a paternalistic gesture, it assumes that all extreme viewpoints are indeed 
untenable.  The structure of the argument does not allow the reader to look at 
extreme and untenable viewpoints as two separate ideas.  The humanist emphasis 
on reason is behind this ideological fusion.  Students can be introduced to radical 
ideas in class for the sake of interest, but reason will help them drift toward views 
that are less extreme, views that would be considered tenable by most people.  
This attitude stands apart from progressivism, which assumes that peaceful 
reforms—sometimes radical ones—are necessary.
Just as we saw when looking at Vital Center philosophy, we see tensions 
emerge when scholars try to use a moderate stance against the pressures of 
anticommunism.  Like Schlesinger and Raymond B. Allen (and unlike the 
AAUP), the writers of the pamphlet believed that members of the CP did not have 
the right to teach in institutions of higher education.  Adams felt that the 
following passage was important enough to excerpt from the pamphlet and read to 
his audience:
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If a person wishes to espouse Communism, Fascism, or any other “ism” he 
should be free to do so, to exercise, too, his right to be a martyr, and 
perhaps even to suffer death for his ideas.  But this freedom does not in 
itself include, in our judgment, any right to teach in our schools and 
colleges, whose purpose is to inculcate faith in our institutions and to 
promote a society of free people, not to assist a totalitarian regime that 
seeks to enslave the human mind.  (qtd. in Adams 259)
This passage makes it clear that Adams wants to use the objectivist function of 
suspending judgment to separate the field of English from the damage that 
anticommunist attacks could potentially cause.  The NCTE statement has many of 
the same implications as Raymond B. Allen’s injunction about the role of 
professors in the university.  In fact, the NCTE statement seems even more 
politically conservative.  It conflates communism and fascism with any other 
“ism.”  This could include, we assume, Marxism, anarchism, socialism, 
progressivism, though probably not capitalism, formalism, or objectivism.  It 
conflates membership in the Communist Party with the espousal of CP doctrine in 
the classroom.  Like Allen, the writers of Censorship and Controversy fail to even 
consider the possibility of a professor being a Communist Party member while not 
espousing communism in the classroom.  Furthermore, the writers of the 
pamphlet do not qualify the notion that the purpose of the university is to 
inculcate faith in our institutions.  The writers of Censorship and Controversy
explicitly state that the business of teachers is to inculcate faith in our institutions.  
Of course, this would not be problematic if the writers had been more specific 
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about what “faith” means, but the lack of definition leaves too much room for 
critics to assume that any type of criticism of our institutions equals a lack of faith 
in them.  
Undoubtedly, the NCTE found itself in a difficult position in 1953.  
Despite Eisenhower’s calming influence, the nation was still in the midst of a Red 
Scare.  To stand up for a minority of professors who had been involved or were 
still involved with the CP must have felt like political suicide at the time.  
McCarthyism, not communism, was the enemy of academic freedom.  Adams 
spoke to this when he read another quotation from the pamphlet to his audience:
It is the strong conviction of the National Council of Teachers of English 
that the schools and colleges of the nation must be on guard against 
Communism and also against those persons who use the fear of 
Communism as a pretext for their vicious attacks upon the American 
educational system.  (qtd. in Adams 259)
Those people were, of course, McCarthy and the Senators and House members 
who made a career out of red baiting, who attacked all kinds of leftist thought 
under the guise of fighting communism.  The NCTE hoped to remedy this 
situation by getting more of the public involved.  Adams felt that this solution was 
important enough to read to his listeners as well:    
In any particular instance of difference over the use of instructional 
materials, controversial topics, or speakers in schools and colleges, no 
single individual or group can make decisions alone.  At least five parties 
may be actively concerned: teachers; students; school authorities, 
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including boards of control; parents, other relatives and friends of the 
students; and leaders of community as represented by influential 
individuals and organizations.  (qtd. in Adams 259-60)
The primary concern here centers on both curricula and methods.  Ignoring the 
question of what should happen to teachers who have lost their jobs, the NCTE 
shows faith in the public sphere.  It is generally hoped that if parents, teachers, 
administrators, and the general community got more directly involved in what 
happened in the classroom, fear would diminish, thus putting an end to 
anticommunist fervor.
The rest of Adam’s speech is equally remarkable because it provides us a 
concrete connection between anticommunism and the desire of administrators to 
move away from the progressive educational slant toward child-centered 
education.  Adams argues that student-centered pedagogies have helped us 
understand 
the importance of recognizing individual differences.  At the same time 
two dangers have arisen: (1) the danger of merely encouraging “self-
expression,” which has sometimes meant only unguided, unrestrained, 
unsocial behavior in the pose of individuality and (2) the danger of 
minimizing standards, which could result in a leveling to mediocrity, in 
the attempt to effect conformity and adjustment. (263)
Quoting Joseph Wood Krutch, Adams fears that “normalcy” has replaced 
“excellence” altogether.  Looking for reform, he argues that “it is the aim of 
democracy to produce an independent, distinctive individual who is, also, a co-
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operative, understanding, socialized citizen” (263-264).  In this passage, Adams 
asserts the ideal of an “independent, distinctive individual”—a fundamentally 
humanist ideal—at a time when anticommunists were conflating progressive 
educational techniques with—as Berlin puts it—softness on communism.  
“Excellence” became the term that helped mediate what liberals wanted to 
achieve in their classrooms while appealing to the values of what officials wanted 
from them.  
Interestingly enough, administrators also looked toward the realm of the 
spiritual as a way of gaining ethos in the community.  The emphasis on excellence 
was conflated in this address with an emphasis on spiritual matters.  Adams 
argues that “there is a perceptible swing of the pendulum from a primary concern 
for material things to a renewed interest in things of the spirit” (264).  Cremin 
argues that there was a tremendous amount of pressure from community leaders 
for universities to stand up against utilitarianism and focus more on the spiritual 
realm in colleges and universities during this time.  Adams responds to this 
pressure by arguing that “for the teaching of spiritual values there is no teacher so 
well prepared as the teacher of literature” (264).  In this case, we see literature 
rising up against the materialism that underlies the composition course.  
Cremin also notes that religious leaders wanted universities to “convey 
through a revitalized humanistic curriculum ‘an appreciation of forms of art and 
science, of imagination and comprehension of life’s dimensions’ that ‘do not 
promise an immediate increment of obvious success’” (55).  This agenda is more 
suited to literature or composition classes based on literature, and may point us to 
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another reason that composition courses aligned themselves with literature in the 
later part of the decade.  Progressivism could have helped turn those primarily 
materialist concerns toward a different, more fundamentally democratic end, but 
not in this political climate.  
The passages that Adams read to his audience summarize fairly well the 
content of the pamphlet, but further investigation of Censorship and Controversy
yields one more important insight into how we responded to McCarthyism in 
English studies.  Like most liberal anticommunists, the writers of the pamphlet 
excluded Communists from their institutions.  They also show repressive 
tolerance to those who had once been Communists but were no longer, as long as 
they renounced all affiliation:
Among teachers, as among writers and other professional groups, some 
foolish idealists seduced by Communism in a period of stress and 
depression have come to their senses and repudiated Communism.  
Toward such persons our attitude should be watchful but tolerant. (10)
This statement simplifies the reason that some leftist academics became 
Communists in the thirties and forties and reduces it to an individual neurosis.  In 
the interest of fairness to liberal anticommunists, this statement also trivializes the 
principled reason that some liberal academics decided to repudiate communism in 
the early Cold War era by simply reducing this decision to “coming to their 
senses.”  For a polemic such as this one, which tried to protect our rights as 
teachers to use the types of materials in the classroom that we were trained to use 
most effectively, this historical blindness may be understandable.  For our 
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purposes, however, it is important to point out that the “watchful but tolerant” 
clause in this statement must have been repressive for teachers who had any type 
of progressive goals in their teaching.  After all, McCarthy had encouraged his 
constituency to go after “Communist-minded professors” in the public forum.  
How many of us would not have changed our teaching in order to avoid even the 
possibility of having a student or a parent bring some aspect of our classrooms to 
the attention of administration or the broader general public?
“The Microphone Hidden in the Ivy:” Responses to Red Scare Politics
An answer to this question can be found by looking at the symposium 
about “Controversial Subjects in the Classroom” that College English published 
in 1954.  It seems to suggest that many of us would have circumscribed our 
teaching in some way.  The series of responses in this symposium proves that 
teachers found themselves and their teaching extensively changed during the Cold 
War period, not only because of McCarthyism but because of the broader 
political, cultural, and academic climate as well.  In planning this symposium, the 
editors of College English had invited its readers to respond to the following 
question:  “Should controversial subjects—for example, communism—be 
discussed in either literature or communication classes?”  Six professors 
responded to the question.
Richard K. Welsh, at Arizona State College, responded with sarcasm so 
deep it is an understatement to describe it as cynical.  “There is a microphone 
hidden in the ivy that clings to the ivory tower, and the professional 
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vivisectionists at the other end of the wire are not long in interpreting what they 
hear.  The revelations,” he continues, 
are as startling to college teachers as a trip through the hall of mirrors at a 
carnival funhouse.  It is well that we examine our blunders and foolish 
notions before the inspectors come tapping at our door some night.  Our 
chief blunder seems to be—according to others’ views of us—that we 
have tried to do more than our share.  It is our duty to instruct tender 
minds in the manipulation of alphabetic symbols for reading and writing.  
More than that we must not do.  Our foolish notion that we should train 
these tender minds to think with the aid of the symbols is a dangerous 
misconception that we had better get rid of.  (459)
This passage, as parodic as it is, reflects an epistemological reality that Welsh saw 
around him.  When Welsh refers to the manipulation of symbols, he refers to 
objectivist writing instruction in its barest form.  Welsh’s response is another 
example of the power of the Cold War climate, how it pressured teachers to move 
toward word-manipulation only.  He pushes back against this climate by 
illustrating what living in this reality would require teachers to do: 
Keeping students from thinking may be much more difficult than training 
them to think.  But it is not impossible…  Some successful people have 
learned how to talk and write without conveying ideas.  There is no reason 
why English teachers cannot teach their students this intellectual bead-
stringing. (460)
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He proposes that we revise our textbooks to contain “an entirely aseptic collection 
of essays,” and only include “the Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution” as well as “articles on baseball, apple pie, and Mother… Any thing 
related to sex, religion, business, education, politics, and other vital aspects of life 
is definitely out” (460).  While we have no way of knowing how deep Welsh’s 
jeremiad really goes—while we do not know how many of the vital aspects of life 
he kept in or out of his classroom—we do know, from this response, that he felt 
pressured to keep them out.  The evidence of this pressure alone has deep 
implications for both literature and composition teachers.
He ends his response with an equally parodic (and this time sexist) 
metaphor:
At first I found it difficult to view English as a sort of handicraft subject, 
but a young lady majoring in physical education put me in my place.  In a 
theme she described her recent experience as a counselor at an in-school 
camp for children.  She told how the children were taken at night to view 
the stars and thus learn of ‘their place in the universe.’  Since I read that 
theme I have been content to go humbly about my business of teaching 
word-manipulation.  Deep questions and controversial matters I leave in 
the capable hands of muscular maidens in the moonlight. (460)
While there is little use in deconstructing the message here and how he portrays it, 
it does reflect a certain amount of rage that many must have felt about what they 
were allowed to do in the classroom during this time.  There were tremendous 
pressures to teach English as word-manipulation only.  This relates directly to the 
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objectivist imperative.  The business of English under objectivism is to reflect 
truth clearly and directly.  There is no room to question how that truth comes 
about.  There is no room for the humanist to use literature to show a student his or 
her place in the universe.  In the literature class, the emphasis is on a literary text 
devoid of its entire political and historical context.  In the composition classroom, 
the emphasis is even narrower: disembodied rhetorical forms and grammatical 
exercises.  
As the second writer in the symposium, Robert A Dufour directly 
addresses the issue of composition classes.  He suggests that “before deciding 
whether to discuss controversial subjects like communism, we should ask 
ourselves whether we would discuss them to avoid teaching composition or as a 
means to teaching it” (460, italics his).  “Many of us would rather teach 
practically anything other than the extremely difficult subject of composition” 
(460).  He argues that a subject like communism could be an effective means for 
teaching composition, but only if 1) the teacher knows enough about the subject 
“to lead a penetrating discussion,” 2) the class is capable of learning from this 
subject, 3) The teacher can get the students to “subordinate their emotions to their 
reason,” 4) There is enough time to cover such a complex matter, and 5) The 
subject can be limited enough for a short theme (460-61).
These five points underscore quite a few assumptions about the nature of a 
composition class in the Cold War era.  The first places primary emphasis on the 
teacher’s authority.  It assumes that the teacher has to be in the position of 
knowledge in the classroom in order to impose his or her wisdom on the class.  
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This is not entirely an unreasonable assumption, of course, but it does assume that 
the students have less of a role in class discussions than the teacher.  The second 
idea is closely related to the first.  It gives the teacher latitude to decide if a class 
is capable of learning from this type of subject.  This view of writing instruction is 
paternalistic, assuming that a teacher has the role of protecting students who are 
incapable of receiving such information.  The third assumes that emotion has no 
place in writing, that logos is the most important aspect of the rhetorical triangle 
and that it is the teacher’s job to get students to realize and bring this separation 
into practice.  The fourth assumes that complexity has no function in the 
classroom and the fifth relates to that from the final product’s point of view.  All 
five put the teacher in an authoritarian role, to one degree or another, which gives 
us further proof that some classrooms were more authoritarian in the Cold War 
era.  A progressive teacher, after all, would not have the same concerns about 
authority as Dufour.  A humanist teacher like Baird at Amherst would also fail to 
see problems with the disorienting nature of complex material.
William Sylvester looks at the issue from yet another angle, by trying to 
discern why students often avoid challenging issues altogether.  “I suspect that 
students often feign boredom from fear: they are afraid of questions that are too 
direct, and so they retreat into a protective nonchalance or into the safety of 
clichés” (461).  He then talks about a method he likes to use, which is to 
intentionally use a provocative paragraph to engage class discussions.  The 
examples he includes are very interesting because they turn out to be very indirect 
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responses to the question of using communism in the classroom.  Here are the two 
paragraphs, included in their entirety:
Philip Wylie has said something to the effect that the American mother is 
the most boring, and consequently the most bored, creature on earth.  She 
is interested in dominating her son and in urging her husband to earn more 
money.  Only in America could so nauseating a custom as Mother’s Day 
become established.  Congress should pass a resolution:  Mom is a jerk.  
(461)
And:
People who work hard will rise to the top in business and will earn a lot of 
money.  Poor people are stupid or lazy or both.  Wealth and intelligence 
go together.  Intelligent people should have more power.  In fact, we’d be 
a lot better off if we didn’t worry about poor people so much.  The right to 
vote and the right to hold office should be restricted to people who have an 
I.Q. of at least 140.
Both of these paragraphs, Sylvester argues, are poorly written and are designed 
only to provoke “genuine interest” on the part of students, in order to help them 
“find their own subjects” (462).  But what is finally most interesting about them is 
their content, both of which are at least indirectly about the philosophy of 
communism.  This article may be the most progressive of all the responses 
because it works subtly toward engaging students with social concerns and it does 
so in a less authoritarian way by making it an interesting passage for students.
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John Milton (if that really is his name!) approaches the subject from 
another angle.  He argues that the primary reason many do not use controversial 
materials in the classroom is that they lead “inevitably to impassioned and 
illogical discussion, to a battle of prejudices which can, in turn, lead only to 
trouble” (462).  But Milton argues that this result provides the teacher with “a 
wonderful opportunity for tempering passionate prejudice with logic, while 
retaining the authentic feeling and drive which almost always accompany the 
discussion of controversial subjects” (462).  He moves from this to a description 
of the way that he can get students to realize that while they object to 
communism, they often do not know why.  He contends that Koestler’s The God 
that Failed is a good book for students to read because it is about writers who 
once believed in communism, but who no longer do.  This argument, that we need 
to more fully understand communism in order to more fully defeat it, shows faith 
in the power of reason to stand outside of the realm of persuasion.  It conflates 
communist thought with passionate, illogical thought.  By defeating illogical 
thought and tempering passions, it assumes, teachers can help defeat communism.  
This idea parallels the central tenets of the Institute of Propaganda Analysis.
Robert Palmer Saalback, the final writer in the symposium, argues that an 
often-ignored reason that teachers would not want to teach about controversial 
subjects is because 
it is no part of their philosophy to consider any question really unsettled; 
they may feel that what is needed is to teach ‘the truth.’ Truth, to them, is 
not a matter of debate; it is to be found in ‘tradition’ as they interpret 
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tradition and involves the Parmenidean belief that reality is essentially 
timeless and unchanging, that truth is absolute for all times and places, and 
that we need only discover it.  Such a view is authoritarian; it sees the 
answers to educational problems in the acceptance of authority—perhaps 
Plato, perhaps Thomas Aquinas, perhaps (even) Hitler.  (462)
This statement has tremendous implications for our study as well because it 
reminds us of Raymond B. Allen’s epistemological assumptions about the 
university.  Allen pretends to be scientific, but relies instead on an authoritarian 
view of knowledge to suppress radical inquiry.  “Such a view is not scientific,” 
Saalback argues, “for it does not set up its hypotheses tentatively or look upon 
truth as something still to be found.  Its error seems to me to be in assimilating 
empirical truth to logical truth and in overemphasizing the importance of the 
latter” (463).  
Then Saalback asks and answers the following question: 
‘Does the concept of an American democratic education leave room for 
such an authoritarian view?’  Here the answer seems obvious: if 
authoritarianism were compatible with democracy, our constitution would 
have no need for checks and balances, our political arena could be served 
by one party only, and the three branches of our government could be put 
together under one head.  (464)  
Arguing that if we wanted our institutions to be democratic as well as scientific, 
“we would insist on the free flow of all opinions in and out of schools so as to 
make qualified citizens of a democratic state” (464), Saalback gives us insight 
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into our understandings of democracy today.  If we want today to “encourage 
independent thinking and to encourage effective communication of such thought” 
(464), we must still wrestle with how we can do this in the face of what 
composition expects of us.  Many of the same conflicts exist for us today, and he 
points to an interesting resolution:  
In what better way can we estimate the student’s grasp of his facts and the 
validity of his logical deduction than by using subjects which admit of the 
presentation of a point of view with which some of us will disagree?  It is 
in controversy that the mind is whetted; it learns quickly that, to defend a 
point, it must be careful to gather all necessary data and present it 
carefully.  (464)
Here, Saalback attempts to reconnect the empirical with both ethics and dialectic.  
His response may do the best job of bringing the best of the empirical together 
with the best of the humanist and progressive.
The symposium of controversial issues that College English published in 
1954 brings together many of the issues brought forward in the last two chapters, 
as well as those in the earlier part of this chapter.  Weisinger’s proposal for first-
year composition used critiques of democracy to help strengthen students’ and 
faculty’s conceptions of the democratic process.  Like Saalback, Weisinger 
believed that academic process could bring students to a fuller conception of 
democracy only if it contained the specific agenda of interrogating and more fully 
defining the construct of democracy.  He did not believe, as Raymond B. Allen 
did, that academics had to hold views which, shaped by the accumulation of 
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tested evidence, are subject to no dictation from outside the mind of the holder 
(19), but had faith instead—like the contemporary John Milton—that democracy 
would win out in a free exchange of ideas.
Weisinger did not fear dissent, but encouraged it instead.  Raymond B. 
Allen argued that “if a University ever loses it dispassionate objectivity and 
incites or leads parades, it will have lost its integrity as an institution and 
abandoned the timeless, selfless quest of truth… It is for this reason that a teacher 
has a special obligation to deal in a scholarly and scientific way with controversial 
questions…” (93).  Weisinger, seven years before Allen made this speech, wanted 
academics to deal with controversial questions in an ethical way, and to bring into 
question the methods of scientists.  Saalback wanted to accomplish this again 
more than a decade later.  
In this symposium, scholars attempted to pose questions of ethics and 
dialectic, i.e., questions of rhetoric, back into the public forum, but this could only 
be done after Communist professors had been removed from the equation.  Allen 
ensured that membership in the Communist Party was outside the realm of 
academic debate.  Most universities—especially state supported ones—followed 
this precedent.  The NCTE reasserted this precedent in order to argue more 
effectively for teachers’ rights to use whatever methods and materials in the 
classroom would bring about better teaching.  While at this point in our history, 
the question of whether or not Communist professors should have been allowed to 
teach in our institutions may be purely academic, I believe that universities should 
have backed the AAUP’s argument and allowed Communist professors to keep 
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their jobs, providing they had broken no laws.  If it had been proven that any of 
these professors had used their positions of power to proselytize in the classroom, 
then academic tenure committees could have addressed those individual cases.  In 
any case, Communist Party membership was not sufficient grounds for removal.  
I am willing to concede the point, however, that it would have been nearly 
impossible for individual professors to stand up for the rights of this small 
minority in our institutions.  Had we stood up collectively, we might be able to 
more effectively steer the direction of our field today against other types of 
administrative pressures, but this is merely an idealistic afterthought.  Because of 
the pressures of Red Scare politics, it is possible that leftists had little choice but 
to make concessions to the political climate.  The AAUP’s absolute inertia, their 
failure to respond to the firings of hundreds of tenured and untenured faculty 
across the country, is a tragic story too long and too complex to take up in this 
project.33  Suffice it to say that academics had little or no support in this matter, 
and it is certainly much easier to see now what could have been done differently.  
There is, however, the final matter of what materials and methods should 
be encouraged in the composition classroom today.  These issues, which resonate 
directly with the historical period in which we have been immersed, still feel 
remarkably current—especially when we consider the range of debates that 
emerged in the ’90s about the function of composition in the university.  The 
conclusion of this work, therefore, is dedicated to the role of first-year 
33
 See Schrecker’s No Ivory Tower, pp 308-337.
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composition as it relates to empiricism, progressivism, and humanism in 
university epistemology.
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Conclusion: Humanism, Empiricism, Progressivism, and Composition 
Curriculum materials and methods of first-year composition have been a 
site of contention for as long as composition courses have been required.  This 
dissertation has illustrated what shape this contention took during the early Cold 
War era.  In the years 1934-1954, the political atmosphere curbed teachers’ 
freedom to use the best elements of humanist, empirical, and progressive teaching 
philosophies.  This repression cannot fail to remind us of more recent arguments 
about the materials and methods allowed in first-year composition.  In the early 
1990s, Maxine Hairston published a highly controversial essay in The Chronicle 
of Higher Education that argued against making the required writing course at the 
University of Texas at Austin a course on racism and sexism.  This controversy 
received nationwide attention, as the Texas State legislature ultimately stepped in 
and forbade the curriculum.  A decade later, controversies about the role of 
politics in university classrooms have emerged again after 9/11.  While there is 
not space in the conclusion of this work to outline the full complexities of these 
recently emerging arguments, we can connect these discussions to the ways that 
composition and communication scholars responded to the politically repressive 
early Cold War era.  From these connections, we can speculate on what aims and 
methods we should, as compositionists, assert in a post- 9/11 environment.  
In 1950, in the midst of Red Scare politics, composition and 
communication scholars argued for a set of objectives that were connected to the 
broader social and cultural sphere.  Composition and communication scholars 
wanted students to be able to present logical and organized essays, but both 
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communication and composition scholars acknowledged, in some way, that these 
concepts had to be connected to social contexts.  Both camps wanted students to 
be able to distinguish between different appeals, but the assumptions held by 
teachers of composition and communication courses were often different from 
one another.  Generally speaking, communication scholars favored the analysis 
and production of texts that had more immediate social purposes.  Their methods 
were also more permissive, working with the assumption that students produce 
better writing when they are more actively engaged in their learning processes.  
While some humanist scholars in the composition camp were more comfortable 
teaching essay genres to students, others saw in literature a way of bringing 
students to more forceful and effective expression.   
It is difficult, looking back at the early years of CCCC, to directly translate 
these aims and methods to composition studies today.  Argumentation was not at 
the center of composition theory as it is now at many universities.  Kenneth 
Burke’s 1951 proposal is an early argument for placing rhetoric at the center of 
composition and communication courses.  It upsets the binary between 
composition and communication by providing a method for reading both literary 
and nonliterary texts as forms of persuasion.  Furthermore, his proposal connects 
writing more directly to ethics through the principle of identification.  
If we believe what composition historians tell us, it will not be until the 
sixties and beyond that this type of social-epistemic rhetoric will gain any ground 
at all in the academy.  Berlin’s last work reflects frustration at what little progress 
we, as scholars dedicated to social justice, have gained in the field of composition 
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and rhetoric.  The binary between rhetoric and poetics continues to impose its 
clandestine violence on those who have not had the luxury of being part of the 
dominant culture in the United States.  Proposals such as the one at the University 
of Texas at Austin hoped to confront this problem directly by placing issues of 
race and gender at the very center of first-year composition.  While this proposal 
was grounded in some part of composition and rhetoric theory, it lost sight of 
public and administrative expectations about the purpose and function of writing 
instruction in the academy.  
Maxine Hairston attempted to address these expectations when she
asserted her beliefs about the objectives for first-year writing.  “As a writing 
specialist and teacher for 20 years and as a former president of the Conference on 
College Composition and Communication,” Hairston writes,  
I believe required college writing courses should teach students to:
• Use writing as a tool for discovering and organizing knowledge.
• Become critical thinkers by learning to articulate their ideas in writing 
and then refine those ideas through revision.
• Become confident writers who use logic and rhetoric to communicate 
their thoughts clearly.  (B1)
While the UT Austin proposal fails to speak directly to student writing-related 
needs, student-centeredness is readily apparent in Hairston’s response.  In the first 
objective, students are to use writing as a form of inquiry, a tool for coming to 
judgments.  In the second and third objectives, students are to articulate their
ideas and communicate their thoughts by using logic and rhetoric.  Generally 
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speaking, Hairston’s emphasis on students’ interests and concerns reflects the 
progressive emphasis on working with individual student needs, interests, and 
values.  This commendable emphasis places her objectives in what early 
communication scholars called “the permissive.”
For our purposes, Hairston’s proposal is important because it shows that 
composition can still use permissive epistemology to protect itself from 
conservative critiques.  From the conservative perspective, a required composition 
course based on the subject matter of race and gender lends itself to a leftist 
indoctrination of students.  Given this rhetorical situation, it makes sense to 
emphasize permissive goals in a public forum.  By accusing the writers of the UT 
Austin proposal of retreating “from everything we’ve learned about teaching 
writing in the past 15 years” (B1), she presents composition studies as a more 
permissive discipline.  
While she is correct to point out that our research has proven that students 
write better when they can work with their own interests, she fails to connect her 
objectives to an important component of first-year composition: introducing 
students to the type of writing they will be required to do in the academy.  Shortly 
after the UT Austin controversy, Donald Lazare published an essay that addresses 
this problem and presents a solution that he hopes will give both liberals and 
conservatives what they want in terms of first-year composition.  In “Teaching the 
Political Conflicts: A Rhetorical Schema,” he argues that a primary reason that 
the University of Texas at Austin (and the University of Massachusetts at 
Amherst) experienced disputes over whether or not they could address racism and 
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sexism in first-year composition courses was that “little basis has been established 
within the disciple of composition delineating either a theoretical framework or 
ethical guidelines for dealing with political controversies in writing courses” 
(194).  While he is certainly correct to point out that we have not established a 
stable ground in our field for dealing with political controversy, this study 
suggests that there has been, historically, an attempt to suppress the establishment 
of this ground since our field’s very beginnings.  
Lazare proposes that we use Gerald Graff’s theory of “teaching the 
conflicts” in the first-year composition classroom.  This way, composition 
instructors could introduce
as explicit subject matter, the issues of political partisanship and bias, as 
examples of the subjective, socially constructed elements in perceptions of 
reality and of the way ideology consciously or unconsciously pervades 
teaching, learning, and other influential realms of public discourse, 
including news reporting, mass culture, and of course political rhetoric 
itself.  (195)
By making language and ideology an explicit subject in the first-year composition 
classroom, Lazare believes that “the left agenda of prompting students to question 
the subjectivity underlying socially constructed modes of thinking can be 
reconciled with the conservative agenda of objectivity and nonpartisanship” 
(196).  Bias can be transformed in this environment “through dialectical 
exchanges with those of differing ideologies” (196).  This may work well in 
theory, but I do not believe that his proposal goes far enough toward using the 
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best of humanist, empirical, and progressive teaching philosophies in the first-
year composition classroom.  The reasons for this will become clear when we 
investigate the practical aspects of his proposal.  
Lazare, like composition scholars in the past, turns to General Semantics 
for a solution to the problem of dealing with controversial topics in the classroom.  
Instead of using this theory to get students to realize how “judgments stop 
thoughts” and that “reports are the highest form of persuasion,” however, he has 
students consider the definitions—denotations and connotations—of controversial 
terms in order to direct students to the ways in which these terms are used for 
rhetorical purposes.34  By having students investigate how the meanings of 
controversial terms shift according to their rhetorical contexts, he avoids the 
trappings of objectivism.  In fact, by having students interrogate definitions and 
how they are used, he shows that pure objectivity is impossible.  
This opening unit then proceeds to three closely related ones.  The first 
explores the psychological blocks to critical thinking.  The goal of this unit works 
with “the hypothesis that many students have lived all their lives in a parochial 
circle of people who all have pretty much the same set of beliefs, so that they are 
inclined to accept a culturally conditioned consensus of values as objective, 
uncontested truth” (200).  As it was in Kenneth Burke’s proposal, objectivity and 
its impossibility becomes the subject of the course, encouraging students to see 
the ways that “we are all inclined to tailor our ‘objective’ beliefs to the shape of 
34
 Lazare suggests the following controversial terms: “conservatism,” 
“liberalism,” “radicalism,” “right wing,” “left wing,” “fascism,” “plutocracy,” 
“capitalism,” “socialism,” “communism,” “Marxism,” “patriotism,” “democracy,” 
“totalitarianism,” “freedom,” and “free enterprise.”  (197-98)
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our self-interest” (200).  The second unit mirrors the epistemological assumptions 
of the first unit, but helps students learn to recognize these tendencies in the texts 
of authorities (journalists, scholars, researchers, politicians, business leaders, etc.).  
The third unit then moves students toward locating these biases in a subject that is 
of interest to them.  
When we lay out what Lazare wants to accomplish in this type of 
composition class, we can see that he translates many of the objectives of 
composition in 1950 into the more rhetorically based conceptions of first-year 
composition we have today.  He shows students that truth is related to audience 
through persuasion and teaches them to recognize this aspect of persuasion in the 
writings of other people.  
As a way of making sure that his readers do not think his proposal is an 
“invitation to total relativity or skepticism” (202),35 Lazare makes it clear, as he 
nears the end of his proposal, that 
students are asked in the conclusion to their term papers not to make a 
final and absolute judgment on which side is right and wrong about the 
issue at hand, but to make a balanced summary of the strong and weak
points made by each of the limited number of sources they have studied, 
and then to make—and support—their judgment about which sources have 
presented the best-reasoned case and the most thorough refutation of the 
other side’s arguments.  (202)
35
 This, we may remember, was the criticism that Kenneth Oliver made about 
teaching methods based on General Semantics.
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This gesture ties in directly to academic discourse conventions and the 
expectation on the part of academic audiences that writers give reasoned 
arguments and support.  This focus also helps the teachers of the course to 
separate political beliefs from their grading because students are graded in this 
schema on “the quality of students’ support for their judgments—regardless of 
what those judgments may be” (202).  
I generally believe that Lazare’s proposal begins to bring together some of 
the best elements of empiricism with the best of humanism.  In his schema, 
students are invited to think of themselves as researchers engaged in a limited 
study and are required to come to some judgment based on the data they have in 
front of them.  This reflects some of the best that an empirical teaching 
philosophy has to offer us in the field of composition.  This proposal also engages 
an element of humanism, in that it encourages students to engage in self-dialectic 
based on their readings of cultural texts—in this case, texts with more immediate 
social purposes.  The extent to which this proposal could be considered 
progressive would depend on two things.  First, it would depend on what extent 
that students were allowed to find their own topics and questions about these 
issues in the classroom.  Second, it would depend on how well students engage 
the social realm, how much students are thrown into dialectic with other members 
of the class and finally to what extent this dialectic could be brought into 
engagement with the broader social sphere.  
It is unfortunate that Lazare does not address these two points in his 
proposal.  Hairston’s reassertion of the student-centered focus in composition 
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studies cannot be overemphasized.  The primary danger of introducing political 
topics into the composition classroom is that it threatens to circumscribe this 
essential component of good writing instruction.   When introducing topics into 
the composition classroom, we must make sure that we are aiding, not inhibiting, 
the invention process of students.  We also have to make sure that the texts we 
introduce into our classes provide a wide enough spectrum of opposing 
viewpoints for students to be able to find their own places within them.    
With this in mind, I would like for us to consider, as a way of concluding 
this project, two final objectives, ones that logically follow from Hairston and 
Lazare’s discussions of first-year composition.  These objectives are to have 
students:
• as democratic citizens, listen to, understand, and consider opposing 
viewpoints, and 
• discriminate between arguments that are worth affirming and those 
that are not worth affirming in a democracy.  
Under even the most ideal circumstances, these objectives are harder to achieve. 
They more explicitly move students into citizenship, finding one’s place in and 
participating in the democratic community to which we all belong.  Lazare’s 
proposal, fundamentally humanist in nature, addresses the first of these two by 
creating a final project that requires students to consider all sides of an issue 
before coming to judgment about who made the most reasonable suggestion.  His 
proposal fails, however, to address the final, most progressively oriented 
objective.
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In a democratic classroom, very fruitful discussions and writings can and 
should emerge around the topic of what type of arguments can be affirmed and 
what types of arguments cannot be affirmed in a democracy.  It is through this 
question that we, as composition teachers, can still seek to improve society 
through education.  As early as 1939, Herbert Weisinger agued that “a university 
in a democracy should teach the meaning of democracy.”  It is far better for us in 
the field of composition and rhetoric today to use this argument against the 
recurrent elements of Red Scare politics that continue to suppress the best 
potential of composition classes, the pressures that promise to make “current-
traditional rhetoric” into a paradigm I would like to dub “recurrent-traditional 
rhetoric.” 
Our purpose in this investigation, after all, is not what John McCumber 
claims is his in Time in the Ditch.  While McCumber explicitly calls for a 
philosophical approach that would, in his words, “enrage Raymond B. Allen” 
(132, italics his), I contend that this gives polemicists like Allen too much power.  
To structure our writing courses in America on the basis of what would enrage the 
more conservative elements of our culture today only feeds into the type of 
ideological battle they seem to want, a battle that is based in metaphors of fear 
and violence. 
Our courses should be based on principles, not on reactions.  That is why I 
contend that what we want, no matter how repressive or permissive the political 
climate becomes, is the freedom to establish a contextually bound relationship 
between humanist, empirical, and progressive teaching philosophies in the first-
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year composition classroom.  While Weisinger believed that scientific method 
alone would help ensure that our teaching not become propagandistic, which may 
be another way of saying it would help ensure that teachers not indoctrinate their 
students, I contend that it is through the balance between humanism, empiricism, 
and progressivism that indoctrination—and unwarranted accusations of 
indoctrination—can be best avoided.
For our purposes, the balance between these three teaching philosophies 
will help us to draw clearer, more distinct lines between teaching from our own 
perspectives and indoctrination.  If students are to fully engage the possibilities of 
the rhetorical tradition, they have to be introduced to a wide range of arguments.  
Therefore, the humanist reliance on cultural texts and the dialectic those texts 
generate in students is essential.  The progressive turn toward the social helps the 
teacher avoid indoctrination by ensuring that she or he is not providing all of the 
perspectives in the classroom.  In this way, our perspectives will take some part in 
shaping what we teach, but by dialoging with our students and by keeping our 
students in dialog with one another, we may even find that our own perspectives 
change.  Empiricism allows us to engage in limited and definable methods of 
proving knowledge.  As set forth in Lazare’s proposal, the establishment of clear 
objectives and ways of assessing those objectives also allows us to keep our 
perspectives from getting in the way of grading our students fairly.  On a less 
practical note, empiricism also gives us methods to arrive at and standards by 
which to judge truth, as these can be mutually agreed and or agreed-to-be-
disagreed upon, in the classroom.
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While this relationship can be described theoretically, it is very difficult to 
achieve in actual practice.  This is not surprising.  “Rhetoric,” as Aristotle made 
clear in his treatise on the subject, “is a [counterpart] to the art of dialectic” (1.1).  
It also happens to be, if we take Richard Weaver’s word for it, an offshoot of 
ethical studies.36  Any system of composition studies that fails to introduce 
students to the full range of rhetoric gives students a limited frame for seeing how 
the writing process relates to their roles as democratic citizens.  This means that 
we, as composition teachers, must create the most democratic atmosphere 
possible in our classrooms.  The biggest difficulty for teachers will be to 
determine what balance between these three teaching philosophies is needed in 
each particular case.  Nevertheless, assessing the individual needs of students is 
one of our most important responsibilities, and just because it is a difficult one 
does not mean that we should not embark upon it.  
This historical study has shown the ways that the early Cold War 
atmosphere circumscribed writing instruction by reducing humanist, empirical, 
and progressive teaching philosophies to formalist, objectivist, and permissive 
teaching philosophies, respectively.  These reductions made the already difficult 
task of achieving the objectives that CCCC asserted at its first meeting 
impossible.  By the mid-fifties, however, domestic anticommunism quieted in the 
American political arena.  Cronin argues that it was the success of the American 
economy that softened Red Scare politics (75).  McCarthy may have been useful 
for getting a Republican administration elected in 1952, but by 1954 he was 
36
 See Richard Weaver’s Ethics of Rhetoric for this translation of Aristotle’s well-
known phrase.
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simply an embarrassment to the Senate, House, and President alike.  Although the 
Senate censured McCarthy in 1954, the effects of Red Scare politics on the field 
of English did not simply disappear when McCarthy fell.  That is why we must, in 
a post 9/11 environment, continue to work against the ways that the political 
atmosphere threatens to circumscribe our abilities to be effective and ethical 
teachers.37
In an as-of-yet-unpublished manuscript titled Toward a Vocative History: 
The Dialectic of Politics and Ethics in English Studies, James Comas connects the 
political atmosphere of the late forties and early fifties to changes in the field of 
English.  Though his study deals primarily with literary criticism and how the 
early forties and fifties brought about New Criticism, his discussion of politics 
and ethics proves to be essential to the conclusion of this study:  
Since ethics and politics name basic categories of human relations, we 
would have to acknowledge that much of our lives are spent responding to 
ethical and political matters.  Moreover, the history of English Studies 
tells us, in ways we often forget or no longer hear, that scholars and 
teachers have been especially attentive to “ethical” or “political” matters 
throughout the range of their professional duties.  (9-10)
37
 My decision to engage the topic of Cold War effects on university writing 
instruction was affirmed after the publication of the American Council of Trustees 
and Alumni’s Defending Civilization: How Our Universities Are Failing America 
and What Can Be Done About It.  In the name of “academic freedom, quality, and 
accountability,” the ACTA employs what appears to be the same browbeating and 
bullying tactics as the worst of our country’s Red Scare demagogues.  
241
Comas hopes to reintroduce a more dialectical relationship between ethics and 
politics in English Studies.  My concerns in the conclusion of this chapter reflect 
his, but apply more specifically to first-year composition, a course that finally has 
to be more concerned with ethics because it is required.  As teachers of one of the 
few courses required of all incoming students, we must continue to argue for the 
importance of a rhetorical education that engages the social and political sphere.  
We cannot, however, lose sight of the ethics of teaching as well.  A better vision 
of democracy may prove to be the only ground on which we should make our 
case.  
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